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ABSTRACT
The Chilean military performed a distinctive role 
during the late eighteenth century— it was engaged in an 
on-going frontier war against the Araucanian Indians, a 
conflict which over a period of nearly three centuries had 
diminished but not subsided. This was in sharp contrast to 
other areas of Spanish America where the subjugation of the 
native race had been completed in a few years after the 
conquest. While other colonies were approaching the zenith 
of their development, Chile was engaged in a debilitating 
war of attrition along its southern frontier.
As a result of its active role in protecting Spanish 
society, the military became one of the most influential 
institutions of the colony. This prominence was character­
ized by the presence of a continuously mobilized army, a 
network of forts along the Araucanian frontier, and a 
military budget which nearly equaled all other expenses of 
the colonial treasury combined. Throughout the South, all 
of these features combined to create a strong military 
tradition, personified by the intimate association between 
the army and society.
Most of the army was stationed in the South, a 
factor which largely isolated it from contact with the
capital of Chile and the mainstream of its society. However, 
there was also a great deal of status isolation, brought on 
by the army's predatory role and a reputation for crime and 
corruption. Lawlessness and violence within the army were 
closely linked to the rough frontier existence and were also 
factors which set the military apart culturally from the 
rest of the colony.
One of the most influential features in the develop­
ment of the Chilean army was the dominant role played by 
Peru. The influence of the viceroys was solidified through 
the situado, a mechanism for supplying the isolated garrisons 
in the far South. This, combined with Peruvian jurisdiction 
over the fortresses of Valdivia and Chilo6, partially drove 
a wedge between the army and the government in Santiago.
These characteristics of the colonial army were 
influential in the formation of its political loyalties 
during the early phase of the independence movement, or the 
patria vieja (1810-1814). They were factors which ultimately 
turned the army against the patriot forces and made it a 
staunch arm of the royalist cause.
After the creation of the first patriot junta in 
Santiago in 1810, the veteran forces in the South became 
even more distant from the capital and the course of the 
liberal movement. In Santiago, the civilian militia and 
creole aristocracy emerged as the base of a new patriot
viii
array, which rivaled the regular veteran forces in size. 
Enthusiasm for the independence movement and efforts by 
political leaders (such as Jose Miguel Carrera) to insure 
their continued political power, made possible the creation 
of this new army. While the veteran troops in the South 
should have logically served as the nucleus for the new 
army, they were almost completely disregarded. Dissension 
and rivalry between competing patriot factions and preoccupa­
tion with the defense of the capital against possible 
royalist invasion from Peru prevented the army of the South 
from being incorporated into the patriot camp and left it 
dangerously exposed to Peruvian subversion.
When hostilities broke out in 1813, Chile was split 
into a patriot north and a royalist south. The success of 
the royalist forces in counteracting the patriot movement 
was directly related to the loyalty of the veteran troops in 
the South to the king. This was due to the army's tradi­
tional geographic and status isolation from central Chile 
and a long history of economic and administrative dependence 
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The objectives of this study are twofold: first, to
examine the Chilean military during the late eighteenth 
century, especially with regard to its basic characteristics 
and its role in colonial society; and second, to ascertain 
how this colonial role influenced the army's political 
orientation during the early phase of the independence move­
ment, or the period known as the patria vieja (1810-1814).
The army is defined as veteran troops, those regular 
soldiers paid by the crown and serving on a full-time basis. 
Very little research has been done on its organization and 
structure. American scholars have limited their research to 
the Araucanian Indians and cultural aspects of their 
struggles with the Spanish. Surprisingly, few Chilean 
scholars have undertaken investigations of the eighteenth- 
century army, despite the existence of a long military 
tradition in colonial society. For the most part, they have 
concentrated only on specific aspects of its organization.
The most comprehensive Chilean study is that of 
Roberto Onat and Carlos Roa, Regimen legal del ej6rcito en 
el reino de Chile, a general study of the army throughout 
the colonial period which emphasizes the effect of Spanish 
military legislation on the Chilean army. A work by
xii
Jorge de Allendesalazar Arrau, Ej^rcito y milicias del reino 
de Chile, 1737-1815, is largely a survey of the genealogy of 
veteran and militia officers. Another Chilean, Pedro Toledo 
S&nchez, has examined the application of Spanish military 
penal codes in the colony in his book Esquema del derecho 
penal militar indiano y su jurisprudencia chilena. Also of 
value are several works by the Jesuit priest, Gabriel 
Guarda, concerning the history of southern Chile and the 
fortress of Valdivia.
Each of these works has contributed to an under­
standing of a particular aspect of the subject. However, 
there is a need to combine these various topics into a 
cohesive, overall concept of the army and its role in 
society. This encompasses more than simply a blow-by-blow 
narrative of the Araucanian wars. Recent emphasis on such 
topics as the racial composition and socioeconomic back­
ground of the troops, the political effects of Bourbon 
military reforms in America, and conflicts between the army 
and civilian institutions, are increasingly important for an 
understanding of the military as an institution in society. 
These studies also help to isolate colonial factors which 
may have determined military behavior during the independence 
period and the subsequent development of praetorianism. This 
specialized study of the Chilean military is a contribution 
to the growing reservoir of knowledge of the colonial armed 
forces in America.
xiii
The thesis of this dissertation is that the army in 
the south of Chile was royalist in 1813 because of geographi­
cal, cultural, and status isolation from central Chile and a 
tradition of economic and administrative dependence on Peru. 
This is significant in that the initial phase of the inde­
pendence movement, and to a large extent the wars which 
lasted until 1820, consisted of a division between a patriot 
north and a royalist south. The army in the South comprised 
a majority of all the colony's forces, nearly all of whom 
followed the royalist banner. These forces were the deciding 
factor in the initial defeat of the patriot army in 1814, 
and they were the backbone of the royalist opposition in the 
protracted struggle which followed.
The first part of this dissertation is a study of 
several basic features of the Chilean army which character­
ized its colonial existence. Foremost among these was the 
distinct geographic and cultural separation of the southern 
army from the center of colonial population in the central 
valley and the Santiago area. Most of the troops were 
isolated along the southern frontier or in coastal garrisons, 
effectively segregated from the mainstream of society in 
central Chile. The rigors of army life bred a soldiery that 
was frequently undisciplined, prone to corruption and 
violence, and professionally lax. Numerous soldiers were 
former convicts, impressed into the service to fulfill 
manpower shortages. Social flux within the army accentuated
xiv
its isolation from the capital and earned it a reputation as 
a predatory institution. Because the coastal fortresses in 
the South were supplied and administered from Peru, the 
troops there inevitably developed closer ties with the 
viceroys in Lima than with the Chilean government.
The second part of this work deals with the role of 
the army during the first three years of Chilean indepen­
dence, up to the Peruvian invasion in 1813. The majority of 
studies of this period have emphasized the patriot viewpoint 
and events in Santiago, center of the movement for autonomy 
from Spain. There has been a corresponding neglect with the 
participation of the South, perhaps because of its royalist 
sympathies and reactionist stance. Yet, the South was the 
scene of equally vigorous political movements, one of which 
occurred within the military. In part, the royalist 
attitudes of officers in 1813 was due to internal dissension 
within the patriot camp and the failure to actively court 
the political support of this influential institution. The 
personal ambitions of Jos6 Miguel Carrera and other leaders 
led to a series of revolts in Santiago during 1811 and 1812, 
resulting in complete disregard for the potential of the 
southern forces. Political discord between the provinces of 
Concepcidn and Santiago was another powerful factor in the 
neglect of strong veteran forces in Valdivia, Chilod, and 
along the Bio Bio River.
However, there had always been a pervading royalist
xv
sentiment in the army, instilled by factors of its colonial 
existence„ Geographic segregation from the capital, close 
ties with Peru, and the volatile character of army life were 
not conducive to strong bonds with Santiago. A steady flow 
of peninsular or Peruvian officers to the southern forts 
almost guaranteed troop loyalty to the crown.
Research for this study was carried out in the 
National Archives in Santiago, Chile, during 1973-1974, with 
the assistance of a research fellowship from the Organization 
of American States. Primary sources constituted a major 
portion of the materials analyzed, and among the more useful 
archival collections were those of the Capitania General,
Real Audiencia, and the Contaduria Mayor. Of additional aid 
were the holdings of the Sala Medina in the Biblioteca 
Nacional. Of particular use were the Coleccibn de documentos 
in6ditos para la historia de Chile, original documents 
transcribed by the historian Jos6 T. Medina.
A number of published documents proved useful, one 
of which was the Coleccidn de historiadores y de documentos
-   .......................- I Mil llll Ill I I r - Ml lllTt 1 ' --------------------------------------------- -----
para la historia nacional, relating to the colonial history 
of Chile. Included in this collection are such works as the 
Relacidn hist6rico-ieogr£fica del reino de Chile, by the 
army officer Vicente Carvallo y Goyeneche. This is an 
extremely rich source of data about the army, as perceived 
by a participant in the frontier Indian campaigns. First­
hand accounts and diaries of soldiers have been used
xvi
whenever possible to gain a picture of how the military 
functioned.
Another useful collection of documents used was the 
Coleccibn de historiadores y documentos relativos a la 
independencia de Chile. This contains many of the important 
papers relating to the independence period, including the 
acts of the various governing juntas. For a general inter­
pretation of the colonial period, the Historia general de 
Chile of Diego Barros Arana has been followed most closely.
xvii
Chapter 1
ARMY ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION
The war between the Spanish and Indians in southern 
Chile lasted throughout the colonial period, considerably 
influencing the course of the colony's development. At the 
time of the Spanish arrival the aboriginal population 
numbered perhaps 500,000.1 The most notable of the tribes 
were the Araucanians, an appellation which the Spanish
improperly applied to all of the natives living in southern
2Chile. Unlike the Incas or more advanced races, the 
Araucanians never attained a high degree of social or 
political organization. The very simplicity of their 
tribal structure rendered them nearly unconquerable by the 
Spanish, as there was no central government which could be 
toppled to bring about the surrender of all its subjects. 
Each tribe was an autonomous unit which must be subdued 
individually.
The conqueror of Chile, Pedro de Valdivia, stood
1Preston James, Latin America (4th ed.; New York: 
Odyssey Press, 1969), 548.
^Louis C. Paron, The Mapuche Indians of Chile (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968),9.
1
apart from many of his colleagues by his intellect and
farsightedness. In contrast to the widespread greed for
gold of that time, he envisioned Chile as a land of future
agricultural wealth, of colonists who would reap the more
3lasting benefits of the soil. He was an ambitious man, 
however, and in his zeal to pacify the land, he committed an 
error common to many early Spanish— he attempted to conquer 
too much territory with too few resources. From the 
founding of Santiago in 1540 until his death in 1553, he
founded eight cities in the heart of Araucanian lands, all
4isolated and defended by only a handful of soldiers. His 
ultimate goal was that of conquering all the territory down 
to the southern tip of the continent (see Map 1).
Valdivia persuaded himself that he had reduced the 
colony to Spanish control, when in fact he had only 
imprudently diffused his troops throughout a vast, hostile 
territory. After an initial period of shock, the Araucanians 
regrouped their forces and launched an implacable war which 
was to continue intermittently until the end of the colonial 
period. This proliferation of frontier settlements, without 
adequate colonists to populate them, was one of the great
^Luis Galdames, A History of Chile (New York:
Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), 39.
^Alamiro de Avila Martel, "Regimen juridica de la 
guerra de Arauco," III Congreso del Instituto Internacional 
de Historia del Derecho Indiano (Madrid: In'stituto Nacional
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5mistakes committed by the early Spanish.
The overextension of Spanish civilization into 
hostile Indian lands affected the entire development of the 
southern half of the colony. During the early 1600's, a 
chain of forts was constructed, stretching from the foot­
hills of the Andes mountains to the sea, along the Bio Bio 
River (see Map 2). By fortifying this perimeter it was 
hoped that Spanish settlements to the north could be pro­
tected, and that this line could be gradually pushed south­
ward as the Indians were either pacified or conquered. Yet, 
the colonizing force of the Spanish was not forthcoming;
there was an acute shortage of settlers, and the Indians
7stubbornly resisted the colonization of their lands.
In the 17008s, this line of forts remained roughly 
the same as it had in previous times, and the lands to the
^Miguel Luis Amun&tegui, Los precursores de la 
independenc ia de Chile (Santiago; Imprenta Barcelona,
1910), II, 65-66.
®The strategy of a fortified line along the Bio Bio 
River was part of a broad policy of defensive warfare imple­
mented during the term of President Alonso de Ribera (1601- 
1605) . A short interlude of peace followed, but hostilities 
had resumed by 1613. The Bio Bio remained the demarcation 
line between Indian and Spanish lands until the end of the 
1700 8s (Eugene H. Korth, S.J., Spanish Policy in Colonial 
Chile. The Struggle for Social Justice, 1535-1700 [Stanford 
Stanford University Press, 1968], 121-23.
7For a Spanish account of the sixteenth and seven­
teenth century Araucanian wars, see Alonso de Ovalle, 
Histbrica relacibn del reyno de Chile (Santiago: Editorial
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Layout of the Fort of Los Angeles, 1794*
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south were hardly more than uncharted forests.8 Valdivia, 
Concepcidn, the frontier forts and settlements on the island 
of Chilo6, all continued their solitary existence. However, 
they were isolated in the heart of Indian lands, deprived of 
commercial and social contact with the rest of the colony 
and forced into a crude, backward existence. Thus, a 
principal tenet of Spanish military policy widened to include 
not only territorial expansion but also the defense of 
existing settlements in the South.
By the mid-1700's, the veteran army consisted of 
roughly 1,700 men. The wars of attrition of previous times 
had subsided to the level of an uneasy truce, marked by 
occasional outbreaks of violence. During the course of the 
century, there were only a handful of what could properly be 
called Indian revolts and only two major, extended clashes 
(1723 and 1767). The situation was more indicative of what 
the Chilean historian Mario G6ngora terms a "little war"-— an
interminable procession of cattle thievery, robbery,
9smuggling, and occasional killings. Still, this violence 
was a sufficient threat to necessitate a standing army.
In terms of strategic location, the army was divided
8During the 1700 's there were approximately eighteen 
of these forts in operation. For a description of these, 
their construction, defenses and population, see "Instruc- 
cidn y noticia...," [c 1755], Doc. No. 4292, JMDI,
CLXXXVIII, 14-25.
QMario Gdngora, Vagabundaje y sociedad fronteriza en 
Chile, Monograph of the Centro de Estudios Socioecondmicas, 
Universidad de Chile, Santiago (1966), No. 2, 22.
8
into two broad groups. In the far south was one portion, 
consisting of an infantry battalion on the island of Chilod 
and another battalion in the coastal fortress of Valdivia. 
Together, they comprised almost forty percent of all veteran 
forces and were primarily designated to protect the coasts 
against corsairs or European invasion. Both garrisons were 
segregated from the rest of the colony by the Indian lands 
and were regularly supplied by the Peruvian viceroy. Near 
Concepcidn was stationed the second major division of the 
army, guarding the chain of forts along the Bio Bio River.
The presiding chief of the army was the president,
who did not necessarily have to possess a career background
in the army. His additional title of captain-general made
him the automatic commander-in-chief of all military
forces.10 Below him were four military governors, each
appointed by the king and each entrusted with the civil
11administration and military security of his district. 
Foremost among these was the Intendant of Concepcidn 
(usually of brigadier rank), whose jurisdiction included the 
entire southern half of the colony. Following him was the 
governor of Valdivia, likewise a brigadier or colonel, who 
governed the town and its infantry battalion. The governor
lOThe leader of the colony combined in his person 
the positions of governor, captain-general of the army, and 
president of the audiencia, and could be referred to by any 
one of these titles.
11Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile 
(Santiago: Rafael Jover, 1884-1902), VII, 341.
9
of Valparaiso administered a similar jurisdiction but one of 
less prestige, for the only regular troops under his command 
was a single company of artillerymen. Finally, there was a 
governor on the island of Juan Fernandez, in charge of a 
handful of soldiers and several hundred civilian resi­
dents.^
Infantry comprised the major branch of the army, and
its troops bore the brunt of the Indian attacks along the
frontier. It was composed of two battalions, one stationed
in Concepcibn and one in Valdivia. The Valdivia battalion
was composed of six companies of whites, or soldiers of
sangre limpia. and one caste company, the compania de 
13pardos. The latter was alternately referred to as the 
compania de obreros. as its lower racial status relegated 
the members to performing menial tasks and doubling as con­
struction laborers. Because Valdivia served as a penal 
colony, its battalion contained many convict draftees who 
were of decidedly lower quality than other enlisted troops.̂  
The batallbn fijo, or fixed battalion of Concepcibn, had 
originally been a unit of peninsular troops and was composed 
of eight companies of fusiliers and one of grenadiers.
These companies were distributed throughout the various forts
12Ibid., 341.
l3"Razbn de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM, XLIX, No. 5.
■^^Lucas Molina to President 0 'Higgins, Valdivia, 
October 15, 1792, AMV. XXI, 318.
10
along the Bio Bio River, with one company being stationed on
15the island of Juan Femiadez.
Mounted dragoons composed the second major division
within the army. Dragoons were a product of the sixteenth-
century French army, originally consisting of .mounted
arcabus troops capable of fighting either on horse or on
foot.'*'® Chilean horse troops were identical in their
armament, possessing both a musket and sabre, whereas regular
17cavalry used only swords and pikes. The bulk of these
troops were formed into the escuadra de dragones de la 
frontera (frontier dragoon squadron), consisting of eight 
companies distributed throughout the forts along the 
frontier. An additional company of dragoons was stationed 
in Santiago, known as the compania de dragones de la Reina 
Luisa. This company was created by President Manuel de Amat 
y Junient in 1758 as a police force to combat rampant crime
•IQin the capital, which the militia could not contain.
Several decades later. President Gabriel de Aviles found 
that the original company was insufficient for the needs of 
patroling and police duty, and in 1797 increased the force
15"Raz6n de los Sueldos..., 1800, " ACM, XLIX, No. 3.
■*"®Barros Arana, Historia general, VI, 393.
^ Ibid. According to a review of 1808, each dragoon 
possessed three horses, two of his own and one furnished by 
the crown ("Revista de..., 1808," ACM, CCVI).
•*-®Royal c6dula of October 12, 1760, Doc. No. 8773, 
JMDI. CCXCII.
19by thirty additional men, all foot soldiers.
Admittance to this company was a mark of social dis­
tinction . Membership was restricted to appointment only,
and the applicants were of upper-class origin, endowed with
20the title of "don." Their duties were not only con­
stabulary, but included serving as the president's personal 
bodyguard, administering the customhouse and participating 
in public ceremonies. At times when European invasion 
appeared imminent, they were divided into picket detach­
ments to serve in the coastal ports.
The artillery branch was composed of three companies, 
one assigned to each of the coastal ports of Valparaiso, 
Concepcibn and Valdivia. In Spain, the artillery corps had
always enjoyed a unique status, much as the royal engineers,
21and qualified for privileges such as its own tribunals.
In Chile, the artillery companies were somewhat less than
special; if anything, they were set apart only because of
the inexperience and ineptitude of their members. There
were far too few artillerymen to be distributed among the
coastal garrisons, in some cases less than one man per 
22gun. Most of these men were of lower-class origins. They
^■0"Raz6n de los Sueldos..., 1800, " ACM. XLIX, No. 1.
20Jorge de Allendesalazar Arrau, Ejbrcito y milicias 
del reino de Chile, 1737-1815 (Santiago: Ministerio de
Defensa Nacional, 1960), 127.
21Ibid., 167.
22"Razbn de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM. XLIX, No. 7.
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were either enlisted or drafted from the regular infantry 
companies, hardly the best method of grooming skilled 
gunners* According to a military ordinance of 1753, artil­
lerymen were required to drill every two weeks in summer and 
once a month in winter, but due to shortages of ammunition 
and a general laxity in their training, there was little 
compliance with such regulations. J
A single company of officers and non-commissioned 
personnel was stationed in Santiago, called the asamblea de 
caballeria. Contrary to its title the company was not a
cavalry unit, but a group of instructors brought from Spain
24in 1768 to train civilian militia in the military arts.
The members of the company were assigned to the various
frontier towns or to northern port cities such as La Serena,
Coquimbo and Valparaiso, where they helped to bring the
militia up to the level of competent support troops for the
veterans. The king alone conferred commissions to this
small but prestigious unit, which was theoretically entrusted
25with the training of over 15,000 militia.
In response to the permanency of the Araucanian wars, 
the Spanish crown created a group of Indian officials to
23pemando Guarda Geywitz, Historia de Valdivia, 
1552-1952 (Santiago: Imprenta Cultura, 1953), 162.
^Allendesalazar, Ej6rcito y milicias, 126-27.
25Ibid.
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serve as liaison agents, interpreters and guardians of 
Indian welfare. Usually, these men were soldiers, theoret­
ically selected on the basis of their empathy with Indian 
problems and their ability to resolve disputes between the 
two races. The most important of these officials were the 
capitanes de amigos, or captains of friends, who were 
soldiers assigned to live among those tribes which had
Of,declared themselves peaceful to the Spanish. The position 
of capitan was roughly analogous to that of the corregidor, 
but adapted to the unique circumstances of Chile.
The Indian lands were the scene of much contraband 
trade between the tribes and itinerant merchants, which 
invariably led to quarrels and bloodshed as both sides
97attempted to cheat each other. Capitanes were charged 
with suppressing this illegal commerce before isolated dis­
putes escalated into war. The opportunities for self-gain 
naturally led to a certain amount of despotism among the 
captains, which was taken into consideration by their 
superiors. A just but practical captain could increase his 
meager income by serving as a commercial middleman, while at 
the same time generally promoting the Indians' welfare. 
Unfortunately, many were unscrupulous and a cause of 
animosity, rather than peace. They conspired with traders




28to defraud their wards or sold the Indians into slavery.
By 1800, the army remained constant at a level of 
around 2,000 men, distributed in the following manners
Table 1
Army Strength Around 1800, Including Staff,
Officers and Enlisted Men29
Units Personnel
Dragoon Company of the Reina Luisa (Santiago). . . .  84
Dragoon Squadron of the Frontier (Los Angeles) . . . 436
Infantry Battalion of the Frontier (Concepcibn). . . 689
Infantry Battalion of Valdivia .  .................. 535
Artillery Company of Valparaiso.................  64
Artillery Company of Concepcibn. . . . . . . . . . .  55
Artillery Company of Valdivia.......................  23
Asamblea de Caballeria (Santiago)................   . 50
TOTAL 1,936
The selection of upper-echelon military officers 
paralleled that of the civilian hierarchy; both were con­
trolled from Spain. The king had always reserved the 
immutable right of personally selecting such positions as 
president, audiencia oidores, treasury officers, as well as 
high-ranking army officers and members of the general staff.
2®Francisco Encina, Historia de Chile desde la
prehistoria hasta 1891 (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento,
1942-1952), IV, 473.
29,,Razbn de los Sueldos..., 1800, " ACM. XLIX, No. 5.
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The crown also jealously guarded the right of confirming 
many other civil posts and army personnel, some of whom were 
appointed from Peru.30
At the heart of this paternalism was the goal of 
implanting quality administration, but there was also a 
desire that positions of importance be occupied by penin­
sulars . This mentality was personified by the Spanish 
Minister of State, the Conde de Fioridablanca, whose 
suspicions of antimonarchial plots bordered on the 
manaical.3^ In an instrucei6n reservada of July 8, 1787, 
Floridablanca wrote that the use of peninsulars was designed 
to control sedition and rebellion on the part of the creoles. 
In his estimation, the veteran forces in the colonies were 
necessary to combat foreign invasions, but their primary 
function was in "maintaining good internal order."
Peninsular Spaniards were to be shown preference at all 
times as army officers and staff, and Spanish regulars should 
always be stationed in the "principal locations" to assure 
the loyalty of the army.
Positions of great military importance may have
W M M H W  N H M B a M B N M M M M U M H
30Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 341.
3^For a profile of Fioridablanca, see Richard Herr, 
The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press', 1958) ."
3^Amunategui, Los precursores, III, 19. The contents 
of instrucciOnes reservadas were of a classified nature and 
were transmitted only among higher government officials.
33Ibid.
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generally been the exclusive domain of peninsulars, but it 
is incorrect to assume that the crown systematically denied 
creoles positions as officers in the army. In the following 
chart of the Chilean officer corps around 1800, officers 
were classified according to the country of their birth (see 
Table 2). The results show that native-born Chileans were 
substantially represented, and actually comprised a majority 
of all officers.
In each of these major units, a common characteristic 
throughout was the predominant peninsular composition of the 
staff officers, or plana mayor. Even more constant is an 
almost geometrical decline of peninsulars as one descends 
from the staff down to the rank of sergeant. At the level 
of sergeant, the ratios are almost reversed, with creoles 
outnumbering those of European descent by a margin of ten to 
one.
In scanning the general staff, one notices several 
officers whose country of origin was Ireland, which was not 
uncommon in the Chilean army. Many Irish Catholics fled to 
Spain in the 1640's after their country fell under English 
domination and the subsequent imposition of the Puritan 
regime.^ In Spain, they were hospitably received and 
freely admitted to posts in the government and military.
•^Thomas L. Coonan, The Irish Catholic Confederacy 
and the Puritan Revolution (Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds,
Ltd., 1954), 90-91.
•^Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 8.
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Table 2
Nationalities of Enlisted Officers and Men36





























































0 Chile 5 Chile
4 Spain 4 Spain
1 Puerto Rico 1 France
2nd Lieutenants Sergeants
Chile 8 Chile 6








A number of Irish officers came to Chile in the 1700' s, the 
most notable of whom was Ambrosio 0 'Higgins, who came to the 
colony as an engineer1s assistant and later became one of 
the most able and respected presidents of his time. Irish 
officers were discriminated against in Chile but excelled in 
their professions, a number of them becoming governors or 
other prominent officers.37
The rank and file veteran soldiers were nearly all 
Chileans, much more so than the officers. After the arrival 
of the infantry battalion of Concepcibn in 1778, no more 
major detachments of peninsular troops were sent by the 
crown. Iii 1796, one of the infantry companies of the 
Valdivia battalion was made up of seven peninsulars and 
seventy Chileans, a figure illustrative of the predominate 
Chilean composition.38 In 1800, the frontier dragoons were 







37A few of the prominent Irish officers in the army 
were Juan Mackenna, Alejandro Eagar, Juan Clarke and Tomas 
O'Higgins.
38,1'Revista de..., 1796, " ACM. CX.
•^Review of the frontier dragoon squadron, December
31, 1800, ACM, CLXV, 1-3.
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As a by-product of the protracted Indian wars* the 
army became a dominant force in the society of southern 
Chile. Presidents of the colony were frequently military 
men of distinguished records in Europe, for whom the colony 
was another testing ground. Here, they sharpened their 
administrative and military skills before ascending to 
higher positions, frequently in Peru. Several presidents 
during the 1700 's later became Peruvian viceroys, among them 
Jos6 Manso de Velasco, Ambrosio 0 'Higgins, Manuel de Amat 
and Agustin de J&uregui.
Officers were proud of their profession and their 
role in combating the Araucanians. Whether of Chilean or 
peninsular extraction, they shared a common fraternal bond 
of long years of hard work (or persistence) to attain their 
rank. A study of the service records of the frontier 
dragoon squadron in 1800 reveals that the median age of its 
seven captains was 49.8 years.4<"* Most had originally 
enlisted as young men (probably as cadets) and had served an 
average of 33.4 years in the army. The captains were 43.4 
years old before being promoted to that rank, after having 
served a full 27 years of active service. Most of the other 
units displayed a similar age pattern in their advancement. 
The officers of the Valdivia infantry battalion were an 
exception, for they seem to have been subject to slower 
promotions than the other units. In the same year (1800),
4DIbid.
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the battalion lieutenants also averaged 49.8 years of age 
and were 43.2 years old before attaining the rank of 
lieutenant.4^ This means that the Valdivia lieutenants 
required the same number of years to attain a full rank lower 
than their fellow officers in Concepcibn.
The commeradarie within the officer corps was mani­
fested in a number of ways, one of which was the perpetuation 
of the military tradition through two or more generations in 
a family. The sons of many officers were enrolled as army 
cadets at early ages, frequently as young as eight or nine 
years old.42 Officer marriages often required prior approval 
by the crown, but the officers themselves guarded their 
social prestige by selecting brides from as high a social 
strata as possible.43 These men were understandably 
sensitive to civilian challenges to their authority in the 
administrative posts which they sometimes held. They 
especially looked down on militia officers, whose rank and 
titles were often honorary, unaccompanied by the years of
frontier duty which they were forced to undergo before
. . . 44attaining positions of command.
41Ibid.
42"Revista de..., December, 1795," ACM, CIII.
^Encina, Historia de Chile, V, 439, 532.
^Before leaving Chile to become Viceroy of Peru in 
1796, President 0 'Higgins appointed a militia colonel, Jos6 
de Aldunate, as interim military governor of the port of 
Valparaiso ("Informe del..., September 15, 1796," Doc. No. 
5430, JMDI. CCXIII). Francisco Borja de Araus, a veteran
21
Personal pride in their profession was one of the 
few things which veteran officers could attain, for there 
were few tangible benefits from a career of soldering. 
Infrequent promotions, displacement from home and family, 
the backward living conditions of garrisons, and physical 
dangers were factors which kept most of these men from 
attaining social prominence in the aristocracy. The pay was 
lower than in comparable civilian professions, and one 
officer noted that after forty or fifty years of service, 
" . . .  the men go to eternity, leaving their families wrapped 
in misery and mendicancy.
As an institution, the Chilean army seems to bear
Af%little resemblance to its counterpart in Mexico. In the 
viceregal center of New Spain, the size and organizational 
complexity of the army spawned an organization which was 
more sophisticated, acutely aware of its social status, and
lieutenant colonel of artillery, angrily wrote to the king 
that he should have been selected for the post by virtue of 
a c6dula of August 2, 1789, which automatically gave pref­
erence in such cases to the senior veteran officer present. 
He was joined in his outcry by two other prominent officers 
who similarly asserted the right of Borja de Araus ("Carta 
de..., June 14, 1796," Doc. No. 5425, JMDI. CCXIII). The 
author has been unable to detect any record of sustained 
jurisdictional disputes between the regular army and militia; 
when challenged by civilians, however, they were quick to 
assert what they felt was their privilege in administering 
strategic districts.
^Encina, Historia de Chile, V, 439.
46Lyle N. McAlister, The "Fuero Militar" in New 
Spain. 1764-1800 (Gainesville; University of Florida Press, 
1957) .
more apt to become embroiled in jurisdictional rivalries 
with other groups, such as merchant guilds or the bureau­
cracy.^7 Especially in the capital and in urban areas, the 
army and militia may have been useful mechanisms for social 
advancement or aristocratic pretensions. As Lyle McAlister 
points out, acrimonious disputes arose between the army and
civilians over the application of military privileges, or
48fueros. Although McAlister restricts his study princi­
pally to militia, the character of urban veteran units 
seems to follow the same pattern of development: frequent
jurisdictional conflicts with competing civilian interest
49groups. v
Chile was a more simple, unsophisticated colony. As 
the army was largely stationed in inaccessible forts, there
was little basis for institutional rivalry or a self­
inflated image which could bring on jurisdictional conflicts. 
Nor did a praetorian tradition emerge. Eeing immersed in
Indian campaigns and purely military matters, officers had
little idle time to have their honor affronted by civilians. 
Instead, the officer corps pursued a more undramatic but
47Ibid., Chapters 3 and 4. 4SIbid.
4% n  Chris ton Archer' s study of the Mexican coastal 
garrison of Veracruz, there is further evidence of the 
hypothesis that proximity to colonial centers of government 
was conducive to the growth of military prestige and influ­
ence. In the Veracruz area disease, terrible living 
conditions, and poverty combined to deter individuals from 
using the army as a means of social advancement (Christon I. 
Archer, "To Serve the King: Military Recruitment in Late
Colonial Mexico," HAHR. LV [May, 1975], 226-60).
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noteworthy role— that of the protector of Spanish society
along the frontier.
This contrasted sharply with the case of Peru, where
the absence of internal threats cast the army in a rela-
50tively weak role in society. Peruvian viceregal power was
traditionally based on the church and civil bureaucracy, and
the military reforms of the later Bourbon rulers failed to
51professionalize the existing veteran forces. The Chilean 
army was a pervasive and influential factor in the pre­
dominately rural south. It was a functional institution, 
and its importance in preserving Spanish civilization there 
established it as a vibrant and essential force.
50Leon G. Campbell, "The Changing Racial and Adminis­
trative Structure of the Peruvian Military Under the Later 
Bourbons," The Americas. XXXII (July, 1975), 117-33.
Slperuvian military reforms during the second half 
of the 1700 's centered not around the veteran forces, but 
the civilian militia. The proliferation of new militia 
units, financially supported by rich creoles, was envi­
sioned by colonial leaders as a means of simultaneously 
decreasing expenditures and bolstering military readiness. 
However, neither the veteran army nor the militia proved 
effective, as shown by their ineffectualness in quelling the 
Ttipac Amaru revolt in the early 1780' s (Leon G. Campbell,
"The Army of Peru and the Ttipac Amaru Revolt, 1780-1783, "
HAHR [February. 1976], 31-57).
Chapter 2
COASTAL DEFENSES
The Indian struggle was an inherent part of the 
colonial history of Chile* perhaps the single most influ­
ential element in the formation of the colonial character. 
Militarily, the threat of foreign interlopers in the Pacific 
almost rivaled the frontier war in importance. As a result, 
nearly half of all veteran troops were stationed along the 
coasts as a defense against possible invasion. Chileans 
were thus compromised in combating separate enemies on two 
fronts— the restive Araucanians in the interior and European 
intruders along the coasts. Regardless of the manner in 
which the army was deployed, its back was turned to one of 
these threats at all times.
To all appearances, it would seem that Chile was 
amply protected by its own peculiar geography; a number of 
natural barriers isolated and separated the land even from 
contiguous Spanish possessions. Chile was thousands of 
miles distant from Europe, a joumey requiring eight to ten 
months to complete. On the southern flank was Cape Horn, 
the most formidable obstacle to vessels entering the 
Pacific. To the east lay the Andes mountains, stretching
24
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almost the entire length of the colony. And to the north 
was the barren Atacama desert.
Despite these natural defenses,, geography was the 
very undoing of the colony, the impediment which complicated 
its defense. The 2,300 mile coastline was largely unin­
habited and filled with an infinite number of deserted bays 
and inlets, offering ideal sanctuary to foreign enemies.
The extended length of the colony made the supplying of the 
far-flung garrisons a matter of considerable difficulty, not 
to mention coordinating army movements and the dispatching 
of reinforcements. In consideration of these limitations, 
the Spanish had constructed a number of forts in the prin­
cipal harbors to counteract the periodic sorties of pirates 
and the possibility of European naval invasion.
Valparaiso was the principal port of the colony and 
the focal point of commercial activity. Through its ware­
houses passed the bulk of Chilean commerce, most notably the 
wheat shipments to Peru. Its strategic importance was 
enhanced by its proximity to Santiago, which made it the hub 
of governmental comings and goings. The bay was capable of 
holding numerous ships, although it was exposed along the 
north and northeast to strong winds which buffeted the 
anchorage, leaving vessels in jeopardy during the fierce 
winter gales.1
■^Vicente Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn histbrico- 
jeogrAfica del reino de Chile (Santiago: Libreria del
Mercurio, 1875), CHDC, X, 81.
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The first defenses of the bay dated from 1676 when 
the castle of Concepcibn was constructed, containing eight 
cannon. In 1684, President Josb de Garro initiated the 
construction of the castle of San Josb at the foot of the
high bluffs facing the bay entrance as a precaution against
3the raids of the English pirate Bartholomew Sharpe. Until 
the middle of the 1700 's, the port was not Valparaiso proper 
but the castle of San Josb, which with its ten cannon served 
as the governor's residence, troop barracks and military 
warehouse.
By the late 1700's, four forts overlooked the bay. 
San Josb and Concepcibn were located on either side of the 
bay mouth. Both were hardly more than flimsy batteries, 
poorly constructed. Two more forts protected the interior 
of the port: Baron on the north side and San Antonio along
the southern shore, the latter constructed to frustrate a 
possible landing of troops along the beach.^ In reality,
San Antonio was merely a battery situated at water's edge at 
the base of a high rock bluff, leaving its defenders highly 
vulnerable in the event of an attack. Both of these forts 
were incapable of defending the entire scope of the bay and
2Ibid.. 82.
^Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso 
(Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio, 1872), II, 110.
^"Relacibn que dejb el senor marqubs de Avilbs, 
presidente de Chile, a su sucesor el sehor Joaquin del Pino, 
1796-1797," AUC, XLVII (1875), 452.
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could only protect Spanish ships lying at anchor beneath 
their guns. There were no pilotboats, cannon launches, or 
other naval vessels which could be used for defense or 
reconnaissance.
In 1790, the total of Valparaiso's cannon numbered
Cseventy, thirty-seven of which were of bronze. The com­
plement of veteran troops consisted of only one artillery 
company (40 men), dubiously reinforced by four urban militia 
companies (a total of 280 men) and a squadron of militia
cavalry (134 men), bringing the total force to around 450 
6men. Valparaiso was regarded as the strongest port of the 
colony, after Valdivia, and was considered to be reasonably 
well fortified.
In contrast to Valparaiso, the bay of Concepcibn was 
immense, by far the largest in Chile and capable of safely 
holding the largest naval squadrons. Furthermore, it was 
the best port along the coast because of its sheltered
7anchorage and facilities for refitting and revictualmg. 
Concepcibn was not a commercial center and was thus visited 
by only two or three merchant ships each year, which took on
^ "Expediente formado sobre...curenas, 1790," ACM, 
XCIX. Bronze cannon were stronger than those of iron and
were preferred in coastal fortresses as they would not rust.
^Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II, 114.
^Amadeo Francisco Frezier, Relacibn del viaje por el
mar del sur a las costas de Chile i el Peru durante los anos 
de 1712, 1713, i 1714 (Santiago: Imprenta Mejia, 1902), 12.
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board modest quantities of wine and wheat for export.
Although an excellent port, the bay was so vast in
size that defense was rendered almost impossible. One
governor noted that because of the bay's expanse and the
numerous anchorages, ". . „ total defense is morally
impossible."® In view of this fact, the Spanish contented
themselves with constructing several batteries at key
positions overlooking the major anchorages. Merchant
vessels could thus be protected against a lone corsair or
9two, but not against an invasion taskforce.
The mouth of the bay was almost blocked by the 
island of Quiriquina. On its south side, the pass was only 
deep enough to permit entry of shallow draft lighters. The 
northern pass was a full two miles wide but defended by only 
a small battery on Quiriquina. While most ship captains 
preferred to enter the bay to the north by sailing close to 
the shelter of the island, the middle of the channel was 
also navigable. This would allow an enemy to enter almost 
out of cannon r a n g e . I n s i d e  the bay was another coastal 
battery near the site of the original settlement of Concep­
cibn. The new town was located inland to the south, just 
off the harbor between the Bio Bio and Andalibn rivers.
8 "Sobre Reparo..., 1763, " ACG. DCCVII, 18.
%eIchor Martinez, Memoria histbrica sobre la 
revolucibn de Chile, desde el cautiverio de Fernando VII, 
hasta 1814 (Valparaiso* Imprenta Europea, 1848), 266.
10,1'Sobre Reparo..., 1763, " ACG, DCCVII, 18.
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Another battery protected the wharf and main anchorage in 
front of the village of Talcahuano, a small cluster of huts 
and warehouses which became the principal port of Concep­
cibn This battery was of no practical use because enemy 
ships could anchor at any number of points to the north, 
facilitating the safe landing of troops out of gun range.
An isthmus of land separated Concepcibn bay from a much 
smaller bay, overlooked from surrounding bluffs by the rude 
settlement of San Vicente. It too, was a good port and
defended by a battery, but this defense could not prevent
12troops from landing on the far side of the bay. Both 
settlements had little more than a few dozen residents at 
most, and could thus be regarded as only token defenses 
against a determined foe.
The veteran forces of Concepcibn consisted of a 
single company of artillerymen, augmented by several rustic 
militia and artillery companies. As in the case of Val­
paraiso, these were considered to be grossly insufficient for 
the needs of the port. A positive factor was the proximity 
of the bay to the frontier infantry headquarters in Los 
Angeles and to troops stationed along the chain of frontier 
forts. With these troops and militia from the nearby
settlements, it was judged possible to amass over 1,000 men
11to the bay area m  less than twenty-four hours.
Ibid. "Relacibn que dejb...," AUC, XLVII, 454.
•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, X, 95.
Valdivia occupied a very special position in the 
scheme of Chilean defense, and was often referred to in 
military correspondence of the time as the "key to the 
kingdom" and "stronghold of the Pacific."'1'4 Not only did it 
comprise the strongest and most extensive fortification 
works of the colony, but was comparable in strategic impor-
1 Ctance to such fortresses as Callao and Panama. J Although 
it could not rival the labrynthian fortifications of 
Cartagena, Valdivia was the primary defense of the southern 
Pacific and the guardian against foreign incursions around 
Cape Horn. A complex of seventeen castles and batteries 
with over one hundred cannon ringed the entire bay. The 
Spanish had expended enormous sums of money to accomplish 
these ends. One source estimated that from its refounding 
in 1645 until 1750, over 36 million pesos were consumed in 
the construction of defenses and fortifications
The bay was broad, and according to one estimate was
capable of holding up to twenty large ships at one time,
17along with numerous others of smaller sxze. Around the 
southern perimeter were high bluffs upon which rested the 
most formidable works, well above the fire from enemy
14"Plan de..., 1769," AVG, XI, 11.
•^Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Peru, 
durante el tiempo del coloniaje espahol (Lima: Libreria
Central de Felipe Bailly, 1859), VI, 305.
•^Martinez, Memoria hist6r.ica, 262-63.
17 "La verdad.. 1 7 8 2 , "  AFA, XXV, 1.
vessels. To the north of the bay, eleven miles upstream
along the winding Valdivia and Tornagaleones rivers, was the
city of Valdivia, accessible to deep draft vessels. While
the bay was spacious, the many sand bars, shifting currents
and prevailing winds dictated that ships must maneuver and
anchor only in specific areas. With this in mind, the
Spanish had taken detailed soundings of the entire harbor
floor in order to ascertain where vessels could navigate and
consequently, where forts should be constructed (see Map 4).
The positioning of each cannon and reduct was the result of
meticulous calculation, with the knowledge that a single
weak point could be crucial in the control of the entire bay.
There were three areas of defense: the entrance to the bay,
the anchorage, and the city and its approaches.
The southern side of the bay entrance was guarded by
several fortifications, the first of which was the lookout
post of Morrogonzalo on the promontory at the very edge of
the sea. As it was the most forward position, a sentry was
continuously posted here to detect the approach of enemy 
13vessels. Next in line toward the bay was Aguada del 
Ingles, a small reduct initially consisting of three cannon. 
It was situated on a rocky cliff to impede a troop disem­
barkation along the beach. It possessed a protective ditch,
19parapet and a barracks capable of housing 80 men. The
18Ibid., 7.
^Gabriel Guarda, La toma de Valdivia (Santiago:
Zig Zag, 1970), 37.
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Map 4
The Bay and Fortress Complex of Valdivia*








fort of San Carlos was constructed by the engineer Juan Birt 
in 1762 on a tiny peninsula defended by up to twelve 24—
20calibre cannon and a furnace for turning out red hot shot.
As it was a key to the bay entrance, the presence of a 100-
man garrison was considered imperative, although the actual
number never approached this figure.
To the side of San Carlos was the battery of El
Barro, constructed in 1687 and provided with two barracks
capable of housing 100 troops. Its ten cannon were
positioned in such a manner as to flank the entire beach and
land approaches to Aguada del Ingl6s, preventing a force from
9 1taking the forts from the rear. At the narrowest point of
the bay entrance was the castle of Amargos, mounting twelve
24-calibre cannon. Like San Carlos, Amargos possessed an
22oven for red hot shot. Built under the direction of the 
Conde de Alba y Liste in 1677, the structure was imposing.
Its cannon pointed towards the pass to cross fire with those 
of Niebla on the opposite side of the bay. Completing the 
defenses of the southern approach was Chorocamayo Bajo, a 
light battery of six cannon designed to complement the fire 
from Amargos.
It was between Morrogonzalo and Aguada del Inglds 
that an enemy landing was deemed most likely. In positioning
20"La verdad..., 1782," AFA, XXV, 19.
21"Revista de la guerra," CHDI, V, 341.
22Ibid., 340.
guns to cover the land flanks of this area, the Spanish were
aided by the rocky shore line, which afforded no smooth
beaches for disembarkation. From Aguada all along this
portion of the coast was undergrowth so dense that the
garrison troops were accustomed to by-pass this route by
water. Cannon fire from Aguada, El Barro and Chorocamayo
Bajo was designed to rake the shore line with shot and gain
valuable time until infantry reinforcements could be brought
to bear on the threatened area. These reinforcements,
combined with the uneven terrain and undergrowth through
which the enemy must pass, could ideally stall a frontal
23attack until the enemy's ammunition was exhausted. The
guns from these batteries were also designed to defend the
flanks of Amargos, which jutting seaward with its cannon
facing the bay mouth was exposed to attack from the rear.
Initiating the line of defenses along the northern
shore of the bay entrance was the battery of El Molino,
analogous in location to Morrogonzalo on the southern shore.
Constructed in 1779 with four 24-calibre cannon, its
function was to prevent an infantry landing along the narrow
beach at its front, from which Niebla could be stormed from 
24the rear. El Molino overlooked the only beach along the 
rocky shore line and was naturally defended by currents and 
undertows which made troop disembarkation a dangerous under­
taking. The fort of Niebla was situated on the northern side
23ibid., 341. 24Ibid., 343.
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of the narrow strait leading to the harbor. During the
1760's, it mounted approximately nineteen cannon, which were
positioned to present a deadly cross fire with Amargos,
25directly across the strait.
An enemy assault by sea would be forced to actually 
penetrate the harbor. In order to accomplish this it would 
be necessary to sail close to the shore line in the initial 
approach to avoid the dangerous currents which swept up the 
coast from the south, all the while exposed to fire from the 
southern perimeter forts. A precise channel existed by 
which ships could enter the narrow strait, being forced to 
pass between the rocky coast of Niebla and the large sand 
bars in the center of the bay.26 It was inconceivable to 
the Spanish that a ship could maneuver through the channel, 
unfamiliar with its peculiar currents and winds, while 
simultaneously enduring cannon barrages from Amargos and 
Niebla.
Assuming an invading squadron passed the strait 
intact, it faced the second area of defense— the bay. The 
anchorages were of special importance, for although the 
harbor could hold a number of ships, these could safely 
anchor at only certain points. A roadstead existed in front
26Vicente Rodriguez Casado and Florentino Pdrez 
Embid (eds.), Memoria de gobierno del virrey Amat (Sevilla: 
Editorial Catdlica, 1947), 651-52.
26Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas
de America (Madrid: Editorial Madrid, 1918), I, 66.
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of Niebla capable of holding two or three vessels but was
unused as it was exposed to strong winds which could drive
ships onto the rocky shore. The only secure anchorage was
the inlet sheltered by high bluffs in front of the castle of
Corral.^7 This fort was originally composed of three
separate units: Argolla, the northern portion; San
Sebasti&n, the southern reduct; and La Cortina, the great
28wall that joined both into a single structure. The walls 
were defended by twenty to thirty 24-calibre cannon which 
could be loaded with red hot shot, making this the most
OQformidable structure on the bay. The walls of the 
interior fort were over 110 feet wide and nearly 20 feet 
high. Inside were stone barracks spacious enough for 200 
troops„30
To the immediate west of Corral was the battery of 
Bolson, which mounted nine cannon and pointed towards the
O 1anchorage. Atop the bluffs to the west of Bolson was 
Chorocamayo Alto, the most strategically placed battery of 
all with a minimum of six to a maximum of seventeen cannon. 
Its elevated position rendered it immune to fire from ships, 
while at the same time giving the gunners a clear field of
37Ibid., 66.
2®Guarda, La toma de Valdivia, 36.
29"La verdad..., 1782," AFA, XXV, 2.
30 • •Guarda, La toma de Valdivia, 36.
31Ibid.
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fire over all ships transiting the bay from the entrance to 
the anchorage.3^ in addition to furnaces for red hot shot, 
this battery was armed with chain cannon balls, used to 
dismast enemy vessels.
The third area of defense was that of Valdivia and 
the approaches to the city. To the southeast of Corral was 
the battery of Santa Rosa, defending the entrance to the 
inlet of San Juan. The island of Mancera was located midway 
between the mouths of the Valdivia and Tornagaleones rivers, 
with three forts to block upstream traffic. San Pedro de 
Alcantara, founded in 1645, became the principal fort but was 
later abandoned in 1779. In the extreme southwest of the 
island was Baides, defending the entrance to the Tornaga­
leones River, but likewise dismantled in 1748. Another 
battery of eight cannon rested upon a hill facing towards 
Corral.33
Guarding the entrance to the Valdivia River on the 
Niebla side was the battery of Piojo with two 24-calibre 
cannon. On the other side of the river lay Carboneros, with 
three cannon. These batteries were normally manned only in 
times of impending attack.34 It was believed that without 
possession of the city an invader would soon exhaust his 
supplies and be forced to abandon the bay.
32jyiartlnez, Memoria histbrica, 262.
Guarda, La toma de Valdxvia, 32.
34"La verdad..., 1782, " AFA. XXV, 4.
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To the infrequent merchant ships entering the bay, 
the sight of over one hundred cannon must have certainly 
presented a formidable, if not fearsome, appearance. Yet, 
Valdivia possessed a certain contradictory quality. On the 
one hand, it was Spain's bastion in the south Pacific, where 
great sums of money had been spent in erecting fortifications. 
On the other hand, the city and garrison were dependent for 
survival on an annual supply ship, while the infantry 
battalion was composed of rogues and convicts. These were 
only two of the flaws which undermined Valdivia's defense.
In terms of the deployment of defenses there were 
visible shortcomings. The island of Maneera, which ideally 
should have been almost invulnerable, was considered acces­
sible on nearly every side except that which faced the 
anchorage. This was due to the faulty positioning of its 
cannon. It was considered useless as a defensive position. 
Actually, the batteries of Piojo and Carboneros were 
originally constructed to protect Mancera, rather than
OCdefend the Valdivia River against ships sailing upstream. 
Amargos similarly presented a weak field of fire because its 
guns pointed away from the land, leaving open the possibility 
of a flanking attack by foot soldiers. And Niebla was 
regarded by a number of tacticians as obsolete. In their 
opinion, its location so far forward on a point of land 
subjected it to enfilades of fire down its entire length
35 "Sobre Reparo..., 1763," ACG, DCCVII, 12.
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from ships passing between it and Mancera.36 Finally, in
1765, an officer of the garrison, Pablo de la Cruz y
Contreras, noted ten points inside the bay where troops
37could be landed without being menaced by cannon fire.
In view of the many batteries encircling the bay, it 
was logical to assume that an enemy would not dare to venture 
into the harbor to meet the onslaught of massed cannon but 
would land on the shore behind them, taking the forts one 
by one. This was perhaps the most obvious weakness of the 
entire complex. The engineering officer Juan Mackenna 
reflected in 1810 that the forts on the southern perimeter 
were so isolated and helpless with their guns facing toward 
the sea that an enemy force of 400 to 500 men could dis­
embark behind San Carlos on the beach of Aguada del Ingl6s 
with relative safety. By then advancing along the heights 
behind the forts, these troops could catch the Spanish com-
• 5 0pletely exposed to their fire and force them to surrender.
Ten years later, the invading squadron of Lord Thomas 
Cochrane took Valdivia by duplicating this strategy.
Cochrane landed 600 men from two ships in front of Aguada 
del Ingl6s, who took the entire succession of forts in less 
than two days.
A key to the protection of the bay was the cannon
3^Martinez, Memoria histdrica, 262.
07Guarda, La toma de Valdivia, 50.
3®Martinez, Memoria histOrica, 262.
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cross fire from the various forts, which could saturate 
approaching vessels from two sides. In particular, the 
Spanish regarded the cannon trajectories from Niebla,
Amargos and Mancera as a theoretically deadly triangle of 
cross fire against any hostile warship. Among the proponents 
of this cross fire theory was the military engineer Olaguer 
Feliti, who claimed the power of the guns was such that shots 
from these forts could cross to the other side of the bay, 
" . . .  their balls ricocheting or rebounding on the opposite
O Qshores." And yet, the distances within the bay were such
that one may seriously doubt whether the Spanish were secure
in their logic, if not flatly deceived by the judgment of
Olaguer. Over one full mile of water separated Amargos and
Niebla, the narrowest point of the bay entrance. In
addition, Niebla was separated from Corral by a distance of
a mile and a half. In any attempt to force the bay entrance
by an enemy, gunners from either fort would be forced to
fire at moving targets over half a mile away with a high
degree of accuracy. Considerable damage could be wrought in
this manner, but crippling the aggressor in his passage of
40the straits is questionable.
The answers to these and similar questions went 
largely unanswered, for the bay was not besieged during the
3^ " I n f o r m e  sobre la defensa..., 1807," AMG, C.
40The maximum range of eighteenth-century cannon was 
roughly one mile. (Albert Manucy, Artillery through the 
Ages [u. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C ., 
Reprint, 1956]), 32.
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eighteenth century. One element was certain, however. The 
weakest link in Valdivia's defense was not the ring of stone 
fortifications but the troops who manned them. The entire 
concept of the bay's defense revolved around the coordination 
of artillery fire and the mobility of troops in moving to 
threatened landing points, maneuvers involving infinite 
skill and precision. These qualities were almost absent 
because of the low quality of the average soldier and the 
woefully insufficient number of troops. At some point in 
his administration, nearly every governor voiced the urgent 
need for increased numbers of troops. The garrison force 
of four to five hundred infantry barely sufficed for pro­
tection of the forts themselves, not counting the many 
support troops which would be necessary to repel an invasion. 
In February, 1796, a defense council in Spain concluded that a 
minimum of 1,200 combat troops would be needed to thwart an 
enemy landing.^
As heavy ordinance constituted the principal 
weaponry of Valdivia, it was essential that enough qualified 
artillerymen be kept on hand for any contingency. The 
artillery squadron of Valdivia consisted of only six master 
gunners and seventeen artillerymen, a somewhat ludicrous 
number when considering that they were charged with the 
operation and firing of over one hundred cannon. When
^"Oficio del..., February 18, 1796," Doc. No. 9096, 
JMDI. CCLXLV, 118.
42"Razdn de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM, XLIX, No. 7.
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Captain Tamcis O'Higgins inspected the fortress in 1797, he 
expressed the most severe reservations as to the garrison's 
ability to repel an enemy. He noted that the cannon were 
loaded and ready but that should an attack occur, . . 
these could not be counted with more than one shot for each 
c a n n o n . I n  this statement, he was referring to the 
deficiencies of the artillerymen, not the capacity of the 
cannon. It was this substandard quality of the troops and 
their insufficient numbers which comprised the real 
vulnerability of Valdivia.
The province of Chilo6 was the southernmost strong­
hold of the Spanish, the very first line of defense against 
enemy ships rounding Cape Horn. The arduous journey from 
Europe was of such duration that even if a corsair stopped 
in the Azores or along the Atlantic coast of South America, 
the first objective after entering the Pacific was normally 
that of putting in at a sheltered inlet to obtain fresh food 
and water. Not only would Chilofe serve as a temporary 
shelter, it would also provide an excellent base of opera­
tions against Valdivia or other ports along the coast. The 
Spanish realized that with so few vessels at their disposal, 
this island fortress might be nearly impossible to retake if
4-1"Viaje de .. .Tom&s de 0'Higgms, 1796-1797," AFA, 
XXXIII, 11.
44 . . •overrun by an enemy. With the implementation of registry
shipping in the Pacific during the 1740's, the island came
to be regarded as an especially likely target for visit,: by
enemy vessels.
The archipelago of Chilo6 consisted of over one
thousand small islands, but the only one of importance was
Isla Grande, an elongated island paralleling the mainland
and separated from it by a broad channel of water. The
western or seaward side contained no settlements, but along
the sheltered eastern shore were three fortified positions:
Castro, Chacao and San Carlos.
The fort of San Carlos was constructed in a well-
sheltered inlet of the Bay of Lacuy, along the northern
shore of Isla Grande. It consisted of stone walls with
45parapets and positions for up to twenty-four cannon.
After 1767, it was the chief fortress of the island, housing 
the provincial government, royal officials and governor. As
the only port of Chilo£ directly exposed to the Pacific, it
46was thought to be the most likely target for attack.
To the east of San Carlos lay the fort of Chacao on
4^In 1767, the president of Chile acknowledged the 
receipt of communiques from Spain warning of possible 
English attacks in the Pacific. According to Spanish intel­
ligence sources, the English planned to establish a base not 
on the mainland, but on the islands between Chilob and the 
Strait of Magellan. ("El Gobemador.. ., February 23, 1767," 
Doc. No. 4566, JMDI, CLXLIV, 25) .
45Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn, X, 317.
“̂ Martinez, Memoria histbrica, 261.
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the southern shore of the narrow chacao Channel, which 
separated Chilofe from the mainland. It was through this 
strait that boats passed to reach settlements on the eastern 
side of the island. A small fort and a few cannon were 
posted here, although the chief deterrant to attack was the 
powerful current which rushed through the straits at great
A *7velocity. 7 The town of Castro was located in the center of 
the island's eastern side. The fort there was likewise a 
very minor structure with several cannon overlooking the 
anchorage.48 In addition to these defenses, there was 
another fort named Calbuco located on a small island to the 
northeast of Isla Grande, just off the mainland. It 
defended the northern shore of the Chacao Channel and acted 
as a communication outpost with the mainland.4^ Its only 
population was the military garrison and families of the 
troops.
During most of the 1700's, the veteran forces on
Chilo6 consisted of one dragoon company (53 men) defending
San Carlos and Chacao, an infantry company (53 men) stationed
in Calbuco, and an artillery company (33 men) in San Carlos.
Late in the 1700's, these forces were increased substantially
50to battalion force, or around 400 troops. The militia
47Ibid. 317. 48Ibid., 316.
49"Relaci6n que..., February 15, 1773," Doc. No.
7491, JMPI, CCLIX, 131-32.
50"Discurso que hace..., 1782," Doc. No. 7492, JMDI. 
CCLIX, 254.
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comprised 23 companies, or a total of 680 cavalry and 1,145 
51infantry.
The island of Juan Fernandez served as a fortress 
not from any intrinsic value of the land but because its 
location on the same latitude as Valparaiso could make it 
attractive as a base for enemy vessels preying upon Spanish 
shipping. Discovered in 1585 by the explorer Antonio Veci 
and his pilot, Juan Fernandez, the island remained deserted 
and forgotten until the 1740's when Lord Anson's English 
squadron used it to repair their damaged s h i p s . Alarmed 
that the island might be used as a base for foreign inter­
vention in the Pacific, the Spanish crown instructed 
President Ortiz y Rozas to colonize and fortify it with all 
the resources at his disposal. In March of 1750, a ship 
departed from Valparaiso carrying the island's first 
colonists— one infantry company, 171 settlers, and 22 convict 
laborers .
The island was fortified along its eastern shore, 
which was somewhat sheltered from strong winds and offered 
several small bays in which ships could anchor. By 1800,
5^-Carlos Olguin, InstituciQnes politicas y adminis- 
trativas de Chilofe en el siglo XVIII (Santiago: Editorial
Juridica, 1970), 95, 97.
C O-^Thaddaeus P. Haenke, DescripciOn del reino de 
Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1942), 67.
53Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, Juan Fernandez, historia 
verdadera de la isla de Robinson Crusoe (Santiago: Rafael
Jover, 1883), 269-70.
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some forty-one cannon protected the eastern side, arranged 
in seven batteries from Puerto Franc6s to Puerto Ingl6s.54 
There were two gunpowder storehouses, several clusters of 
houses for the troops and settlers and the fort of Santa 
Barbara, Normally, one company of troops from the frontier 
infantry battalion served there, being augmented in times of 
danger by one or two additional companies. Through neces­
sity and custom, the convicts encarcerated there also served 
as soldiers and were armed when the occasion demanded.
That the island should remain fortified was seldom 
in question; it would offer a prime base of operations for 
the infrequent incursions of corsairs. However, there was 
no consensus on the role of Juan Fernandez in the scheme of 
Chilean defense; that is, defense against foreign aggres- 
sion. For this reason, only a detachment of troops were 
stationed there to maintain token sovereignty. While the 
Spanish presence did prevent the island from being utilized 
as a European base, it could in no way safeguard other parts 
of the colony. It is ironic that the nearby island of Mas 
Afuera became a well-known haunt of foreign seal hunters and 
whalers.
These were the coastal defenses of the colony. In 
providing for the maintenance and security of these posi­
tions, the Spanish faced a number of formidable obstacles.
54Ibid.. 376.
55"Plan de..., 1769," AVG, XI, 9.Letter of O'Higgins, Santiago, October 1, 1794, AMV, XXI, 136.
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The most acute of these was the financing of fortifications, 
a persistent preoccupation not only in Chile but in all of 
Spanish America. Defense was an ambiguous concept, contin­
gent not so much upon actual need but upon the availability 
of royal funds? the recommendations made by a procession of 
visiting military engineers and technical experts were never 
fulfilled intact, but normally served as a set of priorities
from which only the most pressing project might be 
56selected. Their meticulous charts and prolific analyses 
were largely ignored by governors who strove to balance 
their slim budgets against royal exhortations to maintain an 
ever-vigilant defense. So insistent was the crown in 
trimming military expenditures that Chilean troops were 
normally forced to pay for their own uniforms, so that when 
President Ambrosio Benavides broke precedent in the 1780's 
by presenting each soldier with a complete, free uniform, 
one officer observed that " . . .  this grace is not frequent 
in that land."57
As long as the colony was preoccupied by an inter­
mittent Indian war, virtually no amount of royal money could 
secure the coast, because the simultaneous need to maintain 
the frontier garrisons split and diffused the veteran troops. 
During the frequent intervals when Spain was involved in
5^"Informe expedido..., March, 1793, " Doc. No. 5300, 
JMDI. CCXI, 35.
57Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, X, 424.
48
continental wars, it was commonplace for the coastal forces 
to be considerably reinforced against a possible invasion. 
This could be done only by reducing the frontier forts to 
mere skeleton garrisons. One of the most calamitous pros­
pects of a president was the possibility of a simultaneous 
Indian uprising and the presence of foreign ships along the 
coast. This condition of splintered forces and a two-front 
war prevented the army from containing either threat with 
any degree of success.
It was also feared that European enemies might 
capitalize on the Indian animosity by making an alliance 
against the Spanish. President 0 'Higgins was especially 
mindful of this possibility, urging the Intendant of 
Chilo6;
In all of your activities, particular care should 
be lent to ascertaining if foreigners initiate com­
munication with the Indians. You should continually 
warn them of the cunning, deceit, and intentions they 
have of establishing settlements along the coasts, 
for the purpose of illicit trade or perhaps to invade these l a n d s . 58
One of the primary Spanish objectives in the parliaments 
with the Indians was to obtain pledges of alliance or at 
least their acquiescence in the eventuality of European 
invasion. At such times when war was declared in Europe, the 
major Indian chiefs were sought out in order to obtain their
58O'Higgins to the Intendant of Chilo6, Santiago, 
November 5, 1791, ACG, DCCLXXXII, 490.
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verbal support against the enemies of the crown. The 
doubtful nature of Indian loyalties added another dimension 
to the insecurity of the colony. Because the Indians could 
not be trusted, colonial leaders wavered uncertainly between 
armed aggression and overtures of peace, depending on the 
magnitude of foreign threat.
Leaders of the colony were all too aware of the 
position of weakness from which they dealt. In his dis­
course concerning the defense of Chile in 1806, the 
secretary of government Judas Tadeo Reyes was of the opinion 
that:
It must be surmised that it is physically impos­
sible to maintain the necessary defenses in the 
extension of nearly six hundred leagues of open 
coasts with innumerable ports, coves and inlets 
that compose the colony. Even confining ourselves 
to the most important fortified points of Valdivia, 
Talcahuano, Valparaiso, city of La Serena and 
islands of Juan FernSndez, we are totally exposed 
for lack of proportionate g a r r i s o n s .60
Discounting the threat of individual corsairs, it was be­
lieved that a coordinated invasion would consist of several 
thousand well-armed troops with their accompanying baggage 
and artillery, abundant munitions, and with the intent of 
establishing a permanent foothold in the Pacific. With 
its forces dispersed along the frontier or in isolated
59"E1 Presidente..„, October 8, 1780," Doc. No. 4752, 
JMDI, CLXLVII, 142-47.




pockets in the coast, the Chilean army would have been 
obliged to meet the enemy from a definite position of weak­
ness.
Cognizant of the many points of entry along the 
coast and the limited number of troops on hand, colonial 
military officers followed the principle of concentrating 
the available forces among only the most vital ports.
Spanish strategists were of a like opinion. During a meeting 
of the royal junta de fortificacibnes in Madrid in 1805, one 
of the topics submitted for consideration was the possibility 
of fortifying Paposo, a deserted bay near Antofagasta. The 
junta resolved that it would be folly to fortify the bay, 
not only because of the great costs involved, but also 
because this would only present an enemy with another 
enticement for sacking and pillage. Besides spreading the 
chain of defenses even thinner, it could only offer addi­
tional incentive to corsairs who otherwise would have had no 
reason to anchor along the empty coast.^2
The crux of the defense problem was the lack of 
adequate Spanish sea power in the Pacific, which left 
merchant shipping vulnerable to pirates and the coasts 
unprotected against contrabandists. This also rendered the 
fortresses subject to extended enemy sieges, with little 
fear of naval retaliation or re inforcement by sea. A
62"La Junta de..., February 17, 1805," Doc. No. 5584, 
JMDI, CCXVIII.
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permanent naval squadron was the only means of changing the 
defensive stance to an offensive capability. Such a task- 
force did not necessarily have to be large, as the most 
frequent acts of belligerency were the raids of individual 
pirate vessels. However, the squadron had to be free of all 
duties extraneous to those of patrolling the sea.
As with the system of fortifications, the scarcity 
of funds was the overriding obstacle to the creation of a 
Pacific squadron. The Spanish navy possessed too few war­
ships of its own for the European and Mediterranean theaters 
of action, and could not relinquish ships to the relatively 
peaceful Pacific Ocean. Those royal warships which visited 
Chilean and Peruvian ports from time to time came for a 
specific purposes to conduct situados, to deliver mail, or 
to transport military supplies from Spain. There were 
shipyards along the coast, notably in Guayaquil where most
/* oof the ships along the Pacific coast were built. In 
Chile, shipyards operated irregularly at Chilob, Valdivia 
and Concepcibn. One source found that between 1784 and 1811, 
a total of seventeen ships were constructed in these ports.^ 
In view of the availability of timber resources, it seems 
that the major factor inhibiting the creation of a squadron 
was the cost of construction and maintenance. According to 
the computations of Viceroy Amat, a frigate of twenty-six
63Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas. I, 78.
64vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II,
136-37.
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cannon and a crew of 267 men consumed 5,886 pesos each month,
6 5an amount which the Peruvian treasury could not afford.
During the 1750 's, the naval force was composed of 
two vessels, the Esperanza. of fifty cannon, and the San 
Perm in, of forty cannon. Their armament came from two other 
ships and several galleys in the Guayaquil shipyard, which 
were found inserviceable and stripped of all useful materials. 
These ships proved grossly inadequate for their intended use. 
Thus, when English warships were at one point rumored to be 
in the Pacific, both vessels were promptly anchored in 
Callao harbor to augment the cannon fire from the forts, and 
were of no use in patrolling the coasts.^
The general tenor of naval defense remained roughly 
similar to this throughout the following decades. Possess­
ing no war vessels of their own, Chileans were forced to 
accept the decisions of the viceroy regarding the movements 
of warships and their patrol routes. This proved to be a 
source of irritation to the presidents. In 1780, President 
Tomas Alvarez de Acevedo complained to Minister of the 
Indies Jos6 de Galvez, concerning the naval squadron then in 
Valparaiso. He protested that the squadron commander com­
municated his actions in Chilean waters either to the 
viceroy or to the crown; thus, he felt there was no
(1CRodriguez and P6rez (eds.), Memoria del virrey
Amat, 795.
^ Memorias de los vireyes, IV, 262, 265.
53
coordination in the use of these forces or in protecting 
those areas considered important by Chileans.^7 It was not 
that authorities in Lima viewed the coasts of southern Chile 
with anything but the highest esteem. However, with the 
limited naval forces on hand, it naturally seemed more 
important to assure the security of the Peruvian coasts in 
the event of military crisis.
In the 1790's. Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus 
envisioned the formation of a true squadron of warships
capable of dealing with any threat on the part of foreign
powers. The plan centered around two existing war frigates, 
the Limeno and the Peruano (each with eighteen cannon) , two
additional vessels whose construction had been approved by
the king, and an additional frigate or two from the royal 
navy. These would be reinforced by several armed merchant 
vessels, bringing the total force to fifteen.^® Obstructed 
by high costs and a scarcity of men and material, the pro­
ject never reached fruition. Several years later, the sea
6 9force was again found to be reduced to two bergantines.  ̂
These sufficed in times of peace and for routine police duty 
but were completely insufficient to deal with the influx
67"El Presidente..., September 7, 1780," Doc. No. 
4755, CLXLVII, 154-55.
68Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 306-307.
6^Ricardo Donoso, El marqufes de Osorno, don Ambrosio 
0 ‘Higgins, 1721-1801 (Santiago; Imprenta Universitaria,
1941), 467-68.
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of foreign whalers and contrabandists, which by that time 
had proliferated throughout the Pacific.
The saving grace of the colony was the fact that an 
invasion never came during the eighteenth century. The 
English and other enemies of Spain were enmeshed in European 
conflicts and were either disinterested or too preoccupied 
with other matters to undertake a Pacific venture of any 
magnitude. As the colonial era neared its conclusion, the 
major concern became not the possibility of invasion, but 
aggressive foreign entrepreneurs and smugglers intent on 
breaking down trade restrictions of the empire. Chile's 
principal defenses remained its geographic inaccessibility, 
its isolation, and general European apathy towards this 
remote colony.
Chapter 3
FOREIGN THREATS IN THE PACIFIC
On entering the eighteenth century, Spain left 
behind the guilded age of its European grandeur and the 
zenith of its world power. It had taken only a century 
from the union of Castile and Aragon until the annexation of 
Portugal (1479-1580) to achieve European supremacy and like­
wise, only another century (1598-1700) to descend to the 
status of a second-rate monarchy.1 The accession of the 
French Bourbons to the Spanish throne in 1700 heralded a new 
era of renewed political strength and a revitalized economic 
life, culminating in the enlightened reign of Charles III. 
However, the recovery was a slow and painful process. The 
first decades of the century were characterized by rebuilding, 
renovation, and the patient eradication of Hapsburg tradi­
tionalism.
Concurrent with the plight of the peninsula, Spanish 
America was also in the throes of severe crisis. The 
colonies found themselves challenged in their long-standing 
monopoly of Indies wealth by the English and other European
ljos6 Maria Jover, et al., Historia de Espana (2nd 
ed.; New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1965), 290.
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adversaries. This challenge was manifested not only through 
military aggression but by subtle trading and smuggling, 
which drained the colonies of their coveted wealth and 
weakened the ties of royalism. The cracks in the super­
structure of Spanish colonial power were not so much 
attributable to inherent weaknesses within the Indies, but 
to the diminishing power of the mother country and the con­
cessions which it was forced to make to its victorious 
enemies. The implications of these political and territorial 
concessions were profound and destined to give Chile a new 
character in the scheme of colonial enterprise.
The War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) was the 
initial testing of Spain's declining international prestige 
and set a precedent for repeated colonial concessions which 
it would be required to make to the victors of European 
struggles. As victors over the combined French and Spanish 
forces, the English were able to extract from the latter an 
invaluable agreement concerning trade and commercial priv­
ileges in America. This was the asiento, or the right of 
the English to be the sole suppliers of Negro slaves to 
Spanish America for a period of thirty years.  ̂ The asiento 
trade was assigned to the South Sea Company, which through a 
network of agents in colonial ports became a front for
2Arthur S. Aiton, "The Asiento Treaty as Reflected 




With the outbreak of war between Britain and Spain 
in 1739, the company was ejected from the colonies. How­
ever, the firm foothold which it had established opened the 
door to a proliferation of smuggling in less conspicuous 
American ports. During the ensuing decades, the popularity 
of these new commercial areas rose to the point where 
Spanish anxieties over the monopoly of the South American 
and Pacific trades equaled those felt earlier in the century 
for their possessions in the Caribbean and Central America.^ 
Another cause of the increasing importance of the 
Pacific colonies was the decline of the commercial fleet 
system originated by the Hapsburgs and its replacement with 
a more vigorous, competitive system known as registry 
shipping. Moribund by 1700, the fleet system was briefly 
revived in 1720, but soon fell afoul of the largely illegal
competition of the English and the maritime confrontations
swhich resulted. The War of Jenkm's Ear, beginning in 1739,
because of one such confrontation, brought an end to all
6efforts to revive the old system.
3Vera Lee Brown, "Contraband Trade: A Factor in the
Decline of Spain1s Empire in America," HAHR, VIII, No. 2 
(May, 1928), 179-80.
4Ibid.. 189.
3For a description of the fleet system routes see 
C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1947), 325-26.
^Valentin V&squez de Prada, "Las rutas comerciales 
entre Espana y America en el siglo XVIII," AEA, XXV (1968), 
208.
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In 1740, all fleet traffic was suspended and replaced 
by a system of registered ships sailing from Cadiz to
7specific ports in America. While merchant monopolists were 
later successful in reinstituting the Veracruz fleet (which 
sailed intermittently from 1757 until its demise in 1789), 
in only a few short years, the dominance of registry
shipping over its aging counterpart was an acknowledged
8fact. As the range of privileges was gradually extended to 
more Spanish American ports and as intercolonial trade 
became sanctioned, heretofore marginal regions of the 
Venezuelan coast, the Windward Islands and Buenos Aires 
experienced unprecedented commercial expansion.
One of the most preferential locale for registry 
shipping in South America was the La Plata area, but a con­
siderable number of ships risked crossing Cape Horn to
Qreach Chilean and Peruvian ports . J  From a military stand­
point, the increased levels of commercial traffic in the 
Pacific intensified the threat of corsairs and enemy war­
ships . Considering the traditional absence of a Spanish 
Pacific squadron, there was very little that could be done
7Haring, op. cit., 336-37.
ohn Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782- 
1810; The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de 
la Plata (London: Athlone Press, 1958), 10.
9According to Benj amin Vicuna Mackenna, between 1743 
and 1748 no less than eighteen chartered vessels arrived at 
Callao, alone (Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II,
34) .
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to counteract the entry of Europeans in these waters. In 
the following decades, the Pacific was to experience a 
tremendous upsurge of foreign traffic among not only 
smugglers and traders but enemy vessels in search of registry 
ships and bases for raiding. This increased traffic changed 
Chile's military status within the empire.
Within the scope of Spain's New World possessions, 
Chile was traditionally not one of the more critical areas 
of defense, nor was it an important territorial pawn which 
changed hands frequently during the course of the colonial 
period. Isolated as it was from both the mother country and 
its foes, Chile occupied a modest niche in the overall scheme 
of colonial domain— that of a link in preserving the Pacific 
coast as Spanish territory.
The fundamental strategic role of the colony in the 
Spanish orb was its relationship with the viceroyalty; Chile 
served as the southern defense perimeter of Peru and the
I pfirst line defense against enemies rounding Cape Horn. In 
analyzing the defense of his vast jurisdiction in 1796, 
Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus isolated three potential 
threats. The first and most genuine threat came from 
foreign invasion and piratical incursions along the coast.
The second came from insurrection on the part of the 
Peruvian Indians inhabiting the sierra, many of whom still 
harbored vengeance towards the Spanish for the subjugation
•̂ OMemorias de los vireyes, V, 161.
of their race. (It is noteworthy that the viceroy held the 
foreign threat uppermost in his mind over that of Indian 
revolt, despite the recent Tupac Amaru rebellion.) The 
third area of concern was the weak Spanish grasp over the 
borderlands and the volatile nature of the Indian tribes 
living there. While he considered this as the least 
hazardous of the three, he treated it with equal precaution 
in the knowledge that Spain's enemies were ever-vigilent in 
exploiting Indian resentment to further their territorial 
acquisitions. He pointed out that the Portuguese had 
capitalized on this animosity in the Sacramento area (which 
he feared might eventually lead to a confrontation with 
Spain)
Gil's analysis reflected the general consensus among 
a succession of Peruvian viceroys that foreign incursions 
did indeed constitute the chief danger to their domains. 
Accordingly, coastal defense became the overriding military 
concern during their administrations. Chile occupied a
I Oposition of prime importance in this overall strategy.  ̂
Viceroy Gil enumerated six critical points of coastal
defense through the viceroyalty: Valdivia; Chilo6; Juan
1*3Fem&ndez; Valparaiso; Panama; and Guayaquil * It is 
11Ibid., VI, 304.
• ^ R o d r i g u e z  and P6rez (eds.), Memoria del virrey 
Amat, 650.
-^Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 305.
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significant that four of these six areas were in Chile. 
Despite the financial drain occasioned by these fortresses, 
the cost was considered well spent if it prevented their 
being used as bases for foreign enemies.
Chile was a focal point of Peruvian interest in 
another manner; the rich valleys of central Chile provided 
Lima with the bulk of the wheat which it consumed. In this 
particular commercial relationship, the traditional role of 
dependency was reversed as Chile assumed a degree of 
economic hegemony over the Peruvian viceroys.
The volume of this trade was impressive--at least 
100,000 fanegas were imported annually through the port of 
Callao.^ Despite this quantity, importation never reached 
the level of internal demand due to opposition from Peruvian 
economic interests, especially the desires of domestic 
agrarianists for a government protectionist policy against 
imported wheat. As a result of crown rulings in 1775 and 
1785, Chilean grains were freed from maritime duties. 
Importation increased to between 150,000 and 200,000 fanegas 
a n n u a l l y . F o r  example, from September, 1788, until 
September, 1789, 199,337 fanegas of Chilean wheat entered 
Callao, carried by fifteen ships making a total of twenty-
■} CLfour trips. °
14oscar Febres Villaroel, "La crisis agricola del 
Pertl en el ultimo tercio del siglo XVIII," RH, XXVII (1964), 
174.
15Ibid.. 179.
^vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II, 161.
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Peru's grain dependency also had military ramifica­
tions. As long as Peruvians were dependent on imported 
grains, the severing of the trade routes by corsairs could 
have serious consequences. In the eventuality that a naval 
squadron besieged Callao, the city of Lima could be strangled 
by the capture of ships transporting the local food supply. 
For this reason, Viceroy Croix was vitally concerned with 
the security of Valdivia, not in a military sense per se but 
in terms of its value in securing the routes of Chilean
1 nwheat shipments. '
The emerging importance of Chile's defense was first 
revealed by events during the War of Jenkin1s Ear, a struggle 
which as shown, accelerated that situation by changing the 
commercial pattern. The English promptly dispatched two 
naval expeditions to America. The first was the expedition 
of Admiral Edward Vernon, which sailed for the Caribbean and 
laid siege to the port of Cartagena in 1741. The second was 
led by Commander George Anson and was destined to be the 
first coordinated threat to the Pacific during the century. 
Anson1s orders were to enter the Pacific, disrupt trade and 
communication lines, incite Indian rebellion, and to gen­
erally distract and damage the Spanish forces along the 
coast. A more specific aim was the capture of Valdivia, 
which would deprive the Spanish of their primary defense in
Memorias de los vireyes, V, 161.
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those latitudes and serve as a base of operations against 
lftshipping.
On September 18, 1740, Anson’s squadron departed 
from England. It was composed of six warships carrying a 
total of 236 cannon, two supply vessels, and a complement of 
1,980 sailors and landing troops.'*'9 News of the expedition 
made its way to Spain, where a similar squadron of five 
warships was prepared to pursue the English, led by General 
de Marina Jos6 Alfonso Pizarro.
In a race to the Pacific, both fleets arrived almost 
simultaneously at Cape Horn where one of Anson's ships was 
actually pursued for a short time by the Spanish. The 
English vessels were badly mauled and dispersed by storms in 
their late autumn passage of the Cape. Nearly one-half of
onthe crews died due to disease and scurvy. After enduring
terrible adversities, the flagship Centurion and three other
vessels arrived safely in Pacific waters. The Spanish
squadron suffered an equally disastrous fate. The Hermione
sank with 500 men aboard, and the Guiptizcoa was abandoned
21along the coast after over half of its crew died. Judging
•*"®Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II, 5.
■*■ ̂ Barros Arana, Historia general, VI, 122.
20l . A. Wilcox, Anson1s Voyage (London: G. Bell and
Sons, 1969), 35-40.
^^Richard Walter and Benjamin Robins, A Voyage round 
the World in the Years MDCCXL, X ,  II, III, IV by George 
Anson, Edited by Glyndwr Williams (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1974), 38-40.
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that to continue around the Cape would risk the loss of his 
entire squadron, Pizarro returned to Buenos Aires with the 
remaining ships and communicated his losses to the Peruvian 
viceroy.
With his remaining crews so shorthanded and weakened
by the ordeal, Anson was forced to put in at Juan FernAndez
22for an extended period of refitting. During this period,
the English had few charts of the Chilean coast and only a
rudimentary idea of the location of major landmarks, but the
island of Juan Fernandez was well known among mariners as a
safe location for regrouping and making repairs:
. . . it is the only commodious place in those seas, 
where British cruisers can refresh and recover their 
men after their passage round Cape Horn, and where
they may remain for some time without alarming the
Spanish coast.23
After assessing the strength of his reduced squadron, Anson
concluded that an attack on Valdivia would be foolhardy,
resolving instead to concentrate on the capture of Spanish 
shipping.
The marques de Villa Garcia, Viceroy of Peru, 
received word from Pizarro that while there was a slim 
possibility of several of the English ships having passed 
into the Pacific, they must now be in such a weak condition
O Aas to be incapable of offensive action. The viceroy 
immediately outfitted four warships and instructed their
22Ibid., 109-10. 23Ibid., 115.
2^wilcox, op. cit., 64.
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captains to patrol off Juan Femdndez and the Chilean coast. 
After none of Anson's squadron appeared, it was assumed that 
they had met the same or worse fate as that of Pizarro. 
Accordingly, the Spanish warships left Juan Fernandez on 
June 6, missing the arrival of the Centurion by only three 
days.25
Ignorant of Anson's entry into the Pacific, Spanish 
shipping resumed its normal flow. Undetected, the small 
English taskforce was able to station itself along the trade 
routes near Valparaiso to intercept shipping from Lima.
Among the vessels captured were the Nuestra Senora del Monte 
Carmelo, the Santa Teresa de Jestis, the Nuestra Senora de
Carmln and the Arranzazu, a huge merchantman of 600 tons
26quite uncommon in those waters. From the crews of these
vessels, it was learned that the authorities were still
blissfully unaware of their presence, and as the chaplain of
the Centurion wrotes
And thus we were certain of, from the information 
of our prisoners, that whatever our success might 
be as to the prizes we might light on, we had 
nothing to fear, weak as we were, from the Spanish 
force in this part of the world.27
As prizes became increasingly scarce over a period
of months the English realized that their presence must by
that time be known to the authorities. Concerned over the
possibility of facing a Spanish taskforce, the English
25Ibid., 64. 26Ibid., 63-71.
27Walter and Robins, op. cit., 158-59.
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abandoned Chilean waters. They sailed for the Peruvian 
coast where they sacked and burned the small port of Paita, 
escaping with over 30,000 pounds sterling in bullion and
O Odestroying many times that amount in property.
All this time the English had met no resistance of 
any kind. With his eyes now set on the possibility of 
capturing the Philippines treasure galleon which sailed each 
year between Manila and Acapulco, Anson abandoned all but 
his flagship and sailed into Pacific waters, arriving there 
in 1743. Later that year, Anson achieved the pinnacle of 
the expedition's success by capturing the Manila galleon 
intact after an hour and a half battle. The cargo was 
valued at 1,313,843 pesos, in addition to 35,700 ounces of 
bullion.29 The lone Centurion reached England on June 15, 
1744, after circumnavigating the globe in a voyage of four 
years.
The voyage of Anson was a classic adventure at sea 
and a re-creation of the privateering type of warfare so 
popular in the Elizabethan tradition of Drake and Hawkins. 
Besides the Spanish losses in shipping and the booty of 
Paita, the fear generated by the raid paralyzed sea commerce 
between Chile and Peru for months. Indeed, the psychological 
effects were even more profound than the material losses.
This raid revealed with patent clarity the vulnerability of
2®Wilcox, op. cit., 82. 29Ibid., 150.
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the Pacific coast and the inability of the Spanish to do 
more than sit idly by until an enemy tired of those waters 
and moved on to more profitable ones.
Anson1s exploit was a strong argument for the 
expansion of British commerce and influence in the remote 
areas of Spanish rule in the Pacific. This influence was to 
take on renewed importance in the following decades as 
England expanded its grasp through the capture of Manila in 
1762, articulation of trade with China, and the opening of 
the Pacific by Captain Cook and others who sought strategic 
bases and new commercial markets.^ The voyage of Anson was 
the precursor of these events and dramatically reawakened 
British interest in this part of the world. Events in 
Europe were now destined to play a major role in the future 
of the Pacific.
The pact between France and Spain which was to form 
a bulwark of their reciprocal military and political alliance 
during the eighteenth century was known as the Family Com­
pact. First signed in 1733 and ratified again in 1743 and 
1761, it was visualized by the Spanish as a way to improve 
their position of strength against European enemies and the 
ultimate weapon in their struggles with archrival Britain„J 
Since the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the Spanish had been 
forced to make debilitating trade concessions in America to
inWalter and Robins, op. cit., x, Introduction.
31Rhea M. Smith, Spain, A Modern History (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1965), 241, 243, 247.
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the London court. Now diplomatically intertwined with 
France, the Spanish actively pursued an aggressive military 
stance against the English in the hope£ of extricating them­
selves from these treaties and once again recapturing their 
colonial trade.^2 culmination of this protracted
struggle was the Seven Years War (1756-1763), in which 
Charles III rashly overestimated his own strength and joined 
France against England only two years after his accession to 
power.
Defeat, not victory, marked the efforts of Charles, 
as a result of which the Spanish lost Florida, were forced 
to recognize English logwood cutters in Honduras, and relin­
quished their pretensions to fishing rights on the Newfound- 
land Banks. More significantly, as a result of this war, 
the French withdrew from North America, leaving Spain as 
sole rival on the continent to a victorious Britain. Far 
from enhancing Spain's political status, the Family Compact 
became an entangling alliance by which new avenues of foreign 
expansion were opened in America.
Lynch, op. cit., 11.
^Smith, op. cit., 248.
34on their withdrawal from America, the French ceded 
Louisiana to the Spanish, which meant that there was no 
longer a friendly buffer territory to protect the northern 
provinces of Mexico. In addition, Spain now shared naviga­
tional rights of the Mississippi River with England and 
faced the presence of English troops in the gulf coast ports 
of Pensacola and Mobile (Vera Lee Brown, "Anglo-Spanish 
Relations in America in the closing Years of the Colonial 
Era, 1 HAHR, V, No. 3 (August, 1922), 337.
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With the outbreak of the American Revolution, Spain 
and France intervened on the side of the thirteen colonies 
in the hopes of avenging their 1763 territorial losses to 
Britain. In 1779, the two nations formally allied them­
selves against the English, and after this, Spain sent large
35quantities of money and arms to the American colonies.
In the Indies, there was fighting at Campeche, the Gulf of 
Honduras and along the Mosquito Coast. Mobile and Pensacola 
surrendered to Spanish forces under Bernardo GAlvez in 1780 
and 1781. Spain experienced a relatively successful out­
come of the war, and by the Treaty of Paris (1783) acquired 
Minorca and East and West Florida. Despite these gains,
the mother country afterwards grew increasingly incapable of 
defending its American possessions. Additional wars during 
the succeeding two decades forced the Indies to subsist 
militarily on their own resources. And the United States 
now became a maritime menace to Spanish colonial interests, 
especially in the Pacific.
The friction between the Americans and Spaniards 
became noticeable after the Revolutionary War, centering 
around whaling and commercial markets. In the second half 
of the eighteenth century, the demand for whale oil reached 
tremendous proportions, stimulating a world-wide search for 
this precious commodity so essential to keeping the lamps of
33Smith, op. cit., 251-52.
36Ibid., 252.
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Europe burning. A rivalry quickly developed between the
American whaling industry centered in Boston, Nantucket, and
New Bedford, and the British whaling fleets of London and 
37Dunkirk. Manned by staunch New Englanders, the American 
whalers pursued their quarry into most of the oceans of the 
world and especially the Pacific.
Many of these whaling captains carried small quanti­
ties of merchandise to sell clandestinely in Pacific ports, 
often with the intent of only covering the cost of their 
voyages. Others continued their fishing or commercial 
sojourns to Hawaii, the far Northwest, and even China, some­
times circumnavigating the globe in voyages of several years 1 
duration.38 Other Americans came to hunt for seals on 
barren islands such as Juan FernAndez and Mas Afuera, con-
O Qtinuing on to Asiatic markets to sell the hides.
Throughout the course of Spain's enterprise in 
America, a constant unrest pervaded the spirits of royal 
officials in seeing the Caribbean and Pacific frequented 
by ships not flying the flag of Castile. Territorial
3^Pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos entre Chile 
y los Estados Unidos, 1778-1809 (Santiagot Editorial Andr6s 
Bello, 1971), Appendix, 315-46.
3®Vicuna Mackenna, Juan Fernandez, 343-44.
•^In 1792, the Eliza, out of New York and captained 
by W. R. Steward, obtained 38,000 seal skins from Mas Afuera, 
which were sold in Canton, China, for $16,000. The Eliza 
was the first North American boat to procure hides on the 
Chilean islands and sell them in Asiatic markets (Pereira 
Salas, Los primeros contactos, p. 317).
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sovereignty was the overriding principle of Spanish coloni­
zation, and this principle was applied with equal fervor to 
the seas which bathed the coasts of America. Just as the 
juridical concept espoused in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 
1494 served as legal justification for the New World terri­
torial claims, it was likewise extended to include the 
waters adjoining them.40 Viceroy Teodoro de Croix epitomized 
the Spanish mistrust of foreigners by alluding to the fact 
that while Spain might be at peace with a particular foreign 
power, there was always a potential for corsairs or inde­
pendent adventurers of that nation to violate these treaties. 
Foreigners, no matter what their mission, were to be treated 
with caution and suspicion.4^ This closed sea doctrine 
became insupportable as foreign traders began to put in at
1ikely-1ooking coastal towns, even moreso as the colonials
4-2showed no hesitancy in entering in these activities.
The first American vessel to actually touch Chilean 
soil was the Columbia, which appeared off Juan Fernandez on 
May 24, 1788. Out of the port of Boston and captained by 
John Kendrick, the ship was reportedly bound for the Russian 
settlements of the far Northwest when it had been damaged by
^Opaul E. Hoffman, "Diplomacy and the Papal Donation, 
1493-1585," The Americas. XXX, No. 2 (October, 1973), 153-54.
41Memorias de los vireyes, V, 247.
42Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas. I, 222, 224 ,
231.
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storms and separated from its sister ship, the Lady 
Washington. ^  Kendrick asked for permission to be admitted 
to port to take on badly needed provisions and repair 
damaged rigging. Governor Bias Gonzales possessed no 
specific instructions concerning the treatment to be afforded 
neutral vessels, but the ship's navigational papers were in 
order, including a recommendation from the French consul in 
America. There did not appear to be contraband on board.
He therefore allowed the crew to carry out repairs and 
provisioning while anchored below the guns of the fort and 
allowed the ship's officers to come on shore.44 After 
several days, Captain Kendrick departed, thanking the 
Spanish governor for his hospitality.
The Columbia incident sent shock waves through the 
upper echelon of Spanish authorities both in America and in 
Spain. The Peruvian viceroy and president of Chile were 
stunned by such an audacious arrival of an American vessel 
in a Spanish port and even more appalled at Governor Bias
45Gonzales for allowing the Americans to set foot on shore.
The issue merited close scrutiny as a precedent regarding 
the treatment accorded neutral vessels and the Spanish claim 
to sovereignty of the sea. Based upon the general tenor of 
previous cddulas, Viceroy Croix ruled that any foreign
4^pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos, 27.
44Memorias de los vireyes, V, 255.
45Ibid., 254.
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vessel "in these seas" without specific permission should be 
treated as an enemy, even though that nation were an ally of 
Spain.46 The fiscal of the Chilean audiencia remembered a 
c6dula of 1777 which similarly prohibited foreign ships from 
the ports of Spanish America.Governor  Bias Gonzales was 
summarily relieved of command for his actions, and coastal 
authorities were warned to detain any foreign vessels which 
might enter their jurisdictions.
T^e Columbia incident gave way to a rash of real and 
imaginary sightings as foreign traffic intensified and as 
Spanish authorities became increasingly wary of the inten­
tions of these strangers. This included not only American 
vessels but those of England, Holland, and even France, the 
ally of Spain. Several months after this event, fishermen 
near Valparaiso reported sighting over a dozen English ships
sailing near the coast. The local militia was mobilized
4-8before the story was discounted as a rumor. In March of 
the following year, 1790, a ship presumed to be English was 
seen entering the northern bay of Caldera, where the crew 
made depth s o u n d i n g s A  concerned President 0'Higgins 
advised each provincial authority along the coast to post
46Ibid., 255-56.
4^Donoso, El marauds de Osorno, 255.
"Carta de..., January 24, 1789," Doc. No. 5134, 
JMDI, CCVI, 3-5.
49"Expediente de noticias..., 1790," ACG, DCXCV, 5.
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sentinels, exercise extreme vigilance in noting the construc­
tion and function of these ships and their activities, and to
prohibit their crews from landing. Should they do so they
cnwere to be imprisoned. w
Juan Fem&ndez was also visited by a number of
vessels, among them the Penelope, an American whaler which
51dropped anchor in the bay in April, 1791. Mindful of the 
mistakes of his predecessor, Governor Calvo de la Cantera 
imprisoned the pilot and part of the crew as they came 
ashore to ask for fruits to combat scurvy. Captain John 
Worth was baffled by this action and could not comprehend 
why his simple requests for fruits could be interpreted as 
such a monumental threat to the Spanish crown. He was a 
personal friend of the captain of the Columbia and was aware 
of the cordial welcome which he had received from Governor 
Bias Gonzales.^2 In a letter which he floated to shore on a 
buoy, Worth penned a resolute if somewhat inarticulate 
letter referring to his pride in being a citizen of the 
great "You Nitted Stats of North Amarick" and demanding the
COrelease of his crew. The captain was subsequently 
deceived into coming ashore, where he was also captured. The 
entire crew was later sent to Valparaiso for a period of 
detention. This sequence of events was repeated many times
50Ibid., 12.
^"Expediente formado..., 1791," ACG, DCXCV, 1-7. 
5^Ibid. # 5 , ^"^Ibid.
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in the ensuing years. It epitomized the nonchalance of 
foreign mariners in approaching the Pacific coast and the 
exaggerated reaction of the Spanish.
Not all foreign ships came for the purpose of contra 
band? many were innocent whalers or merchantmen which had 
floundered on uncharted coast lines or had anchored in bays 
to take on water and provisions. The crews of other ships 
had contracted scurvy in the long passage around Cape Horn 
and were forced to stop in order to obtain fruits or fresh 
foods. Nevertheless, the suspicion pervaded everywhere; 
there was an attempt to define every foreign landing as some 
kind of subversive plot. The xenophobia of the Spanish was 
not illogical, for the soundings, map-making and knowledge 
of the coast which these mariners obtained provided them 
with a steadily growing reservoir of information which could 
be of great strategic value in a future war with these 
nations. In the words of President O'Higgins;
Until now no more injury has been incurred than 
the shame and vexation of seeing foreign ships con­
tinually along our coasts. Under the pretext of 
fishing they advance their nautical knowledge of our 
condition, which will only encourage their hostile 
activities when we are enemies in the future.54
In 1789, England and Spain came into conflict once 
again, this time over a remote and seemingly unlikely loca­
tion for confrontation. The dispute did not escalate to an 
outbreak of war, but the effects were to have notable
^ 0 'Higgins to Valdez, Santiago, September 19, 1792, 
ACG, DCCLXLIII, 217.
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consequences on the Spanish colonies in the Pacific. In the 
late 1700's, the English began to push into the far North­
west and Alaska to take advantage of the booming fur trade, 
an expansion which led to conflict with Spain, whose Pacific 
domain extended at least in theory as far north as Alaska.
One of the Spanish-claimed areas which they occupied was 
Nootka Sound on the island of Vancouver. It was occupied 
and renamed Friendly Cove by the British. This violation 
of Spanish jurisdiction, no matter how distant, disturbed 
the viceroy of New Spain, who sent a small taskforce to 
Nootka Bay under the command of Esteban Jos6 Martinez. He
found two English vessels in the bay, captured their crews
S6and took them to the Mexican port of San Bias. u
This precipitate act almost brought the two nations 
to war. The Spanish naval fleet was actually readied for 
action and an alliance was sought with the United States and 
France. After sober consideration, however, the decidedly 
inferior military status of the Spanish and an empty 
treasury persuaded the crown to discretely opt for a nego­
tiated settlement concerning fishing and navigational rights 
in the Pacific. Signed in San Lorenzo on October 28, 1790, 
the Nootka Sound Convention was a de facto recognition of 
Spain's rapidly deteriorating European prestige and a
b a r r e n  L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire. Spain and 




57gesture of appeasement to the stronger English nation.
Under the terms of this treaty, British subjects 
were granted the right to colonize and establish trading out­
posts on the northwest coast to the north of Spanish-occupied 
territory in North America. In terms of significance to 
Chile, Britain was granted free navigation and fishing rights 
in the Pacific, including both North and South America. In 
return, the English agreed not to use this privilege as a 
pretext for smuggling; to insure this, no British subject
could approach within ten nautical leagues of those regions
58settled by the Spanish. This last provision was sub3ect 
to varying interpretation, for the English were free to land 
on the deserted offshore islands and unpopulated stretches 
of coast line. In the following years, Chileans became 
alarmed as the English began to land on deserted Chilean 
coasts, areas claimed by the Spanish.
The Nootka Sound Convention presented the English 
with a legal foothold in the Pacific and an ideal subterfuge 
for trade with the forbidden coasts. Despite the regulation 
prohibiting English from setting foot on Spanish-occupied 
areas, there was no arbitration commission nor military 
force at the disposal of the Spanish to enforce such a 
ruling. By virtue of their inability to guard the entire 
coast line, the Spanish gave tacit assent to what was 
already a fact— British fishermen landing on offshore
57Ibid., 247-48. 58Ibid., 544-45.
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islands or deserted stretches to build temporary warehouses 
and huts.
On receiving news of the treaty, Chilean authorities 
reacted with consternation at being obligated to assist a 
rival who was so intent upon the destruction of their com­
mercial system. There was also confusion as to the specific 
treatment to be afforded English crews which touched their 
shores. By this time foreign vessels were arriving with 
frightening regularity, either to ask for supplies or to 
trade. The pertinent question was not how to prevent their 
arrival but the manner of receiving them. Should English 
crews be preferentially treated and permitted to come 
ashore, while at the same time denying this right to the 
French allies? Or should another diplomatic crisis be 
risked by detaining or quarantining English crews when they 
asked for assistance? As the subdelegado of La Serena wrote 
to the president:
I await your instructing me how I should comport 
myself, if they [the English] must enjoy the right 
of hospitality and within what bounds, with respect 
of the fact that in the treaty between our crown 
and that of Britain nothing is elucidated concerning these details.59
President 0 'Higgins himself was confused over the 
manner in which these intruders should be greeted. He was 
an openminded, enlightened servant of the crown who 
undoubtedly comprehended the commercial importance the
59"Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, DCCVII, 15.
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Pacific seemed destined to attain. At the same time, he was 
a high colonial functionary and faithful executor of the 
royal will. While he was willing to grant a certain amount 
of leeway to foreigners who were innocent of breaking Spanish 
laws, he strictly upheld royal prohibitions against com­
mercial transactions with foreigners. On January 2, 1792, 
he issued a ruling that any Spaniard apprehended in trade 
negotiations with foreigners would be liable to receive the
death penalty, a measure which received full sanction by the
60court in Madrid.
The most disturbing consequence of the treaty was 
that the ships of other nations now arrived in unprecedented 
numbers, all pretending to enjoy the same rights as those 
granted to the English.^ In just a few short years, the 
Pacific became crowded with the vessels of many nations, 
each professing a right to sail unmolested and to drop 
anchor along those deserted coast lines which even the 
Spanish had not colonized.
The concessions of San Lorenzo were followed by 
disastrous European wars. From 1793 to 1795, there was war 
with revolutionary France, and in 1796, another war with 
England, which was to continue with only a brief interval
^Donoso, El marquds de Osorno, 259.
61"Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, DCCVII, 28.
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for the next twelve years.^ During this tumultuous period, 
the colonies were forced to exist largely independent of the 
mother country due to the disruption of communication routes 
and preoccupation with internal affairs. No longer able to 
maintain the normal level of shipping with Spanish American 
ports, the crown enacted provisions permitting the colonies 
to trade not only among themselves, but directly with allies 
and neutral nations.
Outbreak of war with England in 1796 forced the 
crown to throw open its colonial ports to neutral traffic 
with the unprecedented royal order of November 18, 1797.^
It was an act of desperation. Despite subsequent revocation 
and restrictions of this right in 1799, 1801 and 1804, an 
irreparable damage had been done. By 1800, colonials were 
accustomed to regulate many of their own trade transactions 
while foreign merchants were equally used to hawking their 
wares in American ports.
As the leading neutral maritime power, the United 
States was able to capitalize on Spanish misfortune by 
winning valuable trade concessions in Spanish America. In 
contrast to Anglo-American relations of the same period,
a . Humphreys, "Isolation from Spain," in John 
Lynch and R. A. Humphreys (eds.), The Origins of the Latin 
American Revolutions, 1808-1826, 143.
63a. P. Whitaker, "Early Commercial Relations 
Between the United States and Spanish America," in Lynch and 
Humphreys (eds.), The Origins of the Latin American Revolu­
tions, 1808-1826, 8 8 .
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commercial privileges were not the ultimate goal of American 
diplomacy with Spain, although the merchants of the eastern 
seaboard looked longingly at the closed ports in the Carib­
bean and in South America. The boundary dispute over the 
Louisiana territory and free navigation of the Mississippi 
River were the keystones of American diplomatic wranglings. 
These issues were settled conclusively by the Treaty of San 
Lorenzo on October 27, 1795
Under the terms of the treaty, the Spanish acceded 
to the territorial demarcation line in Louisiana and Florida 
claimed by the Americans and also granted them free naviga­
tion of the Mississippi River. There were also broad 
dispositions concerning navigational rights in the Pacific 
Ocean. Article VIII stipulated that should the vessels of 
either nation be forced by pirates, storms or similar 
emergencies to seek temporary shelter in ports of the other, 
the crews would be received kindly, and be permitted to
t i Crepair damages or refresh themselves without molestation. 
This provision had a much broader application than the 
conventional rules for protection of vessels within the 
territorial waters of another nation. The presence of so 
many Americans in the Pacific inevitably led to smuggling 
and other activities forbidden by the Spanish, all under
^^Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty; America's 
Advantage from European Distress, 1783-1800 (revised 
edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 343-62.
65Ibid., 349-50.
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the cover of this provision.
Effects of this treaty were quickly felt, the first 
test coming in August, 1796, when the whaler Rose out of 
Nantucket was detained and later taken to Callao for dis­
position by higher authorities. On being notified of the 
matter, the Madrid court dispatched the news of the recent 
treaty and ordered that the boat be released.^ In another 
incident, the Boston merchantman Belle Savage and her crew 
were released in 1800 in consideration of the San Lorenzo 
treaty after being detained for contraband activity. Its 
captain confidently resumed his clandestine trade and at the 
end of two years sailed for Canton with $81,000 in specie 
obtained from contrabanding along the Chilean coast. The 
risks which these vessels incurred could at times be severe, 
ending in detention of the crew and confiscation of the 
vessel and its cargo. Those who dealt in this trade trusted 
to luck, their own resourcefulness and the gullibility or 
venality of Spanish officials, but their efforts were aided 
by the breakdown of the Spanish administrative system under
(Z Qthe stress of war.
The Chilean coast became the cornerstone of clan­
destine American trade in the Pacific, and deserted offshore 
islands were lucrative hunting grounds for seal and wolf
^Pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos, 75.
^Whitaker, op. cit., 90-91.
68Ibid., 90.
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skins. Lying 65 miles to the west of Juan Fernandez, the 
uninhabited island of Mas Afuera became a center for the 
seal industry and the object of concern to Spanish officials 
who suspected the hunters of "suspicious designs and nego­
tiations. During the sealing season, droves of sailors
came ashore with clubs to slaughter the docile herds of 
seals, whose skins were then taken to China where the 
hunters reaped handsome profits. One source estimated that
between 1797 and 1804, over three million seal skins were
70taken from the island in this manner.
It is not known how many foreign ships sailed in
Chilean waters or touched the coast during the late 1700's.
Most did not advertise their presence because of the secret
nature of their undertakings. The historian Eugenio Pereira
Salas has compiled a documentation of only the American
ships in the area between 1788 and 1809. In this twenty-two
year period he found that there were at least 291 such
71vessels, or an average of over a dozen per year. This is 
a significant figure when one takes into consideration the 
much smaller scale of overall commercial activity of that 
time.
69"Ei presidente..., November 11, 1802," Doc. No. 
5518, JMDI. CCXV, 225-26.
^Ralph Lee Woodward, Robinson Crusoe's Island: A
History of Juan Fernandez (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969), 118.
^Pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos. Appendix,
315-46.
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During the 1700's, then, it can be seen that the 
southern Pacific acquired a growing prominence within the 
realm of Spanish defense in America, with significant con­
sequences for Chile. The shifting pattern of colonial trade 
from the Caribbean to the Pacific and other previously 
neglected areas, the proliferation of foreign smugglers, 
traders, and fishermen in those profitable waters aggravated 
Chilean defense and added a new dimension to the role of the 
military. The Chilean army was forced to deploy nearly half 
of its troops in coastal garrisons in order to defend 
against possible invasion or the foreign colonization of 
uninhabited lands in the far south. As a result of the 
combined threats of the Araucanians and foreigners, neither 
could be combated successfully. The deployment of troops on 
two fronts accentuated the instability of the south and the 
close relationship between the military and society.
Chapter 4
THE SITUADO— LIFELINE OF THE FRONTIER ARMY
During the colonial era, the constant preoccupation 
of Chilean officials was in striving for military superiority 
over the indigenous tribes? however, there was an equal 
concern with the staggering costs of continually supporting 
a standing army and the tremendous expenditures which this 
entailed. This fiscal burden was intensified because of 
Chile's economic impoverishment; the colony possessed no 
vast deposits of exploitable wealth, nor was it located at a 
geographic crossroads which would enable it to become a 
master cog in the colonial merchantile system. The Indian 
struggle seriously impaired the development of colonization 
and stable agricultural production. Because of these 
factors, military financing became a continual strain on the 
capabilities of Chilean fiscal administration.
The weighing influence of the military in society is 
illustrated by the fact that during the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, the military accounted for approximately 
forty percent of the total annual expenditures of the 
Chilean treasury."*' A special inquiry into the state of the
■*"Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 338.
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colony's finances revealed that of the 654,278 pesos spent
by the real hacienda in 1788, 277,938 pesos were expended
2for the military and related defense costs. Even with 
these huge sums of money, Chilean presidents were never 
fully capable of adequately maintaining the military forces 
in a strong defense posture. During a three-year period 
from 1786 through 1788, the royal treasury of the Intendancy 
of Concepcibn incurred aggregate military expenses of 500,906 
pesos, but was only able to pay out 395,725 pesos. As was 
customary, the deficit was partially covered by crediting 
the debit against other royal revenues, or through obtaining 
periodic emergency funds from Santiago. Despite such 
measures, Chile entered the nineteenth century still a 
virtual liability to the crown, and its remissions of money 
to the mother country were so diminished as to be only a 
symbolic gesture of fealty.
Within Spain's colonial possessions were a number of 
military outposts such as Chile, which were vital to the 
defense of the kingdom but were too poor to internally fund 
their extensive fortifications and troop garrisons. It was 
common practice for such garrisons to be provided with large 
sums of money called situados, or subsidies, from the vice­
regal centers of New Spain or Peru. In America, the
2Ibid., 336.
3"Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, CCCLXXXIX, 131.
4situado originated in the 1560's and 1570's.
Chile was aided in its treasury dilemmas by Peruvian 
subsidization of its army, an annual assistance which became 
practically an institutionalized part of military life. The 
situado which Peru remitted to Chile was a crucially influ­
ential mechanism, for it constituted the major portion of 
Chilean defense expenditures and virtually sustained the 
strategic coastal fortresses. It established both an 
economic and a political dependency upon Peru, the effects 
of which became manifest during the gestation of the indepen­
dence movement. Indeed, the subsidy existed for over two 
hundred years, representing a sort of umbilical cord by 
which Peru nurtured and fed the frontier forts with all of 
the vital elements of military sustenance.
The history of the Chilean subsidy was as old as 
that of the regular army. By the end of the sixteenth 
century, the diminutive colonial army was composed of no 
more than six hundred ill-equipped and ill-paid troops, who 
received some 60,000 pesos of silver annually from Peru for
Ctheir sustenance. During the period from 1603 to 1607, a 
series of royal dispositions led to the creation of a full-
^Paul E. Hoffman, "Financing the Defense of the 
Indies, 1535-1585," M.S. of a paper read at a meeting of the 
Southern Historical Association, Washington, D. C. (November 
13, 1975), 4-5.
-*Roberto Onat and Carlos Roa, Regimen legal del 
ej6rcito en el reino de Chile (Santiago: Universidad
Catblica de Chile, 1952), 66-67.
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time professional army of 2,000 soldiers, regularly paid by 
the Peruvian treasury and fully governed by Spanish military 
ordinances. This not only lent stability and permanence to 
the army but was greeted by the colonials as the beginning 
of a new era of tranquility and prosperity. Although they 
were mistaken in the assumption that the Indian wars would 
promptly be terminated, civilians were at least free from 
the onerous duty of military service.
The mainstay of this new army was the situado from 
Peru, for it was recognized as impossible for Chile to 
subsist militarily on its own resources. By royal order of 
December 6 , 1606, the king fixed the level of this subsidy 
at 292,000 pesos, 3 reales, which was to be annually 
remitted by ship from Lima to Concepcibn.
The normal procedure for distributing the subsidy 
each year on its arrival in Concepci6n was for the important 
treasury officials, veedor general of the army, an oidor of 
the royal audiencia and the Bishop of Concepcibn to meet 
together in order to oversee the equitable distribution of 
the royal monies. Once the pay lists were drawn up for each 
soldier and the amount due him was ascertained, represen­
tatives from each of the frontier forts were sent to the 
city to collect their respective allotments. Meticulous
6Ibid., 67-72.
7"Carta de..., 1723," Doc. No. 3989, JMDI. CLXXXI- 
CLXXXII, 177.
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provisions were made concerning troop payment— such as 
designating the specific hours of the day in which salaries 
could be distributed, the presence of cex'tified witnesses 
and the designation of proxies for those soldiers unable to 
receive their wages in person. After Valdivia was 
refounded in 1645, it became the recipient of another 
situado, separate from that of Concepcibn, initially con-
Qsisting of 110,221 pesos, 2 reales.
During the course of the 1600's, the subsidy remis­
sions underwent gradual improvement such as in 1690, when 
Chilean presidents were instructed to prepare annual lists 
of all active military personnel to be sent to Lima, so 
that the following year's subsidy might be more accurately 
g a u g e d T h e  route of the situado vessel came to form a 
regular pattern of travel from Peru to the various Pacific 
fortresses, carrying not only the troop salaries but also 
reinforcements, convict laborers, and all manner of military 
supplies.
The system of situado remission almost immediately 
became rife with administrative corruption and malfeasance. 
Complaints were soon heard of shoddy, overpriced clothing 
sent from Lima and of the pilfering of the soldiers' pay by
80nat and Roa, Regimen legal, 83-85.
9"Expediente sobre.. 1 7 8 0 , "  ACG, XLVI, 138. 
•*-80nat and Roa, Regimen legal, 8 6.
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avaricious governors and treasury officials.^ The many 
opportunities for graft stemmed from the long, tortuous 
route of the shipment and the numerous middlemen involved in 
handling and transshipping. The mountainous paperwork in 
this operation and the creation of superfluous administrative 
posts certainly made the falsification of shipping records 
and bills of lading as profitable a means of stealing as 
outright theft of the merchandise. In addition, an attitude 
of bureaucratic detachment among Lima administrators left 
them rather unconcerned over the eventual fate of each ship­
ment, so long as it was dispatched by their office with the 
due perfunctory routine.
Equally threatening the safe delivery of the subsidy 
were navigational hazards, storms and pirates, all of which 
took a mounting toll of vessels. So uncertain was the 
shipment by sea that as a result of the loss of the 1685 
subsidy vessel, the Peruvian viceroy ruled that henceforth 
the subsidy should be transported overland from the treasury
I Oof Potosi, in Upper Peru. This new method was inaugurated 
in 1689, but the results were no more favorable than the 
original system. During the next twenty-nine years, only 
seven shipments were actually made from Potosi, so that in 
1718, the crown again decided to revert to the previous
ll"Carta de..., October 7, 1617, " Doc. No. 7874,
JMDI, CCLXXII, 48.
■^•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, IX, 186.
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13method of shipment by sea from Lima.
For the Lima viceroys, the weighty responsibilities 
of administration encompassed the substantial military 
subsidies remitted to Panama and Chile. As Table 3 indicates, 
during the five-year period from 1790 to 1794, the Peruvian 
viceroyalty spent a total of 19,446,524 pesos in all adminis­
trative areas. Of this amount, 2,151,467 pesos were 
remitted as situados, or about 9.1 percent of the total 
treasury expenditures.
Table 3














Royal Treasury 6,580,384 802,806 7,383,191 37.96
War 7,203,839 227,663 7,431,502 38.21
Political 3,313,343 119,496 3,432,839 17.65
Ecclesiastical 1,198,990 — 1,198,990 6.16
TOTAL 18,296,556 1,149,965 19,446,524 99.98
Another colonial estimate differing slightly from the first 
calculated the subsidies during a six-year period as the 
following amounts:
13"Carta de..., 1723," Doc. No. 3989, JMDI,
CLXXXI—CLXXXII, 178-79.
•̂ •̂ Memorias de los vireyes, VI, Appendix, 30. Totals rounded ofTTo nearest 'whole’'"peso.
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Table 4








1790 87,161 88,656 — — 175,817
1791 77,009 54,069 585,818 — 716,897
1792 87,481 65,407 269,279 — 423,168
1793 95,065 71,914 521,609 — . 688,590
1794 105,992 49,640 17,739 53,916 227,289
1795 101,186 87,790 — — 188,977
Totals 553,897 418,480 1,394,446 53,916 2,420,740
In her study, Maria Encamacidn Rodriguez has con­
cluded that contrary to the widespread belief that Spain 
lived off the royal monies remitted from the New World, the 
greater part of at least the Peruvian revenues were con­
verted into paying for the large military expenditures of 
the viceroyalty, including the situados. Between 1651 and 
1739, 49.4 percent of Peruvian revenues was consumed by 
normal operating costs of government. Only 20.6 percent
found its way into the coffers of Spain, while a full 30.1
17percent was funneled into military-related costs. It can
Ibid., Appendix, 36. Totals rounded off to nearest 
whole peso.
l^Maifa EncamaciOn Rodriguez Vicente, "Los caudales 
remitidos desde el Peru a Espana por cuenta de la real 




be seen from this brief analysis that military expenses 
consumed an excessive proportion of the viceregal budget, 
which aggravated deficit spending and was partially respon­
sible for the dwindling amounts of money remitted to the 
Spanish treasury* The situados constituted a very consider­
able portion of these outlays.
Although a study of the economic effects of the 
subsidy is beyond the scope of this study, it is known that 
the decline of the flota commerce around mid-century 
prompted a great deal of concern among Lima administrators.
A principal source of subsidy revenues was derived from 
the almojarifazgo (import tax) and the alcabala (sales tax), 
which were levied on goods entering Peru by way of the 
Caribbean and Panama. Viceroy Jos6 Manso de Velasco wrote 
in the 1750's that the virtual cessation of fleet commerce 
from Spain to the Indies had brought about a general slump 
in Peruvian tax receipts. Although the registry commerce 
of individually-chartered ships sailing around Cape Horn 
might be expected to take up some of the slack, the viceroy 
was obviously pessimistic concerning the sources of future 
revenues:
. . .  if they [the registry ships] do not satisfy 
the established revenue sources, there will be a 
notable decline in the subsidies of Panama, Chile 
and Valdivia, and . . .  it will not be possible to 
maintain the fortresses.
This crucial phase reflects not only the increasingly rough
■^Memorias de los vireyes, IV, 233.
financial straits through which Peru was passing, but also
the fact that the Chilean defenses would be the first to
suffer from any economic belt-tightening.
The 1753 Chilean military ordinances, conceived by
Viceroy Manso, were the most influential and far-reaching
army reforms to that time, and were predicated upon the need
for a sizeable reduction of forces in order to ease the
19financial burden on the crown. These reforms also
reflected the thinking of Peruvian officials that the
captaincy-general should assume more of an active financial
role in its own defense. The original situado of 292,000
pesos had been gradually reduced over the years, and under
these ordinances it was set at 90,764 pesos, distributed in
the following manner: 72, 212 pesos for Concepcibn and the
frontier; 11,784 pesos for Chilob; and 6,768 pesos for Juan
Fernandez. In addition, Valdivia retained its separate
20subsidy of 50,692 pesos. With the exception of the amount 
destined for Juan Fernandez, the entire quantity was to be 
paid by the Peruvian treasury. However, it was not
-̂ Reglamento para la quamici6n de las Plazas y 
Fuertes de la frontera de la Concepcibn, Valparaiso y Chilob 
del Reyno de Chile, y de las Islas de Juan Fernbndez (Lima: 
Francisco Sobrino, 1753), cited hereafter as Reglamento para 
Concepcibn, Valparaiso, y Chilob, 1753. Copy in Sala Medina
^ Reglamento para la guarnicibn de la Plaza de 
Valdivia (Lima: Francisco Sobrino, 1753), "Resumen general
Cited hereafter as Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753. Copy in 
Sala Medina.
Including transportation expenses, the total cost of 
the Valdivia subsidy averaged between 60,000 and 70,000 
pesos during this period.
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stipulated that the Santiago treasury should assume future 
responsibility for the provisioning of Valdivia and Juan 
Fernandez, and for this purpose should allot 10,000 pesos 
annually for the purchase and transportation (by sea) of
pifoodstuffs to the garrison.
In 1753, the crown monopoly on the sale of tobacco 
(estanco de tabaco) was established in Chile, a monopoly 
which rapidly became one of the most lucrative and stable 
revenues of the captaincy-general. One study computes its 
income for the colonial treasury in the late 1700's as almost 
equaling the other major revenue sources combined. Chile's 
tobacco bureaucracy fell under the larger estanco adminis­
tration in Lima, which supplied it with all of the tobacco 
sold in the colony, without cost. The tobacco monopoly 
impinges on this study in that it became a means of paying 
for the military subsidies. During the next four decades, 
it was also a device by which Peruvian viceroys hoped to
^ Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 1.
The food subsidy for Valdivia and Juan Fernandez was 
known as the situado de viveres, and was remitted each year 
from the port of Valparaiso. It consisted mainly of three 
staple items— flour, jerked beef and lard— -and was comple­
mented by lesser quantities of beans, peppers, tallow and 
salt. As with the Lima subsidy, the situado de viveres 
involved a network of powerful commercial interests, located 
in the vicinity of the capital. Subsidization from Val­
paraiso continued until the first years of the 18001s, when 
the Valdivia area became largely self-sufficient in agri­
cultural production.
22Agnes Stapff, "La renta del tabaco en el Chile de 
la epoca virreinal. Un ejemplo de la politica econdmica 
mereantilista," AEA, XVIII (1961), 26.
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shift the burden of these subsidies to the Chileans.
The first military subsidy to suffer from the aus­
terity measures of Viceroy Manso was the situado of Concep- 
ci6n and the frontier. As a result of viceregal decrees of 
October 22, 1754, and September 16, 1755, it was ruled that 
the two provincial estancos of Santiago and Concepci6n must 
thereafter pay the prestamo of the frontier army; that is, 
the monthly advances given to each soldier in lieu of his 
full salary. This constituted an annual cost of 41,952 
pesos.22 The remaining wages (37,478 pesos) continued to be 
remitted from Lima at the end of each year. In 1759, the 
remaining frontier subsidy from Peru was terminated, the 
corresponding amount of money to be provided by the tobacco 
revenues of Concepcibn.However, the provincial adminis­
trators found this an intolerable burden on their already 
strained treasury, especially in the light of escalating 
military costs. Beginning in the 1770's the Santiago 
bursars were forced to send 100,000 pesos a year to Con­
cepcibn in order to pay two-thirds of the wages of the 
25frontier army. Despite this assistance, m  the three-year 
period from 1786 through 1788, the treasury of Concepcibn
23pernando Silva Vargas, "Peru y Chile. Notas sobre 
sus vinculacibnes administrativas y fiscales, 1785-1800," 
Historia, VII (1968), 163.
24"E1 presidente..., February 4, 1790, " Doc. No. 
5158, JMDI, CCVI, 267.
25,1 Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, CCCLXXXIX, 132.
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fell some 105,180 pesos in arrears in paying the troops.26
After 1755, Chilean tobacco revenues and treasury 
fxands supported two food subsidies (Juan Fern&ndez and 
Valdivia), the salaries of the frontier army, and those of 
the small detachments in Valparaiso and Juan Fernandez. It 
was a responsibility which placed a severe strain on the 
colony's resources, for in spite of the tobacco revenues, 
Chile's treasury was in a state of permanent insolvency. 
Nonetheless, Peruvian officials continued to try to push an 
even greater part of the defense burden onto the Chilean 
treasury.
The logical mechanism for achieving this was through 
the estanco. Peruvian tobacco revenues were as profitable 
as those of Chile, but since 1754 the viceroys had sent all 
tobacco to Chile free of charge, assuming the costs them­
selves . It was the desire of Viceroy Francisco Gil de 
Taboada and others that the cost of the situado be offset
by Chilean reimbursement for the tobacco which it pur- 
97chased. 7 This act carried with it the stipulation that
28Chile pay for all of the tobacco which it consumed. By 
royal c6dulas of June 20, 1787, and July 22, 1788, the 
viceroy received orders to remit to Spain the revenues from 
tobacco and playing cards, which led him to demand the
25Ibid., 131.
2^Silva Vargas, "Peru y. Chile," 173. 
28stapff, "La renta del tabaco," 42.
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?Qimmediate liquidation of the Chilean estanco debts. These 
severe demands on the colonial treasury were protested by 
President 0 'Higgins, but to no avail.
In spite of these fiscal skirmishes, Peru was still
encumbered with the Valdivia subsidy. While it was realized
that this responsibility could not be evaded. Viceroy Gil de
Taboada sought to at least ameliorate the consequences to
his own treasury. On July 7, 1790, President O'Higgins
received correspondence from the viceroy advising him that
henceforth the cost of the situado (which by this time had
risen to 80,444 pesos) must be borne by Chileans from their
tobacco revenues. As compensation for this, an equal amount
of money would be sent to Spain from the Peruvian treasury
to cancel part of the mountainous debt which Chile owed to
the crown. Technically, Peru would still carry the hidden
cost of the subsidy, but would be able to charge this amount
•anagainst its own extended payments to Spain.
The settlement was hardly satisfactory for the 
Chileans, for they would now be forced to pay from their 
reserves on hand, as opposed to the relative ease with which 
they could negotiate their long-term debt with Spain. In 
all of its subtle ramifications, the plan spelled another 
financial obligation for Chile. President 0 'Higgins 
promptly petitioned to Spain for the abrogation of this
^^Memorias de los vireyes, V, 267.
"El presidente..., July 7, 1790," Doc. No. 5118, 
JMDI, CCV, 168.
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ruling, or at least a temporary suspension until the 
colony's case could be presented. This delaying action 
permitted Chile to receive the subsidy as always for a 
number of years more. On November 22, 1804, the Spanish 
monarch finally granted the viceroy authority to decide the 
matter for himself.32 Two years later, in 1806, the Peruvian 
viceroy definitively ruled that Chilean revenues must pay 
for the entire cost of the Valdivia subsidy.
This ruling ended the longstanding contention 
between Lima and Santiago over the military subsidy. Now, 
the Chilean treasury was faced with additional military 
funding of major proportions, which coupled with other 
urgent expenses led to predictions of dire consequences in 
financial circles. Only one year later, in 1807, President 
Munoz de Guzman was forced to lower the salaries of all 
government and military personnel by ten to twenty-five 
percent.34 There were also pleas for voluntary donations 
and stringent efforts to raise new tax revenues.
The apprehension of Chileans over the subsidy1s 
termination were perhaps justified, for it came at a moment
31silva Vargas, "Peru y Chile," 186.
32"Real orden..., November 22, 1804," ACM, XLIX, 1.
33cabriel Guarda, La economia de Chile austral antes 
de la colonizacidn alemana, 1645-1850 (Valdivia: Univer-
sidad Austral de Chile, 1973), 94.
34"Decreto del..., March 11, 1807, " Doc. No. 5610, 
JMDI, CCXVIII, 215-17.
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when invasion by European powers was an imminent possibility; 
1806 was the year in which a British military force captured 
Buenos Aires and was rumored to be readying another expedi­
tion to enter Pacific waters.^ The colony1s increased 
costs in constructing fortifications to meet this threat, as 
well as the mobilization of militia to guard coastal areas, 
became doubly burdensome with the almost simultaneous 
assumption of the Valdivia situado by Santiago.
An incident exemplifying this difficult situation 
took place on the eve of the independence movement in 1810. 
Governor Alejandro Eagar of Valdivia wrote to President 
Garcia Carrasco in July of that year that the garrison was 
in desperate straits because no money had been forthcoming 
from Santiago on the situado v e s s e l . T h e  situation was so 
critical that of the 13,000 pesos consumed by the treasury 
each month, only 3,760 pesos remained in July of that year—  
barely enough to pay the infantry battalion its current 
salaries.37 It was customary in times such as these for 
Valdivian treasury officials to utilize the practical but 
undependable recourse of borrowing funds from local 
merchants. During this particular year, however, no citizen 
had volunteered any assistance. The treasurers in Santiago 
protested to the governor that the capital was entering an
33Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 295-97.
35"Expediente. . 1 8 1 0 , "  ACG, CCCLXLV, 225.
37Ibid., 226.
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equally bleak fiscal crisis and finally persuaded Concepcibn 
officials to dispatch 12,000 pesos to Valdivia as an emer­
gency relief. As the winter was too far progressed to send 
the money by ship, the mail courier for the two cities was 
contracted to carry the money overland, aided by his amiable
Oprelations with the Indians.
Stopgap remedies such as this one were the typical 
responses of the financially strained Santiago treasury to 
the military needs of the south, depicting an almost com­
plete incapability in shouldering the responsibilities of 
situado remission. Long-range solutions to the provisioning 
of Valdivia were not only beyond the range of the colony's 
resources, but were looked upon with relative disinterest by 
the Santiago decision-makers. They were at this time more 
preoccupied with defense of central Chile and the capital 
area, especially due to the possibilities of independence 
and the subsequent need to protect this vital core of the 
patriot movement.
* * * * * *
Because of its unique historical development and 
local circumstances, Valdivia offers an exemplary model of 
the actual implementat ion of the situado system, not only 
from the complexities of its operation, but also because the 
corrupting influence of garrison life presented the greatest
38Ibid.. 229.
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impediment to its intended use.
The Valdivia situado was used for the salaries of 
military personnel, fortifications, public works and the 
maintenance of convict laborers. The amount of the subsidy 
varied from year to year, but roughly 80,000 pesos annually 
was sent from Lima— -about 30,000 pesos worth of which 
arrived in the form of clothing or other commodities for the 
troops.3^ it constituted the economic base of existence for 
the city and forts and became a kind of oil that lubricated 
the entire economic machinery of government.
The importance of the subsidy is illustrated by the 
fact that the most critical matters of deliberation between 
the governor and his staff were undertaken in a junta de 
hacienda, or finance council, rather than in a council of 
war, for on the maintenance of the tenuous supply and 
communication routes hinged the very survival of the colony. 
This finance council, composed of the governor, sergeant 
major, company captains and treasury officials, met each 
year to elect a situadista, or an agent charged with 
traveling to Lima to personally supervise the delivery of 
the subsidy.^0 Until the 1750's, the selection of this 
important official had defaulted to the individual 
governors, who frequently chose a relative or crony in 
conspiracies to defraud the royal treasury. While a 1753
^Guarda, La economia, 89.
^Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 4.
103
ordinance provided that the junta de hacienda should elect 
the situadista from the ranks of the battalion captains, 
categorically excluding any relatives of the governor, it 
was not until late in the colonial period that these irregu­
larities were somewhat diminished. This was due to the use 
of wealthy bondsmen who put up considerable sums of money to 
guarantee full delivery of the subsidy.4^
There were other officials commissioned by the 
governor to coordinate the delivery of the situado. The 
apoderado (attorney) representing Valdivia maintained 
permanent residence in Lima and was charged with managing 
legal technicalities and insuring the financial solvency of 
individuals bonding the subsidy. Unlike many of the 
situadistas, these lawyers were evidently responsible
officials. They were usually of great social prominence in
40Lima and enjoyed an annual salary of 1,200 pesos.  ̂ After 
1707, another position of legal agent was established in 
Santiago in order to manage the financial accounts of 
Valdivia and the food subsidy, which was sent each year from
A OValparaiso. These positions were of singular importance 
as the security of the situado against embezzlement was best 
insured by the use of bondsmen, whom the officials directly 
supervised.
4^Ibid., Ord. 33.
42Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 164.
43"Indice alfabetico...," [c 1792], AV, CCLXXXIII, 
Item 1, "Apoderado."
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The Valdivia situado included not only troop salaries 
but also clothing, hardware, woolen cloth, gunpowder, arms, 
and particularly those specialties and luxury items such as 
sugar, hams and wines.^4 Immediately prior to his departure 
for Lima, the situadista received from the junta de hacienda 
an inventory of the company pay lists, miscellaneous mer­
chandise to be purchased (such as medicines and clothing) for 
the convicts, and the amount of pay which each soldier 
desired to receive in merchandise. On his arrival in Lima, 
this inventory list was presented to the treasury officials, 
who disbursed the stipulated amount while the situadista 
purchased the other necessary items. In order to place a 
check on the infamous collusion between situadistas and 
Peruvian merchants, it was stipulated that the buying of 
merchandise should conform to current price guidelines 
issued periodically by the Lima tribunal of commerce, the 
consulado.4  ̂ In actuality, both parties were sufficiently 
skilled at avoiding such regulations, often dealing in 
transactions far below the price guidelines with the dif­
ference going into their own pockets.
On returning to Valdivia with the cargo, the 
situadista was presented with another itemized list of the 
alterations in the pay scales of the troops which had 
occurred during his absence, due to desertion, discharge or
44"Expediente sobre..., 1802," ACG, CCCCXIV, 206.
45Ibid., 213.
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additional recruitment. He must rearrange the accounts 
accordingly and then distribute the particular merchandise 
to each company captain. Once this was concluded, a carta 
cuenta was drawn up relating the amounts given to each 
soldier and the resulting deductions from his pay.̂  The 
position of the situadista could be precarious, for if he 
misjudged the amount of money due the troops or spent too 
much for merchandise in Lima, he was personally held liable 
for repaying the difference to the treasury. This was a 
circumstance which was not infrequent.^7
The root cause of graft in the subsidy lay not merely
with the situadista but also with a multitude of royal
officials, who realized that there were enormous gains to
be made from this very large flow of money. Governors of
Valdivia were frequently the most ardent practitioners of
these illegalities. The seldom-practiced method of electing
the situadista usually resulted in two competing groups of
officials coalescing within the town, each attempting to
gain the favor of the governor with promises of lucrative
48payments if their candidate was chosen. It appears that 
the situadista at times had to suffer the consequences of 
his prestigious cohorts.
46"Indice alfabetico.. "  [c 1792], AV, CCLXXXIII, 
Item 1, "Situadista."
47"Expediente sobre..., 1802," ACG, CCCCXIV, 206.
A Q^°Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 165.
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One particular agent. Captain Pedro Usauro Martinez,
was exposed in 1762 for having defrauded the treasury of
10,013 pesos in his supervision of the s u b s i d y I t  is not
known whether or not he had accomplices, but in this case
Martinez was imprisoned, his personal property auctioned by
the treasury, and his normal yearly salary deducted from the
debt outstanding. This in itself is not unusual, but it is
interesting to note that Martinez served for many years in
prison, all the while on the active military roster and
forfeiting his salary to repay the debt. In 1783, it was
ruled that he should be granted one-third of his salary to
provide for his family, but when he died in 1789, he still
snowed 2,169 pesos to the royal treasury.
The urgent need for the troops to receive the 
situado promptly each year, and intact, was aggravated by 
the practice of paying them their full salary once yearly, 
rather than on a monthly or trimester basis as was customary 
in the forts along the frontier. Soldiers were given a 
small monthly advance from the Valdivia treasury for 
subsistence and for purchasing a few necessities, then paid 
the remainder of their salary on arrival of the Lima boat. 
This monthly stipend was far from sufficient, as evidenced
49"Testimonio de..., 1764," ACG. DXXXV, 379.
50Ibid., 400.
■^Letter of Oyarzdbal, Santiago, May 9, 1808, ACG,
DCXXXVI.
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by the widespread usury which developed. The governor him­
self lent out large sums of his own money to the soldiers at 
exorbitant rates of interest. In addition to this loan­
sharking by prominent officials, the scarcity of clothing 
and food obliged the soldiers and their families to fall 
into debt peonage by purchasing necessities from the 
governor's own warehouse. Although this practice was for­
bidden by royal law, the need of the soldiers was so great 
that the Ordenanzas politicas y econbmicas de Valdivia 
( 1 7 4 1 )  not only relented to its use, but laid down specific
instructions as to how such lending should be transacted and
52the maximum rates of interest which might be charged.
If the subsidy proved a lucrative source of income
for Lima merchants and high-ranking officers of Valdivia,
the same did not necessarily hold true for shipowners who
transported it. While the Peruvian treasurers paid 6 ,000
pesos for expenses to each shipowner making the j ourney,
these men were hesitant to risk the tempestuous weather of
the southern latitudes or to voluntarily exclude themselves
53from more profitable voyages. As there were seldom royal 
warships available to undertake this loathsome task,
3^The conditions of such loans were that they be 
voluntary on the part of the troops, that the amount of the 
loan should not exceed one-third of the soldier1s salary, 
and that the interest rate must not be exhorbitant ("Orden­
anzas politicas y econOmicas de la Plaza de Valdivia," 
Concepci6n, November 17, 1741, Ords. 29 and 30. Hereafter 
cited as "Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741. Copy in Sala 
Medina.
53"Autos seguidos..., 1766, " ACM, XXII, 30.
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officials were constantly preoccupied with either persuading 
or intimidating a private owner to fit out his vessel on 
short notice and then making certain that he did not wriggle 
out of his obligation before completing the voyage. This 
system of private contracting left the subsidy vulnerable to 
costly delays, spoilage of perishables, and a fluctuating 
delivery schedule. The short sailing season made it 
imperative that the ship leave on time, or else an entire 
year's effort would be wasted. Coordination and planning 
were often an impossibility considering that reluctant ship­
owners could bottleneck the entire yearly operation by 
refusing to sail on the scheduled date, sometimes under the 
pretext of their vessel being unseaworthy.
Finally, in 1766, the viceroy decreed that all large 
ships of the Pacific coastal trade were obliged to take
c Aturns carrying the situado each year. This decision was 
predicated on the theory that such strategic shipments were 
not regarded as normal commerce presided over by the Lima 
tribunal del consulado, but fell under jurisdiction of the 
royal treasury.̂  Under this turn system known as the 
sorteo, shipowners agreed to rotate the delivery, the first 
period extending from 1769 through 1779. If a particular 
owner could not fulfill his appointed turn, he might trade 
positions with another owner by mutual consent, but refusal 
to comply with one' s obligation entailed a fine of 4,000
54ibid., 1. 55Ibid., 18-19.
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pesos. This improved system was a first step in choosing
a willing shipper, and was later renewed after the first
ten-year period expired.
Apart from the flaws of the sorteo, the subsidy was
continually threatened by either loss at sea or piratical
incursions in the Pacific. The mere rumor of the latter was
sometimes sufficient cause for the delay or suspension of
the ship's departure. Once loaded in Callao, it was normal
for the vessel to proceed directly to Valparaiso, where it
also took on board the food situado before continuing to
Valdivia, in this manner cutting transportation costs by a
considerable margin. Governor Joaquin de Espinosa bitterly
denounced this practice in 1766 on the grounds that a
single large vessel lacked the capacity to carry both
situados combined, which resulted in the garrison not having
57enough supplies to last an entire year.
In 1782, a more uniform delivery method was devised, 
which utilized a separate vessel for each subsidy and a 
rotation system as agreed upon under the sorteo. The 
first ship must be a large, heavy vessel which transported 
the provisions to Valdivia, departing from Valparaiso 
punctually each February 15. The second vessel should be 
smaller in size, leaving Callao during October, with the 
regular Peruvian subsidy. After unloading in Valdivia, this
56Ibid., 33. 57Ibid.. 24.
5 8"E1 tribunal de Cuentas..., 1782," AV, CCLXXXIII,
14-15.
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vessel was to return to Valparaiso to take on the supplies 
and relief troops destined for Juan Fernandez, which had to 
arrive at the island by March at the very latest. Under this 
system, a total of 11,000 pesos was allotted for transporta­
tion costs: 6,000 for the larger ship and 5,000 for the
smaller one,59
The situado was more than a means of supplying the 
soldiers of the Chilean army. In a broader context it 
represented the policy of Lima and Valparaiso commercial 
interests to preserve their own trade monopolies by pre­
venting the growth of would-be competitors. As Father 
Gabriel Guarda points out, there was a conscious effort on 
the part of many governmental officials, both in Chile and 
Peru, to deny Valdivians trade licenses or access to out­
side commerce.^9 The situado constituted a basic component 
of this monopolistic system because the bulk of its worth 
was remitted in merchandise rather than the currency which 
was needed to develop the local economy. A royal investi­
gator lent credence to this with his statement that:
. . . there is no doubt that the method of carrying
the subsidy in merchandise results that no one
[speaking of merchants] thinks of sailing to Valdivia, 
as there is no purpose, its commerce being thus closed
and restricted to a few established individuals that
never v a r y . 6 1
59Ibid., 14.
6°Guarda. La economia, 66-67.
61-Escobedo to Jhuregui, Lima, October 1, 1782, ACM,
XLIX, 4.
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Governor Juan Clarke remarked in 1795 that one of his over­
riding desires was that Valdivia should develop a class of 
merchants, but an even more important aspiration was that 
these merchants be residents of the city, for the region 
would never prosper as long as it depended on outside 
assistance for survival.®2
* * * * * *
To the island colony of Chilo6 , the situado repre­
sented even a more necessary component of life than in 
Valdivia, for the primitive agricultural existence and the 
absence of local commerce forced even the civilian populace 
to hang upon the arrival of the ship from Callao. The 
amount of the situado averaged around 70,000 pesos a year 
during the term of Peruvian Viceroy Gil de Taboada (1790's), 
much of this consisting of merchandise.®^ The poverty of 
the island was heightened by its isolation, for the belicose 
Indians impeded terrestial contact between Chilob and 
Valdivia, while the long eight-month winter closed off all 
sea traffic. The subsidy was thus justified in that it 
provided the essentials for the colony's survival. But 
through the years Peruvian policy-makers had continued to 
hold the island in economic servitude and had steadfastly 
refused to allow the inhabitants to gradually decrease their
62,,Sobre mejorar..., 1795, " ACM, CX, 14. 
®2Olguin, Institucibnes, 85.
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dependence by the stimulation of local commerce. The subsidy 
arrived so infrequently at times that it caused extreme hard­
ship among the inhabitants of the island. For example, the 
subsidy was not sent from 1733 through 1735. During that 
time, the soldiers contracted such large debts borrowing 
money on which to subsist that when the shipments finally 
resumed and their creditors demanded immediate payment of 
the loans, the troops were left as pennyless as b e f o r e . 64
Practically all of Chilo6 1s ties were with Peru. 
Island residents traveling to Valparaiso or other Chilean 
ports had to take the roundabout itinerary of first 
joumeying to Lima, then traveling southward to Chile on 
another ship. Commerce was restrictive because the 
islanders possessed no vessels capable of transport ing their 
goods to Peru. Consequently, they were at the mercy of a 
handful of Peruvian shipowners who agreed to transport their 
commodities only at outrageous prices, at times up to one
£ Chundred percent of the product's worth. J The engineer 
L&zaro Rivera wrote that the total value of Chilo6 's exports 
to Peru in 1782 reached 95,700 pesos, while the worth of 
imports from Peru was only 13,326 p e s o s . 66 Such an unfavor­
able balance of trade was compounded by the discrepancy in
64" C a r t a  del Presidente..., March 15, 1739," Doc.
No. 4125, JMDI. CLXXXIV, 320-21.




price between identical products in Lima and in Chilo6 , 
which resulted in the islanders paying prices several times 
higher than elsewhere.
Table 5
Price Discrepancies Between Products 
in Lima and C h i l o £ 6 7




Jug of liquor 11 pesos 25 pesos
Sugar (one arroba) 4 pesos, 4 reales 10 pesos
Soap (one arroba) 10 pesos 35 pesos
Rock salt 1 peso 4 pesos
Rivera realized that the island's barter economy and 
poverty could only be transformed by the availability of 
capital, through which local business initiative could off­
set Peruvian monopolism. The situado, composing one of the 
two or three ships which annually visited the colony, 
actually impeded economic progress. As a royal inspector 
reported s
. . . the scarcity of money comes from the traditional 
practice of the island's agent [the situadista] being 
a merchant from Lima? he receives the subsidy in
/■ •*7
Ibid., 213-14. An arroba equals approximately 
twenty-five pounds.
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currency and sends it converted into merchandise.
This results in money being so rare that two 
reales have been called and are still called a provincial p e s o . 68
The Peruvian situado, then, was the heart of a master 
plan for the maintenance of the strategic fortress complexes 
throughout the viceroyalty, and a notable example of Spanish 
administrative genius. Considering the immense planning 
which went into its functioning, the coordination of 
shipping, and the dispatching of currency and merchandise, 
it served admirably well. It was the only means of sustain­
ing these important areas, without which such vital positions 
as Panama and Valdivia might have become possessions of 
foreign powers. It also promoted the cohesiveness and 
loyalty to the crown of the residents of these areas, as the 
annual situado ship was sometimes their only communicative 
tie with the outside world. Not only did it provide them 
with essential elements of survival, but this direct link 
with the viceregal bureaucracy and a constant flow of royal 
military officers was a subtle but powerful means of culti­
vating loyalty to the crown. In an era when frontier 
arsenals represented the epitomy of isolation, Spain's 
centralism was reinforced to a remarkable degree.
"Fragmento de...," [c 1780], Doc. No. 4844, JMDI, CXCVIII, 320-21. A  peso consisted of eight reales.
Chapter 5
THE DESTERRADOS
One of the worst maladies of eighteenth century 
Chilean society was the prevalence of crime, banditry, 
vagrancy and other forms of social degeneracy, especially 
among the mestizo-Indian castes and the semi-barbaric rural 
inhabitants. This heritage of lawlessness and violence was 
more than a persistent vestige of the period of conquest, to 
be gradually eradicated by the inroads of Spanish civiliza­
tion; rather, it constituted part of the very fabric of 
society itself, and was a way of life for thousands of rural 
inhabitants.^ The disrespect for authority was a definite 
factor in weakening the Spanish grip over the southern lands 
and in their pushing back the frontier.
The expanses of underpopulated lands between the 
Maule and Bio Bio rivers served as principal sanctuaries for 
countless half-breeds and Spanish who had fled there either 
to escape from crimes which they had committed or because 
they had simply grown weary of the social conformity imposed 




centering around cattle thievery, contrabanding, or highway 
2robbery. They lived on the margins of Spanish society, and 
the most draconic rulings by presidents had no apparent 
effect on their actions. While he was an army officer along 
the frontier, Ambrosio 0 'Higgins wrote that the Spanish and 
mestizo criminals who preyed on the civilian population were 
almost as great a problem as the Indians, for the militia 
was so occupied in apprehend ing these derelicts that they 
were of little use in reinforcing the veteran troops.3 
Municipalities and cabildos were entirely inadequate in con­
tending with the rampant crime, for local jails were either 
non-existent or so rudimentary that criminals could escape 
almost at will. The fiscal burden of maintaining prisoners 
was an equally acute problem. In 1762, the entire prison 
population of Santiago was at the point of starvation because
there were no available revenues to procure food for the
4inmates, save for the scant alms of a concerned priest.
It was customary in Chile, as in other areas of the 
Spanish empire, for civil authorities to remand convicted 
criminals to military fortresses where they would be far 
removed from endangering or burdening the civilian populace. 
This was mutually beneficial, for the military was able to
2Ibid., 5-7.
^0'Higgins to J&uregui, April 21, 1776, ACM, LIV, 3.
4jos6 T. Medina, Cosas de la colonial apuntes para 
la cr6nica del siglo XVIII en Chile (Santiago: Imprenta
Universitaria, 1952), 297.
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utilize convict labor to construct the extensive fortifica­
tions throughout the south® Thus, the Chilean army served 
somewhat of a dual role: not only did it provide for the
defense of the colony, but it was also responsible for the 
detention and upkeep of criminals. While this diminished 
the pressure on the overburdened, civilian penal facilities, 
it left a rather profound stamp on the character of the 
military.
Convicts serving their sentences within the military 
outposts of Chile were known as desterrados, or exiles, and 
they were shipped there from such distant centers as Peru, 
New Granada, and even Spain. The policy of these adminis­
trative centers was almost uniform in the desire to rid 
their colonies of as many undesirable elements as possible. 
In Spain, both the civil and military tribunals were charged 
with dispatching military delinquents to America in order to 
serve out their sentences. In spite of this deliberate 
policy, until very late in the colonial period it was cus­
tomary to send most convicts either to peninsular fortresses
7or to Africa. Because Chile fell under the direct juris­
diction of Lima, the colony was obliged to serve as a
^At times, convicts were also referred to as 
presidarios.
6 "Indice alfabetico..., July 4, 1777," ACG,DCCLXXIII.
7Pedro Toledo SSnchez, Esquema del derecho penal 
militar indiano y su jurisprudencia chilena (Valparaiso: 
Editorial Juridica de Chile, 1961), 130.
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dumping ground for some of the viceroyalty's most incor­
rigible offenders, especially military deserters from the 
Peruvian army. A Peruvian military ordinance of 1753 
specifically provided that apprehended deserters should be 
forced to serve for six years in Valdivia, with a reinci­
dence of desertion punishable by "perpetual exile" in either
QValdivia or Juan Fernandez.
The majority of convicts came from the captaincy- 
general, itself. The wheels of justice turned with 
agonizing slowness in Chile, due to the almost epidemic 
proportions of criminality and the cumbersome nature of 
colonial jurisprudence. Magistrates found it impossible to 
process the accused quickly enough to avoid massive backlogs 
of pending cases, so that sheer practicality came to dictate 
that criminal cases frequently be expedited with penalties 
of forced labor. This was standard practice not only for 
common thieves and footpads, but also for capital offenders, 
for the hanging of murderers was an expensive and lengthy 
process.9
There was a similar urgency within administrative 
circles to remit enough convicts in order to fill the quotas 
of construction laborers, for the defense of the colony was
^Reglamento para la Guamici6n de la Plaza del Real 
Phelipe del Callao (Lima: Francisco Sobrino, 1753), Ord.
18.
^Vicuna Mackenna, Juan Fernandez, 301. The customary 
sentence for vagrants was two years fortress labor and up to 
ten years* confinement for robbery.
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felt to pivot upon a strong network of fixed fortifications. 
In order to comply with orders for new fortifications, 
President O'Higgins solicited the audiencia in 1788 to 
expedite criminal cases more quickly and to pass out more 
sentences of forced labor. When the royal court was unco­
operative with his plea, the president issued a decree 
ordering the subdelegados to immediately ferret out up to 
four hundred vagrants and known criminals throughout their 
districts. If at least two witnesses could testify to the 
guilt or bad character of each accused, he was to be remitted 
to Valparaiso for shipment to Valdivia on the earliest 
possible boat. As the foregoing example depicts, expedi­
ence was the key to the remission of desterrados, either 
from the overburdened dockets of the audiencia or from the 
needs of military labor camps. There was little concern for 
the lack of prison facilities within these forts, nor the 
manpower limitations in providing for convict maintenance.
Valdivia, Juan Fernandez, Talcahuano (the port of 
Concepci6n) and Valparaiso were the four Chilean fortresses 
used for the detention of criminals. A handful of convicts 
were occasionally sent to forts along the frontier, but the 
bulk of them were housed in the coastal fortresses because 
of the ease with which they could be transported there by 
sea. The collection and remission of the convicts were 
normally undertaken in conjunction with the situado, and
border of February 14, 1786, ACG, DCCLXXIII.
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each year convicts from Peru were loaded aboard the military
supply ship in Callao for the trip south. Upon their
arrival at Valparaiso, additional convicts were put aboard
from the Santiago jails and outlying areas of the 
11intendancy. Before leaving port, those men destined to
serve in Valdivia or Juan Fernandez were given thorough 
medical examinations to ascertain their fitness for enduring 
the cold, southern latitudes and the arduous physical 
labor.12
Separated from the mainland by 400 miles, Juan
Fernandez became Chile's maximum security prison. To the
island were consigned the hard-core incorrigibles and
1 ̂especially those men with habitual escape records. J 
Although the island was not far off the Lima-Valparaiso 
trade route, the extremely treacherous seas and craggy coast­
line enhanced its almost total isolation and discouraged all 
but one or two ships landing there each year. Ironically, 
the governor and troops stationed there considered them­
selves as much prisoners as any convict, for they were 
rotated only once a year from the despised garrison.1^ The
11"Expediente formado..., 1800-1806," Doc. No. 1338, 
ARA. DCII, 8 .
1Certification of prisoner's health bound for 
Valdivia and Juan Fern&ndez, Santiago, April 11, 1799, ARA, 
CCCLXXXV, 3-5.
12"Correspondencia del Tribunal..., May 22, 1762," 
ACG, DCXLV, 126.
1Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn, X, 202.
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island was completely poverty-stricken, and the letters of 
its governors attested to the wretched state of the inhabi­
tants, the undiscipline of the troops, and the absence of 
productive enterprises. Dependency was the overriding con­
cept in its existence, for the very survival of the 
islanders hinged upon the prompt arrival of the annual 
situado from Valparaiso. This subsidy of food and supplies 
sustained not only the regular crown dependents (soldiers 
and convicts) but their families and the colonists, as 
well.15
Anywhere from several dozen to as many as one hundred
prisoners a year were brought to the island, and they served
as laborers and as auxiliary troops in time of war. In
April, 1802, there were 165 convicts on the island, 44 of
whom had come from Lima.1** Notwithstanding the island's
reputation as a maximum security prison, prisoners did
escape. This necessitated vigilance on the part of the
troops there. One of the ordinances for Juan Fernandez
promulgated under President Jduregui ordered that a corporal
and two soldiers guard each ship arriving at port in order
17to prevent convicts from stowxng away on board.
^"Relacidn que expresa..., July, 1795," ACM, CIII,
2.
1 5 "Relaci6n que manifiesta..., January 2, 1799," ARA, 
CCCLXXXV, 1.
1  ̂"Ordenanzas del presidente J&uregui, " Santiago, 
April 25, 1776, hereinafter cited as "Ordenanzas de 
Jciuregui, " 1776. Copy in Sala Medina.
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In 1787, a bizarre episode occurred which involved 
the Peruvian viceroy's signature being forged in order to 
secure the release of three convicts. The archival source 
does not mention who might have perpetrated the forgery but 
does relate that three men left the island on ships with 
supposedly valid documents confirming their release. One 
convict even managed to sign aboard the visiting situado 
ship as a sailor. The authorities in Santiago advised the 
Intendant of Concepcibn to search all incoming vessels for
T Othe escapees. This and similar occurrences convinced 
Chilean officials that prisoners could escape from an island, 
even one as far away as Juan Fernandez.
In an effort to stimulate the growth of the island 
population, incentives for colonization were offered (such 
as land, tools and housing materials), and the families of 
soldiers stationed there were encouraged to settle on the 
island. These benefits were also extended to the convicts 
with the realization that they composed an integral portion 
of the p o p u l a t i o n H o w e v e r ,  the inhospitable environment 
of the island doomed these attempts to failure, and the 
proportion of independent colonists to crown dependents 
remained consistently low. In his visit to the island in 
1793, the naturalist Thaddaeus Haenke estimated the total
IS"Expediente...sobre aprencibn de unos Reos, 1787," 
ACG, DCCGLXV, 1-4.
19"Ordenanzas de J&uregui," 1776, Ord. 61.
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?Apopulation as around 300 souls „ A commissary review dated
two years later revealed that there were almost 200 crown
7 1dependents present, including 93 convicts. If we are to
accept Haenke's census figure as a reasonable approximation,
then it is evident that at least two-thirds of the population
was reliant on government support in order to live and that
one-third of the total were convicts. This attests to the
island's poverty and the impossibility of creating a self-
sufficient, industrious colony. The island never lost its
reputation as a squalid army outpost and penal colony, and
the association between soldiers and convicts constituted
the dominant theme in its existence.
In 1645, the city of Valdivia was rebuilt with the
status of plaza-fuerte, or town-fort, and under direct
supervision and jurisdiction of Peru. From its refounding
until the end of the colonial period, the authorities of
Lima and Santiago made regular practice of sending shiploads
of convicts to Valdivia in order to construct the formidable
? ofortress complex which eventually encircled the entire bay. 
During its colonial prime, Valdivia possessed over two 
thousand residents, several hundreds of whom were convicts
^^Haenke, Descripci6n, 75.
21"Relaci6n que expresa..., July, 1795," ACM, CIII,
1.
22 . • .Guarda, Historia de Valdivia. 166.
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living within the confines of the forts and the city.22 An 
untold number of others had become residents of the town 
after completing their sentences. With a penal population 
of at least ten to fifteen percent of the entire city, it was 
inevitable that these convicts would dramatically influence 
the character of Valdivia. This influence was even more 
pronounced considering that convicts did not remain segre­
gated from the citizenry but actually lived and worked among 
them, employing their skills as artisans, laborers, and 
soldiers.24
Spanish authorities were intensely concerned with 
providing for the maintenance and upkeep of large numbers of 
convicts and the security problems inherent in their 
proximity to military garrisons. At the same time, it was 
realized that convict labor was indispensable in the construc­
tion of the crucial defensive works. These two objectives 
were not always compatible, for convicts were usually 
remitted on the basis of construction timetables and not 
with regard for the capabilities of military prison facili­
ties. Governors of Valdivia were usually hard-pressed 
simply to provide food and clothing for their own troops,
22"Viaje de...Tom&s de O'Higgins, 1796-1797," AFA, 
XXXIII, 8.
The monthly reviews of the Valdivia prison popula­
tion in 1796 show a fairly constant level of over 200 con­
victs: February, 248 prisoners; March, 236 prisoners;
April, 242 prisoners ("Relacidn..., 1796, " ACM, CX, 1-4).
24 "Expediente formado..., 1792," ACG, DCCCLXVIII, 6 .
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especially since survival was so dependent on the prompt 
arrival of a single shipload of supplies. Because of the 
absence of prison facilities and shortages of military per­
sonnel, there was a pronounced laxness in the vigilance and
care of prisoners. As late as 1757 there was not a single
25jail within the entire Valdivia complex. As time pro­
gressed, the prisoners within the log palisade walls of the 
town were locked up each night in a long barracks , but in 
the forts they could be found laboring among the fortifica­
tions unguarded, without cells, even living among the 
soldiers.^6 to an officer newly-arrived at Valdivia, the 
sight of such a motley garrison of soldiers and its apparent 
inability to control the movements of the prisoners must 
have been very disconcerting. One officer of longstanding 
frontier service lamented the fact that,
. . . the positions of employment in which the prisoners 
are engaged, as well as the cells where they are kept, 
are of no security and frankly facilitate their 
escape.27
The capabilities of the Valdivia garrison were 
undeniably strained with the encumbrance of maintaining a 
large prison population. Simply from an administrative point 
of view there was frequent uncertainty as to just how long 
prisoners were to be confined. This was due in part to the
^Medina, Cosas de la colonia, 453.
^"Viaje de...TomAs de 0 'Higgins, 1796-1797," AFA, 
XXXIII, 8 .
27,lExpediente formado..., 1792, " ACG, DCCCLXVIII, 7.
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variety of jurisdictions from which they were sent and the
practice of remanding convicts to the fortresses without
28stipulating the length of their sentences. But it was 
more likely that the infrequent communication with the out­
side world, the continual need of laborers, and the wide 
prerogatives of the governors were most instrumental factors 
in determining the length of a prisoner's stay. It was not 
uncommon for men to complete their original sentences but be 
faced with additional years of hard labor for crimes 
committed while they were prisoners. The neglect of convicts 
and their welfare lent an air of permanence to the sentences
of pena de presidio, for many of these men served for years
. . . ■ 29past the time limit of their original sentences.
The great preoccupation of military governors was in 
stemming the criminality within Valdivia and preventing the 
escape of the convicts. It was impossible to maintain close 
supervision over the prison population without compromising 
the military preparedness of the garrison. Escape was a 
common occurrence which seemed to generate a great deal of 
fear among the townspeople and also in neighboring parts of 
the intendancy. The danger of these convicts lay not so 
much in their actual numbers, but in their criminal person­
alities and their propensity towards crime. Many were
28According to Governor Espinosa, there were numerous 
convicts who had no definite time limit for their encarcera- 
tion, only the general penalty of "presidio labor" (Espinosa 
to 0 'Higgins, April 8 , 1774, ACG, DCCCLXVIII, 8 ).
29Ibid.
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repeated offenders from Peru or other areas who, having once 
escaped, found themselves in an unfamiliar, hostile terri­
tory where continued crime was the only alternative for their 
survival.
The high incidence of escape caused concern as far 
away as Santiago. In 1792, President 0 'Higgins chastised 
the governor of Valdivia for not giving him an account of 
escaped convicts which were known to be running loose in the 
vicinity.30 He let the governor know in no uncertain terms 
that he expected the apprehension of these men and an end to 
the crimes which they were committing. He ordered that in 
the future the intendants of both Santiago and Concepcibn be
Olimmediately notified of escapes. Lawlessness and insta­
bility were abiding features of Valdivian society, not so 
much from the hostile environment of the region as from 
factors within the town.
Townspeople also feared the criminal because one of 
the most common tactics of escape and certainly the most 
unique, was that of setting fires to the town dwellings in 
the hope of creating enough distraction to flee unnoticed. 
Fire was always a danger where wooden structures predominated, 
but in Valdivia it occurred so frequently as to become one 
of the worst threats to local residents. Three major fires 
ravaged the city during the first half of the eighteenth
3^o'Higgins to the governor of Valdivia, Santiago,
May 15, 1792, ACG. DCCLXXXII, 511.
31ibid.
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century (1734, 1742 and 1748), as a result of which few of 
the original colonial buildings were left intact.33
Arson was prevalent not only in the town but also 
among the forts, evidently to such a degree that a local 
attorney called it the major danger faced by the garrison of 
soldiers. J It appears that the most common time of day for 
these fires was during the early afternoon when the inhabi­
tants were resting and vigilance was relaxed. Prisoners 
threw torches onto the thatched roofs of the wooden houses 
and then escaped in the ensuing confusion. During much of 
the term of Governor Pedro Gregorio de Echenique, arson was
so prevalent that it was necessary for special watchmen to be
34posted around the clock to detect the spread of fire.
Special ordinances provided that administrative offices, 
powder magazines, and even the individual houses be roofed 
with tile. But the use of flammable building materials 
must have continued to predominate, for as late as 1794 the 
residents of Valdivia petitioned to the governor to con­
struct a small factory for producing roofing tile. They 
pointed out that within the past December, alone, a total of 
eleven houses had been destroyed in two separate fires, and 
another house had been partially burned in January. They
33Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 96.
33"Causa criminal..., 1777, " ACG, CCCX, 29.
3^Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 167.
35Reqlamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 43.
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were quite specific in placing the responsibility for these 
fires on the "perverse mentality" of the prisoners.3^
The shortage of soldiers and the presence of large 
numbers of convicts resulted in the enlistment of many 
criminals in the army. It was the logical expedient to 
alleviate overcrowded penal facilities and to satisfy the 
manpower shortage in the army. This was perhaps the most 
pervasive and far-reaching effect of the desterrados, for 
the composition of the military was radically altered by 
their presence. Military archives of the period reflect the 
concern of governors in filling out the ranks of their 
commands rather than documenting the background of the 
recruits. However, it is known that a very large ratio of 
soldiers were former convicted criminals. In his visit to 
Valdivia in the early 1700 *s, the French engineer Amadeo 
Frezier estimated that the majority of the local troops were
0 7convicted men. Several decades later, President Amat 
similarly remarked that the greater part of the Valdivian 
troops were criminals, many of whom were serving their
Opsecond prison term as soldiers.
Convict soldiers were not uncommon in the Chilean 
army but were especially prevalent in the infantry battalion 
of Valdivia. The military ordinances of Valdivia (1753)
35"Los vecinos..., 1794," ACG, CMLXXVII, 1.
37Frezier, RelaciOn del viaje, 3.
3®"Carta de..., March 28, 1756, " Doc. No. 4305,
JMDI. CLXXXVIII, 165.
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sanctioned the enlistment of desterrados as soldiers, and 
they were admitted according to their racial status in 
either the regular companies of Spanish or the caste company 
(compahla de pardos). Enlistment entailed an obligation of 
serving for the length of the sentence, plus an additional 
three years in the town militia after one's discharge. ^  In 
spite of the strict racial guidelines, castes were frequently 
placed into the regular companies of Spanish, an infraction 
which for the class-conscious Spanish mind was worse than 
the unsavory character of these recruits.4® Only those 
prisoners who had committed the most grave offenses were 
barred from military service.
Convict soldiers were prohibited by law from 
receiving any salary or other remuneration for their services, 
and were furnished with only a daily ration and the neces­
sary clothing.4-*- Likewise, they were forbidden from 
ascending to the rank of officer. If they were dismissed 
as unfit at some point during their duty, their accumulated 
length of service was deducted from their original prison 
sentences.4  ̂ After successful completion of their military 
service the criminal records of these soldiers were
^®Req1amento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 15.
40Ibid.. Ord. 35. 41ibid., Ord. 14.
42"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741. Ord. 20.
43o'Higgins to the King, Santiago, October 11, 1794, 
AGG. DCCXCIII, 275.
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considered clean. Those men who agreed to settle permanently 
in Valdivia were given status as regular citizens and fur­
nished with homes for their families
With such lucrative incentives offered them, it was 
only natural that a great many convicts would turn to the 
career of soldier, rather than face grueling labor as con­
victs . During an Indian revolt in 1792, the Valdivia 
garrison was so understrength that the convict population 
was picked over to find volunteers with a knowledge of 
firearms. Some forty-seven of them were chosen to take part 
in a punitive expedition against the Indians, with the 
promise of having their sentences reduced. They were also
assigned a salary of four pesos monthly, about half that of
<45the regular veteran troops. J Enlistment was known to have 
been extended even to Indian half-breeds, who once discharged 
from the service made war against the very troops with whom 
they had s e r v e d . A l l  manner of dregs of colonial society 
were either enlisted or impressed into the army1s ranks, 
where the most severe penalties failed to deter their deser­
tion and undiscipline.^ Although a critical manpower
^Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 19.
45;LUcas Molina to 0 'Higgins, Valdivia, October 15, 
1792, AMV. XXI, 318.
^Medina, cosas de la colonia. 269.
^ I n  1763, fifteen soldiers deserted en masse from 
the fort of Niebla, accompanied by several prisoners. All 
were apprehended and the instigator of the movement, Vicente
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shortage was satisfied by such measures the calibre of the 
army was immeasurably lowered, for the very nature of these 
convicts was anathema to discipline and regimentation.
Considering the strategic importance of Valdivia and 
the other Chilean forts as a first line of defense against 
European incursions in the Pacific, it is indeed ironic that 
the Spanish chose to send there some of the worst human 
elements imaginable. The Bourbon committment to building 
a strong defensive posture in America and the outlays of men 
and material which this entailed, was in a sense hobbled 
because of the presence of so many criminals alongside and 
in the regular army. There was a very real concern in some 
circles that should the colony be invaded by foreign powers, 
the unruly convict population would defect to the enemy, 
providing invaluable assistance and information. As 
Governor Clarke of Valdivia remarked:
The situation of Valdivia is unique; it is 
located one hundred leagues from Concepcibn (the 
most immediate fort); it shelters convicts and 
wicked people that would ally themselves with the 
enemy at their first arrival.48
Not only were the prisoners feared, but those convicts who
had become soldiers were so devoid of fighting ability that
Acuna, was remanded to the fort at Yumbel. In a statement 
to the president concerning the incident, the governor 
recounted that Acuna was a notorious vagabond and robber of 
the frontier and had originally entered the army as a 
prisoner on Juan Femfindez ("Sobre indulto concedido..., 
1763," ACG, DCCXI, 1-3).
4®clarke to Guzman, Valdivia, April 29, 1805, ACG, 
DCCCXXIV, 6 .
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officials virtually discounted their ability to repel an
invasion. The foreign threat was perhaps more imagined than
real, but security was definitely at stake; there could be
no real safety for the inhabitants of the south as long as
the military fortresses perpetuated instability and the
criminal influence.
Although convicts were admittedly a security problem,
a financial burden and contributed to the shoddy character
of the army, they did fulfill the all-important function of
constructing fortifications. Convict labor built practically
all of Chile's coastal fortresses and was as vital an element
of construction as quarry stone or mortar.49 Ordinary wage
laborers and artisans were not only scarce, but their
employment constituted the single most expensive item in
50construction costs. For this reason, convict labor was 
utilized almost exclusively, saving the royal treasury no 
small sums of money. This reliance on convict labor created 
a certain dependency and an incapability of completing con­
struction without it.
In 1798, the Spanish king ruled that Chile must 
function independently of Peruvian military and financial 
assistance, an action which suddenly placed the heavy defense
c: *1costs squarely on the shoulders of the Chilean treasury.
49,lLa verdad..., 1782, " AFA, XXV, 2-3.
50Ibid.. 5.
C  *1 Augusto Orrego Luco, La patria vieja (Santiago: 
Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1933), I, 12.
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As an offshoot of this, in 1804, it was prohibited that any 
further convicts be sent to Valdivia and Juan Fernandez 
unless the Peruvian viceroyalty agreed to assume costs of 
their transportation and upkeep in these garrisons.52 As 
Chile and Peru had always been jointly liable for these 
expenses in the past, the Lima administrators naturally felt 
it in their best interest to cease these convict remissions 
and avoid unnecessary costs.
Interestingly enough, the ministers of the royal 
treasury in Santiago did not view this development as an 
opportunity to rid the colony of burdensome criminals, but 
actually opposed the plan as it would prove detrimental to 
the completion of Chilean defenses.53 A statement of 
similar import by the influential tribunal de cuentas 
(fiscal auditing agency) in Santiago urged continuation of 
the traditional system of convict remissions, for even if 
Chile were forced to bear the costs of transportation and 
maintenance the total expenses would still be substantially 
less than the hiring of free laborers.54 After delibera­
tion, the viceroy agreed in 1807 to reinstate the previous 
system; but for all practical purposes, the colony derived 
no further benefits from this. Shortly afterwards, the
52,,Real Orden..., November 22, 1804, " ACM. XLIX, 1.
53Ibid., 6 . While the treasury ministers admitted
that Valdivia's dependency on convict labor was high, they 




system of military supply (situado) was terminated, which 
finally ended convict remissions to Chile.
The intimate relationship between desterrados and 
the army was one of the most unique and interesting facets 
of the Chilean military. In one sense convicts were bene­
ficial, for without their labor the coastal fortifications 
of the colony would have never reached fruition. In another 
sense they were an encumbrance, absorbing manpower and 
resources by the crimes they committed and the continual 
escapes which they perpetrated. Their most profound influ­
ence was that of their recruitment as soldiers, which 
substantially affected the calibre and morale of the army. 
For good or bad, the desterrados were an intrinsic and 
accepted feature of military life.
Chapter 6
RECRUITMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
THE MILITARY
For the residents of the peripheral, borderland 
areas of Spanish America, the presidio and its complement of 
soldiers often represented the only secure bulwark against 
the instability of rural life. The military was frequently 
the crown's principal agent in the extension of territorial 
sovereignty and colonization, but it was not necessarily a 
civilizing factor. On the contrary, the Chilean military 
seems to have displayed a marked predilection towards 
criminality and was intimately linked with the violence and 
lawlessness of frontier society. A great many of the rank 
and file soldiers were miscreants and rogues of the worst 
order, which often made the army appear as much a threat to 
society as the elements it sought to contain.
The military did possess many brilliant and accom­
plished soldiers. Among them were the royal engineers, who 
not only constructed some of the colony's grandest public 
buildings but contributed to the cartographic knowledge of 
Chile by their extensive mapping of the coasts and natural
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ports.1 And a host of governors and presidents exercised 
prudent judgment in balancing both the needs of civil 
administration and the exigencies of military preparedness. 
But two centuries of internecine Indian warfare and the 
poverty and isolation of the colony had combined to breed an 
army low in morale and woefully deficient in professionalism, 
rife with desertion and crime and stubbornly resistant to 
reform. As a commandant of the San Pedro fort wrote of the 
fourteen veteran troops under his command, only four knew 
how to fire a musket and the rest were incompetent, due to 
sickness or advanced age.2 Another commander was even less 
camplimentary, referring to his troops as a ludicrous pro­
cession of delinquents, "all of them idiots in the art of 
warfare."3
Deficiencies in the army were perpetuated not so 
much by an absence of professionalism and training as they 
were by recruitment practices, for the unpopu1arity of 
military service left little recourse but the drafting of 
convicts and vagrants. The Spanish army, which was the 
fountainhead of soldiers for Chile during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, had virtually curtailed large-scale
•^Foremost among these army engineers was the archi­
tect Joaquin Toesca, who supervised many of the great public 
works projects of the late colonial period. Other military 
engineers of note were: Juan Garland, Jos6 Antonio Birt,
Pedro Rico, and Leandro Badar&n (Encina, Historia de Chile.
V, 202-206).
2"Expediente sobre..., 1770, " ACG, DCCCLXI, 2.
^Medina, Cosas de la colonia, 452.
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remissions of troops by the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. As the colony became increasingly self-sufficient 
and as the Indian struggle showed a marked decline, Spanish 
monarchs reduced the flow of foot soldiers to very modest 
proportions. Chileans were forced to rely on a steady 
trickle of peninsular officers to provide the leadership 
backbone of the colonial army.
The burden of raising an army thus fell mainly upon 
the captaincy-general, a task which was intensified by the 
continual state of alert in which the army was kept, either 
from the threat of Indians or from foreign invasion. It was 
of critical importance to maintain troop levels at full 
strength and to keep on hand enough qualified specialists 
in certain fields, such as experienced artillerymen.4 The 
task of recruitment was infinitely compounded by the 
reluctance of the colonials. The normal six-year enlistment 
offered little compensation and little glory or adventure 
for the common soldier. It did offer a lonely tour of duty 
in some frontier outpost where boredom, impoverishment, and 
an oppressive isolation naturally created an atmosphere of 
mediocrity and slack discipline.
Enlistment bonuses were offered as an enticement to 
potential recruits, but the numbers of volunteers were 
seldom sufficient, leaving impressment as the ultimate means
4"Carta de..., 1762," AFA, LII, 1.
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5of filling out the ranks. While desterrados and other 
unsavory persons were usually allowed to join the army of 
their own volition, impressment was quite another matter.
The Ordenanza general del ej6reito (1768) strictly specified 
that all recruitment, no matter under what circumstances, 
should be completely voluntary and without c o e r c i o n Y e t ,  
the custom in Chile, as well as in other colonial juris­
dictions, was to use whatever means necessary to obtain the 
required soldiers, which frequently meant scouring the jails
7and city streets. Although impressment was an admittedly 
necessary and accepted means of recruitment, it had the 
effect of continually placing the dregs of society in the 
ranks of the army.
The inevitable outgrowth of the impressment of 
soldiers and the repugnant character of military service was 
widespread desertion. Indeed, it was probably the most
5"Revista de..., 1793," ACM, CX, 13.
The Peruvian military faced similar adversities in 
filling the ranks of the numerous soldiers who had either 
died, deserted or been discharged. Viceroy Croix noted that 
the European soldiers who were sent to Peru soon left the 
army in search of more rewarding and more gentile profes­
sions (Memorias de los vireyes, V, 257).
^Toledo Sanchez, Esquema del derecho, 144.
^Upon creation of the Royal Regiment of Lima in 1787, 
it was ruled that in case there were not enough voluntary 
recruits, that a rigorous impressment be carried out in Lima 
and other Peruvian cities of all idlers, vagrants and 
sailors who had deserted off ships arriving from Spain.
Some of these men eventually deserted, were captured and 
tried, and were sent to Chilean fortresses (Memorias de los 
vireyes, V, 250-51).
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8frequent crime within the ranks. Deserters created a 
plethora of security problems, not only for the military but 
for the civilian populace as well, for these men were often 
of a vile temperament and accustomed to live by illegal 
means. They roamed the countryside in bands, taking what­
ever they could find, and preyed upon residents of isolated 
settlements. When supply ships arrived each summer at the 
island of Chilo6 , the local inhabitants were put on alert
against the sudden influx of criminals and deserters who
9fled the ships, many posing as soldiers. in Valdivia, 
desertion was nearly as great a problem as the escape of 
convicts. Soldiers were not only offered bounty for the 
apprehension of deserters, but also a reduction in their own 
enlistments.10
High rates of desertion were also attributable to 
inadequacies of supply and communication within the army.
The infrequency with which soldiers were supplied and paid 
their wages left many of them with no alternative but to 
pursue farming, mining or other vocations in order to pro­
vide for their families. This was not due to any distaste
^Toledo S&nchez, Esquema del derecho, 149. Accord­
ing to this author, desertion accounted for eighteen percent 
of all military crimes.
^"Bando de buen govierno, June 20, 1797," AFA, 
XXXIII, 78.
1 0 ,,0rden de..., February 6 , 1787, " ACG. DCCLXXIII, 
Vol. 26, No. 12.
"Real orden..., January 6 , 1786," ACG, DCCXXXVI,
Item 10637.
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for the profession of soldiering, but from simple economic 
n e c e s s i t y D u r i n g  the early eighteenth century, the 
situado was subject to delays of several years duration. It 
was then that the distinction between soldier and civilian 
took on a vague, undefined meaning. Soldiers left the ranks 
seasonally to tend their crops or drifted about the country­
side in search of employment, eventually returning to their 
units. On visiting Concepcidn in 1713, the engineer Amadeo 
Frezier found that the troops had not been paid by the crown 
in fourteen years. Most of them had left their companies to 
find employment elsewhere. Only a few aged guards remained
IPto defend the Indian frontier. One of the military
ordinances passed by President J&uregui (1776) forbade
troops from engaging in any other livelihood except the army,
a noble but illusory principle considering the sad lot of
13the common foot soldier.
Spanish military law conceived of two basic types of 
desertion, which were applicable in the mother country and 
the colonies, as well. The first of these, desercidn 
calificada. or qualified desertion, pertained to flight in 
time of war and bore penalties ranging from death for treason 
to ten years of hard labor for desertion in actual battle or
•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, IX, 223. 
^Frezier, Relacidn del viaje, 15.
13"0rdenanzas de J&uregui," 1776, Ord. 21.
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from strategic military fortresses.^ The second, desercibn
simple, or ordinary desertion, was that which was committed
in peacetime without mitigating circumstances. For first
offenders, four months of imprisonment were prescribed,
followed by eight more years of obligatory military service.
Recurrences merited similarly lengthy sentences of forced
15labor in military arsenals or public works. In actual 
practice, the implementation of these penalties varied 
widely throughout the empire, due to amplification and 
amendment among the many colonial j urisdictions; but a 
common denominator throughout was that juridical policy was 
not at all adverse to returning deserters to active military 
service, especially in the Indies.^
The dispensation of military justice in Chile fol­
lowed neither the exacting procedural regimen as practiced 
in the peninsular tribunals, nor were the penalties applied
17with the severity implicit m  the military ordinances.
Within the realm of the judicial heirarchy there were lower 
tribunals (tribunales inferiores) in America, which were of 
sole, first and second instance, while in Spain resided the 
superior tribunals (tribunales superiores), of second 
instance and appellate nature. Although the peninsular
^Toledo S&nchez, Esquema del derecho, 140.
15Ibid.
16"Orden de..., March 2, 1787," ACG. DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 26, No. 18.
17Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn. IX, 172.
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tribunals were by law designated as appellate courts for 
resolving difficult colonial legal matters, they were rarely
used for this purpose because of the great distances
18involved, as well as the time and expense. As a result, 
the ultimate dispensation of military cases normally fell 
upon the viceroy or president, or in isolated areas, a 
military governor. Their decisions were usually tempered 
more by the reality of frontier life rather than the 
rigidity and severity of peninsular legal doctrine.
There was a pronounced tendency to moderate the 
penalties for crimes committed in America, with the possible 
exception of peninsular soldiers who were sent to reinforce 
the colonial armies. These penalties were especially 
diminished in Chile due to the shortage of able-bodied 
fighting men and the realization that there were few replace­
ments for soldiers who were imprisoned or drummed out of the 
service. A royal order of 1794 stipulated that deserters 
from the Valdivia garrison who were apprehended should
simply be reassigned to serve in the infantry battalion of 
20Concepci6n. Another royal order of similar vein offered 
full pardon to deserters if they would voluntarily surrender 
themselves within a four-month period, agreeing to serve for
^Toledo S&nchez, Esquema del derecho, 120.
19Ibid., 127.
20"Orden de..., May 24, 1794," ACG, DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 33, No. 65.
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s i x  more years in the army. The tenor of these rulings
suggests a kind of dry rot among the rank and file troops,
but one which was necessarily tolerated by the general staff.
The trial proceedings of one particular deserter,
one Jos£ Ccircamo, is indicative of the laxity with which
22this crime was often punished. The first page of the 
relatively brief proceeding, taking place in Concepcidn in 
1725, was signed by President Gabriel Cano. It stated that 
the soldier Jos6 carcamo, of the company of Captain Ambrosio 
Lovillo, over a period of time had repeatedly deserted from 
the ranks. After his initial desertion, he was apprehended 
in the partido of Maule and remitted to the fort of Puren, 
where he again deserted. This time he was sent to the fort 
of San Pedro, where he deserted for a third time and was 
taken to Concepcidn for trial. The opening statement was 
closed with the recommendation that proceedings be initiated 
against the soldier as an example to others.23
Diego Orellana, also a member of Lovillo’s company, 
testified that it had been almost a year since carcamo 
deserted and that he knew the accused had also fled after 
this from Puren and San Pedro. The next witness, a soldier 
named Jos6 Fernandez, verified the authenticity of the pre­
ceding testimony, adding that the defendant was now
21"Orden de..., August 23, 1776," ACG. DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 17, No. 81.




confined in the guardhouse.24 The fiscal then ordered that 
the accused present his testimony before the asesor general 
de qobierno and the auditor de querra. On March 2, Carcamo 
declared under oath that it had been almost one year since 
he was given one month's leave to go to the partido of 
Maule, but that he exceeded his leave and was subsequently 
apprehended.25 He added that he had also deserted from 
Puren and San Pedro. When asked if he knew it was a grave 
offense to desert, even more so at a time when the Indians 
were in full revolt, C&rcamo answered that he was fully
aware of the consequences of his actions.
Although a maximum of six days was declared for 
deliberation of a verdict, a decision was reached almost at 
once. C&rcamo was found guilty of deserting three times, 
compounded by having done so during time of war. The 
accused was sentenced to be taken to the city square to 
receive a public flogging. The sentence was dated March 3, 
1724, and was signed by the president, the licenciado 
Rosales, and authorized by the escribiano Tomds de Vald6z ? 
duration of the entire proceeding was five days.2^
The trial of C&rcamo terminated with this sentence. 
Although the severity of the flogging is not known, it would
appear to be only a token penalty for a crime of such





was no mention of his being prohibited from further military 
service, nor in being forced to serve for several years of 
hard labor in prison. Instead, the sole penalty of a public 
flogging leads one to assume that Cdrcamo was reinstated in 
good standing with his company. The Ordenanza general del 
ei6rcito bluntly prescribed that all those soldiers who
27deserted during military engagements should be executed.
Even when considering the prudent practice of 
ameliorating the sometimes extreme penalties recommended by 
military law, justice was too often applied with excessive 
leniency and a propensity to reemploy these offenders as 
soldiers. Rather than ejecting hardened criminals and 
repeated offenders, officers recycled them into the military 
service, with the result that these troops gave the army a 
bad reputation.
2^The military ordinances of President J&uregui 
stipulated that soldiers in the frontier forts not be allowed 
to leave their posts unless by permission of the commandant, 
and only then in urgent cases for a maximum of eight days 
(Ord. 23). Extended leaves of absence of up to one month 
could be obtained only by solicitude to the maestre de campo. 
For longer periods of time than this, it was necessary to 
obtain approval of the president (Ord. 24).
Chapter 7
OFFICER CORRUPTION— CHARACTERISTICS OF 
A PREDATORY ARMY
As an institution, the military possessed a great 
deal of power and influence, both from its enormous budgetary 
demands and from the sheer proliferation of forts and troops 
throughout the colony. In the remote southern outposts this 
power was personified by the military commandant or governor. 
These officers not only commanded the troops at their dis­
posal , but frequently exercised political and administrative 
powers over the civilian populace, as in the case of Vald­
ivia. The potential for abuse of this power was great and 
especially tempting, considering the infrequency of being 
paid and the deprivations of army life.
It was a relatively easy matter for the more unprin­
cipled officers to deal in contraband or stolen cattle, to 
pilfer royal monies through improper auditing, and to sell 
exorbitantly priced merchandise to their own troops.  ̂ Other 
officers headed extensive smuggling networks or retailed 
stolen goods, utilizing enlisted men and Indians as 
underlings. The Indians, whose loyalties were easily





swayed with liquor and gifts, were susceptible to the offers 
of military men. The chronicler Carvallo y Goyeneche com­
mented on this predatory aspect of militarism which seemed 
to permeate frontier life:
. . .  it is said that in America there is no enemy so 
powerful as a military man with money, and once 
unleashed there is no form of deceit they will not use 
in their dealings with the Indians, as well as their 
commercial negotiations on the frontier and other 
branches of political and military government.3
Valdivia was a natural breeding ground for corrupt 
officials and unscrupulous governors because of the unusually 
low discipline of its troops and the lucrative opportunities 
for self-gain. The situado, as the economic mainstay of the 
town, was especially vulnerable to the capriciousness of 
crown representatives. As was discussed in Chapter 4, there 
were an infinite number of ways in which the valuable cargo 
could be stolen or hoarded to be sold at a later date, 
usually with such finesse that detection was a minor risk.
The Ordenanzas econOmicas y politicas de la Plaza de 
Valdivia (1741) were implemented not only to clarify adminis­
trative and economic matters relating to the normal operation 
of the garrison, but in large part were an effort to dis­
courage the rampant graft and pilfering by royal officials.^ 
For example, one ordinance permitted the local residents to 
engage in a supervised barter with the Indians but absolutely
•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, IX, 434. 
^"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ord. 13.
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forbade governors from any trade outside the few fresh meats 
and fruits necessary for the consumption of their own house­
holds .5 Another ordinance several years later ruled against 
the governor and other high functionaries drawing their full 
salaries in advance each year from the treasury, rather than 
waiting for the situado to arrive. Officials were guilty 
of monopolizing local commerce by refusing to license
private businesses and instead, establishing their own
7bakeries and general merchandise stores. A small but 
flourishing importation of lumber was also handed down from 
successive governors involving the exchange of merchandise 
to the islanders of Chilo6 in return for timber. To facili­
tate this, governors made use of the crown reconnaissance 
launch and manned it with crews of convicts, afterward 
reselling the lumber to the citizens. Not only were all of 
these activities prohibited by military ordinances, but 
colonial treasurers no doubt realized that the traffic in 
lumber and other commodities defrauded the crown of its just 
revenues under the system of commercial monopolies.
To a pragmatic and resourceful governor, the dangers 
of eventually facing a court trial for his actions were not 
so frightening when weighed against the profits to be made.
5Ibid., Ord. 15.
^Reglamento para Valdivia. 1753, Ord. 34.
7Ibid.. Ord. 13.
®"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ord. 25.
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One observer noted that with only a thousand peso annual 
salary and the additional strain of financing their own 
joumey from Spain to Valdivia, governors were able to retire 
after only one five-year tour of duty with accumulations of 
up to seventy and eighty thousand pesos. if these officials 
did run the risk of exposure, it was unlikely to come from 
below; the troops and desterrados were many times forced to 
work as laborers for the governors, as well as furnishing 
personal services. At times, the day to day activities with­
in the forts more closely resembled the relationship between 
lord and serf, than that between officer and soldier. Presi­
dent Manso angrily denounced these practices with a similar 
analogy in a letter to the king: "The soldiers that normally
serve in that fortress are those who are remitted for commit­
ting crimes; they serve the governor more than Your Magesty 
with their s a l a r i e s . T h e n  there were instances of gover­
nors destroying the letters of complaining soldiers before 
dispatching mail pouches to Concepcidn. A particular ruling
forbade these actions and ordered that notices be posted
11publicly prior to the sending of mail.
Valdivia was not a perpetual den of iniquity, but 
the power of its military leaders was not always conducive
^"Carta del..., August 16, 1741," Doc. No. 8705, 
JMDI„ CCXCI, 207.
10"Carta de..., February 28, 1739, " Doc. No. 4123, 
JMDI. GLXXXIV, 307.
^"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ord. 28.
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to the growth and prosperity of the city. Their monopoly of
local industry inhibited economic development and discouraged
the relocation of a merchant class to the city. President
Manso made the rather pithy observation that within the
Valdivia area the military-civilian elite had a considerable
influence in determining the degree of "civilization," for
their restriction of economic progress discouraged potential
1 ?colonists and kept the area m  stagnation.
The incidence of corruption within the officer corps 
must have been fairly commonplace,, Records of malfeasance 
are a useful tool in piecing together a picture of army life, 
but of equal interest is the functioning of military justice 
and the intricate relationships within the chain of command. 
The prescribed penalties for infractions of the military 
penal code did not always function in their pure form. As 
in the civil government, bribery or influential associates 
could be of great value to the accused in winning a light 
sentence or acquittal. Likewise, there were close fraternal 
bonds among officers. There were numerous ways for these 
men to supplement their income by illegal means, which 
necessitated the cooperation of other officers, either as 
direct business associates or through their acquiescence in 
not exposing their fellow officers. It is the feeling of 
this writer that the course of military justice in Chile was
12"carta de..., February 28, 1739," Doc. No. 4123, 
JMDI, GLXXXIV, 306.
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heavily swayed by informal bonds of rank and prestige and 
frequently, mutual commercial interests.
The archival transcripts of criminal proceedings 
against an officer for situado fraud, let us say, would not 
necessarily reveal whether he acted as an individual or in 
league with accomplices. The accused might have been 
brought to trial because his actions had been exposed or 
because his superiors preferred charges when he did not pay 
them off for maintaining silence in the matter. Or, the 
unlucky officer might have been sacrificed in order to 
prevent a scandal from spreading to other officials. There 
was probably a tendency to condone a certain amount of 
corruption at the local level, provided that the excesses 
were not too conspicuous and as long as higher ranking 
officers were not implicated. Should the officer's actions 
become too noticeable, it would naturally become necessary 
to hold a trial? but for those who had personal influence or 
prestige a quick, perfunctory trial might result with a 
light sentence such as obligatory retirement. One can only 
surmise the extent to which money or prestige determined 
military justice, for gentlemen's agreements and the per­
suasive power of rank were not the kind of data which would 
be disclosed in court proceedings.
There are ample cases of military corruption but 
very few sources that do more than hint at the collusion 
among officers or allude to their close-knit cliques.
Several Chilean chroniclers departed from the narrow
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historical style of that period to give candid accounts of 
colonial leaders, their personalities and behind-the-scenes
struggles for power. Still, their factual data was not
1 3always accurate, and they were often heavily biased. 
Documentary sources are of use but require careful reading 
between the lines. One archival source is analyzed here 
concerning an officer accused of a variety of crimes and the 
course of his hearing. It is presented as a case study of 
military power and its effects on colonial society.
In 1769, Lieutenant Laureano Bueno, commandant of 
the fort of Santa Barbara, was accused of moral improprie­
ties with a local woman of the town and of maintaining 
extensive and unlawful commercial dealings with the neigh­
boring Indians.'*'4 As the civil and military governor of the 
fort and the nearby town of Santa Barbara, Bueno possessed 
the full measure of power, and his authority was intensified 
by the isolation of the town. His amorous escapades and 
sinister business dealings became so obvious after a time 
that public complaints were voiced, leading to an investiga­
tion by military officials and the Bishop of Concepcibn. A 
Doctor Domingo Villegas of Santa Barbara was commissioned by 
the government to initiate a hearing in the town and call
^Guillermo Felih Cruz, Historiografla colonial de 
Chile, 1796-1886 (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1958),
3-43.
■*'4 "Criminales seguidos contra...Laureano Bueno, 
1769," ACG, CCC, 124-64.
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forth witnesses to testify concerning the allegations„ We 
do not know if Bueno played a role in the appointment of 
Villegas, although by a strange coincidence the doctor 
happened to be a close friend of the commandant. He intimi­
dated a number of the witnesses in order to obtain declara­
tions of Bueno's innocence. Consequently, the hearing and 
the procession of witnesses were moved to Concepcidn in 
January, 1769, where a second set of testimony by the same 
witnesses revealed the contradictions of their earlier 
statements. It is this second set of testimony, or sumario, 
which is abstracted here. This legal brief did not consti­
tute a formal trial but was only a hearing to determine the 
validity of the charges brought against Bueno.
Throughout the hearings in Concepcidn, a steady 
stream of witnesses unanimously testified to the guilt of 
the commandant. Fructuoso L6pez, a resident of Santa 
Barbara, testified that for some time Laureano Bueno had 
engaged in an open and illicit love affair with his mistress, 
dona Feliziana Zapata, and that the lady had given birth to 
twins by Bueno even before her infirm husband had died.
After her husband's death, dona Feliziana moved into a house 
owned by the witness L6pez, but the embarrassment from the 
affair led him to ask her to move to another house in the 
town. When dona Feliziana refused, the commandant brought 
her to live inside the fort itself, and for this purpose 
prepared living quarters for her in what had been a barracks
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Kfor soldiers. Despite the public indignation which this 
aroused, Bueno made repairs to the barracks, placed an iron 
grillwork around it, and even installed a kitchen for her 
convenience. Pursuant to Bueno‘s commercial dealings, Ldpez 
testified that the commandant frequently traded with the 
Indians, but that he always avoided direct involvement by 
hiring intermediaries for the actual transactions. Only a 
short while before, he stated, over one hundred mares were 
seen near the town church belonging to Basilio Fernandez and 
the commandant, which were in turn sold to the Indians by 
Antonio Catalan, Xavier Fernandez and two other peasants. 
Ldpez also knew that these were stolen animals which Bueno 
frequently purchased from known criminals and thieves.
Cristobal del Castillo, the notary public of the 
town of Santa Barbara, related under oath the widespread 
knowledge of Bueno's love affair. The twins which were born 
of this illicit union had died, and Castillo stated that he 
had found the dead children on the doorstep of the church 
where they had been left by the couple. Castillo revealed 
that he had been commissioned to privately investigate the 
allegations against Bueno by the Bishop of Concepcidn. In 
this capacity, Castillo recalled that little more than a 
month before he had seen over one hundred fifty mares 
passing through the town. He was told by various persons 
that they were the property of Bueno and Basilio Fernaridez,
15Ibid., 136.
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and were being taken to the Indian lands. The notary further 
stated that he had questioned one Justo Lagos, retailer of 
Bueno's stolen horses to the Indians, who confirmed the
* | CLinvolvement of Bueno.
Bueno knew of Castillo's commission, and at this 
stage was evidently fearful of exposure to authorities out­
side Santa Barbara. He not only denied the notary the 
assistance for which he had asked, but also made plans to 
blackmail him. Castillo was told by a close friend that 
Bueno had arranged for a town prostitute to seduce him in a 
predetermined location, at which point Bueno and several 
troops would burst out of concealment and arrest him.
Angered by the knowledge of this plot, Castillo went to com­
plain in person to the commandant. Bueno denied having 
masterminded such a scheme but admitted that he had suggested 
it to several other citizens who were also being investigated 
by Castillo, as a means of freeing themselves from his 
"persecutions. 1,17
When called to testify, Francisco Catalan stated 
that the commandant had more than one mistress, for it was 
also well known that he was involved with a certain Narziza 
Zalassar. Catalan also knew that Bueno traded extensively
with the Indians, selling them cattle, mares, wheat and wine





occasion Bueno bought four Indian women for wine from a 
Peguenche Indian named Millau. One of the women became 
drunk and killed another Indian in the town. The commandant 
imprisoned the murderess for only two days before letting 
her go free.
Not until the testimony of Jacinto Molina does a 
contradiction in earlier testimony become apparent. Molina, 
an alf6rez in the local garrison, said that in his original 
statement in Santa Barbara he had testified falsely as to 
the innocence of Laureano Bueno. This statement had been 
forced from him by Doctor Domingo Villegas, who had origi­
nally been commissioned in the town to preside over the 
hearing. Molina was intimidated by Villegas, not only 
because he was indebted to him for twenty-one pesos but
because the doctor was an intimate friend of Laureano
10Bueno. Now free to testify without fear of reprisal, 
Molina recounted that on the day in which Villegas first 
initiated the proceedings the doctor dispatched a message to 
Bueno in Puren, requesting his presence. The commandant 
traveled all night and arrived in Santa Barbara at four 
o 'clock the next morning, whereupon he immediately went to 
confer with Villegas in his house and remained there for the 
rest of the morning. Around noon the witnesses were 
assembled and called before Villegas. All of them were 
fearful of giving detrimental testimony lest they be punished
19Ibid., 145.
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by the commandant and the doctor.
Molina continued by stating that the commandant not 
only had as a mistress the said dona Feliziana, but also 
Manuela Bilchez, Phelipa Romero and Antonia Uzeda.^® The 
witness had been told by one Bernardo Rebollan that Antonia 
Uzeda became pregnant by the commandant and that Bueno found 
a young man whom she could conveniently marry, although the 
father of the young man was vehemently opposed to such a 
match. Molina said that he was the confidant who had warned 
the notary Castillo of Bueno's plot to blackmail him with a 
prostitute. Molina's knowledge of the commandant1s business 
interests were particularly interesting, for he revealed 
that Bueno monopolized the local commerce in certain com­
modities, making certain that no one could buy them except 
through him. He provided the Indians with mares, cattle, 
wine and wheat in exchange for such items as ponchos and 
salt. He also posted guards along the entrances to the 
Indian lands to prevent the townspeople from dealing 
directly with them. He then sold these badly-needed com­
modities to the residents at exorbitant prices..
The last witness, Juan de Agunto, stated that the 
previous testimony which he gave before Villegas was false, 
but that he and other witnesses had acted thusly because of 
the well-known friendship between Bueno and the doctor and a
20On closing his testimony, Molina acknowledged that 
he was a nephew of Feliziana Zapata. Ibid.
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fear of reprisals by them. He knew for a fact that before 
initiating the hearing, Villegas had first summoned Bueno 
from Puren, and on arriving in Santa Barbara the commandant 
went to Villegas' house. There, the two conferred privately 
until eleven that morning. Immediately afterwards, the 
witnesses were called upon to come make public statements 
and were intimidated and threatened by the two men. Agunto 
knew that Bueno's trade with the Indians was of large propor­
tions, and that in addition to the previously-ment ioned 
articles he sold them spurs, bridles, bits and axes. This 
occurred so frequently that Bueno kept a blacksmith in his
employ at all times, solely for the manufacture of these
21articles. Before closing his testimony, Agunto also
admitted knowledge of the commandant1s posting guards in the 
passes to monopolize trade with the Indians. On February 24, 
1769, the testimony closed.
The process was turned over to a new comisionado, 
Sergeant Major Pablo de la Cruz y Contreras, who was 
instructed by President Balmaceda to return to Santa Barbara
with the witnesses and to solicit additional testimony and
22evidence. Cruz y Contreras was also ordered to take
21-Trade was sanctioned between the Indians and the 
Spanish, but only under close supervision. Certain articles 
such as spurs, bridles, knives, or other iron implements were 
strictly forbidden as they could be forged into weapons. 
"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ords. 14 and 17.
22jn military trials for criminal offenses, the 
sergeant major or adjutant of each regiment was designated 
to oversee court proceedings„ Onat and Roa, Regimen legal, 
216-19.
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charge of the property and personal effects of Laureano 
Bueno, pending the outcome of the hearing. Bueno did not 
return to Santa Barbara as he had been ordered, but remained 
in Concepcibn with the excuse of serious illness. In a 
letter to Cruz y Contreras dated May 16, 1769, he stated 
that his physical deterioration was so extreme that he was 
unable to even mount a horse. Being under the care of 
both the army surgeon general and the surgeon of the frigate 
La Liebre, Bueno said that he had been advised by these 
doctors not to leave from their care. Not wanting to appear 
impertinent, he closed the letter with a humble supplication 
for further instructions in view of his being incapacitated.
From this point on, the process of events in the 
hearing, as well as Bueno's actions, appear somewhat vague 
and elusive. For some unexplained reason, President 
Balmaceda suddenly replaced Cruz y Contreras with two other 
officers, charging them with ascertaining the validity of 
the allegations and remitting their findings to him as 
quickly as possible for evaluation.
Less than one month after his letter to Cruz y 
Contreras, Bueno wrote to President Balmaceda asking permis­
sion to return to Santa Barbara as the peste de viruelas, or 
smallpox, was so epidemic throughout Concepcibn that he 
feared for his life.^ Not only was his continued presence
23"criminales seguidos contra...Laureano Bueno,
1769," ACG, CCC, 148.
24Ibid., 162.
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in the city dangerous to his life, but he also argued that 
an officer of his standing should not be forced to undergo 
the indignation of being temporarily deprived of the rightful 
exercise of his duties as commandant. He absolved himself 
from any guilt and vowed to prove his innocence. He also 
asked to be allowed to prepare his own defense by using as 
witnesses not the residents of the town, but his superior 
officers, whom were best qualified to ascertain the guilt or 
innocence of their subalterns. On June 19, the president 
issued a disposition relative to Bueno's letter. In it he 
granted Bueno permission to return to Santa Barbara to pre­
pare his defense and ruled that the written testimony of his 
superiors be admitted as evidence. Balmaceda ordered the
new comisionados to complete the evidence as quickly as
25possible and remit the sealed summary to him.
With this final statement, the hearing was closed. 
There was no mention in the expediente documents of a reason 
for its abrupt termination, nor was there a definite time set 
for its future resumption; the president simply decided that 
the particulars be assembled and sent to him for review.
There is no evidence in other archives that Bueno was ever 
formally tried for the charges against him or that he was 
officially exonerated for his alleged misdeeds. We do know 
that he was relieved of his post as commandant of Santa
25Ibid., 163.
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o ̂Barbara. Yet, there should have been no justification for
this action if there was no formal trial which proved his
guilt. Bueno was evidently not suspended from military
service, for the following year (1770) he took an active
part in the campaign to quell the major Indian revolt along 
27the frontier. The inconclusiveness of the proceedings 
(especially in view of the unanimously damaging testimony) 
and other evidence leads one to assume that the case may 
have been purposely shelved in order to prevent an indict­
ment of the commandant. It is quite possible that Bueno 
possessed enough powerful connections to evade prosecution, 
or again, the process may have been indefinitely postponed 
due to procrastination or red tape.
It is known that Bueno not only had influence in
Santa Barbara, but he also had influence with the maestre de
28campo, or army field commander. The first comisionado, 
Doctor Villegas, was a friend of Bueno and was involved in 
the intimidation of witnesses to obtain his vindication; it 
is not so absurd to speculate that higher ranking officers 
exercised a more discreet influence to obtain his acquittal. 
Less than one month passed between Bueno's first letter to 
the comisionado Cruz y Contreras, in which he professed him­
self unable even to mount a horse, and his letter to
^ C a r v a l l o  y  Goyeneche, Descripcidn, IX, 336. 
27Ibid.. 341, 345, 346.
28Ibid.. 335.
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President Balmaceda, in which he pled for immediate permis­
sion to travel to Santa Barbara (in the dead of winter) to 
attend to his family's needs. It was also during this 
period that Cruz y Contreras was replaced by two new 
comisionados, which may or may not have had a bearing on 
Bueno's actions. These circumstances may have been logically 
explainable, but the inconclusive manner in which the hearing 
terminated would lead one to suspect that justice was in some 
way subverted.
Whether or not Bueno used his rank or influence to 
avoid prosecution is a moot question; it is reasonably 
apparent that he was guilty of the charges against him. His 
licentious private life and retinue of mistresses are of 
minor importance to the theme of this chapter, for morality 
was not one of the stronger traits of frontier life. Rather, 
it was his illegal trade arrangements with the Indians, his 
dealings in stolen cattle and his association with criminals 
that shed light on the ease with which officers could take 
advantage of their considerable powers. That Bueno was a 
tyrant cannot be denied; he was practically omnipotent within 
Santa Barbara and exercised his authority like a petty baron 
over the residents. While his actions may not be an indict­
ment of army officers in general, they illustrate how the 
military could be a predatory force in the development of the 
colony.
Chapter 8
CHILOE AND VALDIVIA— THE FAITHFUL PROVINCES
Chilo6 and Valdivia were the southeriimost centers of 
Chilean colonization, two areas whose existence was justified 
in large part only because of their military importance.
They languished in their development, imposed financial 
strains on the viceroyalty, and were distinctly set apart 
from the mainstream of colonial society by their geographic 
seclusion and regional sentiments. And yet, they had one 
redeeming feature— the inhabitants of Chilo6 and Valdivia 
were among the staunchest supporters of the crown and the 
most faithful adherents of royalism to be found anywhere.
The ties of monarchism which these provinces held so dear 
took on a great deal of importance as the independence era 
approached and as the opposing political camps began to 
emerge.
* * *
During the sixteenth century, the Indian wars pre­
vented the Spanish from colonizing Chilo6 in the same 
sequence as other early settlements of Chile. By 1566, a 
semblance of tranquility reigned over Araucania, presenting
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President Rodrigo de Quiroga with the opportunity to prepare
an expeditionary party to take possession of the island.
The force was commanded by his son-in-law, Martin Ruiz de
Gamboa, who crossed the Chacao Channel in January, 1567, and
founded the first settlement of Castro later that year.1 The
new province was formally named Nueva Galicia, but the more
common name of Chilhub persisted and over a period of time
2became the present Chilob.
Isolation and abandonment were the chief Impediments 
to the island's growth, and when the first priests of the 
Company of Jesus arrived at Castro in 1608, they found only
3a dozen squalid huts and fifty colonists. Furthermore, its 
location so far to the south made it a favorite target of
pirates and corsairs. In 1600, Castro was sacked by the
Dutch corsair Baltasar Cordes, who formed an alliance with 
the Indians to drive the Spanish from the island. A group 
of survivors led by Captain Luis Pbrez de Vargas organized 
resistance in the nearby forests until a column of rein­
forcements arrived from Osorno and defeated the invaders.4 
In 1615, the Dutch corsair George Spilbergh sacked and 
burned the city once again.
The boundaries and jurisdictional limits of the 
province of Chilob were never well-defined and varied




according to the initiative of each governor or the shifting 
front of the Araucanian war. In its formative years, the 
province consisted of only Isla Grande, but later on the 
boundaries roughly became Osorno to the north, the Magellan 
Strait to the south, and the Andes to the east. The 
northern extremity was especially subject to fluctuation as 
it bordered on the neighboring jurisdiction of Valdivia. In 
the decades following the destruction of Osorno in 1599, the 
provincial limits stretched northward past the destroyed
5settlement, occasionally to the north of the Bio Bio River.
With the refounding of Valdivia in 1645, the limits receded
6again to the area around Osorno. In the 1760's, Viceroy 
Amat defined the boundaries as: the "barbarian Indians" of
the plains near Valdivia to the north; the archipelagos of 
Guaytecas and Chonos to the south; and the Andes mountains 
and "Patagonia lands" to the east. The province was thus 
quite extensive but almost uninhabited, and the only settle­
ments of any note were located on Isla Grande.
Since its original colonization, the province had 
fallen under Chilean jurisdiction but for a variety of 
reasons was firmly within the sphere of Peruvian influence. 
The area between Chilod and Valdivia was inhabited by a host
^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripci6n . X, 316.
^Tom&s Thayer Ojeda, "Importancia que tenian para 
los espanoles las regiones patagonicas," RCHG, XXXIII
(1920), No. 37, 295.
7Rodriguez and P6rez (eds„), Memoria del virrey 
Amat. 658.
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of hostile Indian tribes, which made this a virtual no-man's 
land for Spanish travelers. All of the island's supplies 
and provisions arrived by way of the annual situado from 
Lima, as well as the salaries of all troops, royal officials 
and the governor. The islanders were deprived of access to 
the Chilean coast, for they possessed no large ships of their 
own. In nearly every facet of its existence, Chilod was a 
satellite of Peru.
Viceroy Amat launched a campaign during the 1760 ' s 
to acquire direct control of the province. His views 
mirrored those of his predecessors— there was little use in 
sustaining the islanders and assuming the responsibility for 
their welfare if the viceroys did not also have corresponding 
governmental authority. In pleading the Peruvian case to 
the crown, he argued that the military importance of the 
archipelago demanded a strong defense, something which 
Chileans were incapable of providing in light of their
Odismal failures in containing the Araucanians. His 
reasoning finally prevailed in Spain. In August, 1767, the 
king authorized Amat to take all the necessary measures to 
insure Chilo^’s defense and to appoint a military governor
Qfor the island. Although President Jci.uregui opposed this 
change and petitioned the crown for a review of the matter, 
on March 28, 1768, the viceroy took charge of the province
8Ibid., 660.
^Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 165-66.
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and appointed Captain Carlos de Beranger as governor.10
From this date forward, Chilob remained under
Peruvian authority in the political as well as the literal
sense.11 In this transferral of authority, the province
esqperienced no great economic revival, but the armed forces
were augmented considerably and existing fortifications were
expanded. Prior to this, the upgrading of defenses was
largely a local problem encompassing little more than an
increase in patrols or the simple repair of batteries.
Governor Beranger was the first in a line of military
governors who presided over the province and was among
several royal engineers who came to assess the defenses and
make proposals for their strengthening. Several of these
officers compiled detailed reports concerning the island,
its population, administration and urgent problems which
12required action. Of special interest were their topo­
graphical maps, soundings of the bays and analyses of 
batteries and their fields of fire, which placed defense on 
a more professional basis. The militiamen received a more 
rigorous military instruction by visiting Peruvian officers
10Rodrlguez and Pbrez (eds.), Memoria del virrey 
Amat, 660.
11The only exception to this was in the religious 
realm, for the island continued to fall under ecclesiastical 
authority of the Concepcibn bishopric.
1^"Relacibn que..., February 15, 1773," Doc. No. 
7491, JMDI, CCLIX.
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13and were periodically rotated for active duty. All of 
these measures were designed to implant a sounder system of 
military defense by the islanders, themselves, and to 
enhance the degree of Peruvian administrative control.
Despite its long administrative adhesion to Chile 
then, Chilo6 was bound by stronger ties with Peru. The 
situ ado, commerce, communication and the appointment of royal 
officials nearly always originated in Lima. Even before 
1768, the military influence and the planning of defenses 
were predominately Peruvian. Chileans could ill-afford to 
aid the province in the light of their expenses in the cam­
paigns against the Araucanians, and it was realized that 
such aid could only constitute an additional burden.
Chilo6 1s geographic separation from the captaincy-general 
and an inhospitable frontier only accentuated its orienta­
tion towards Peru.
* * *
Valdivia, that envied fortress which attracted the 
attention of Spaniards and foreigners alike, was established 
in February, 1552, when the conqueror Pedro de Valdivia 
founded the town in one of his campaigns of conquest in the 
south.^ Giving the settlement his own name indicated that 
he was determined it should serve as the nexus of Spanish
13 "Discurso que hace..., 1782," Doc. No. 7492, JMDI, 
CCLIX, 254.
-̂ -̂ Barros Arana, Historia general, I, 404.
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colonization in that part of the colony. From the beginning 
the town was plagued by adversities, in large measure due to 
its separation from other inhabited areas. During the 
Indian revolt of 1599, Valdivia was overrun by Indians who, 
in the space of several hours, massacred over one hundred 
residents and captured three hundred others. Only a handful 
of the Spaniards managed to escape by swimming to several
15merchant ships anchored in the river in front of the town.
In 1602, the town was refounded, this time as a military
fortress. However, the new garrison of two hundred soldiers
was soon decimated due to death and desertion, and was barely
able to hold its own against unrelenting Indian attacks.
The declining fortunes of the town sank even lower
in 1604, when President Alonso de Rivera obtained royal
permission to withdraw all Spaniards to the north of the Bio
Bio River, utilizing this natural barrier as a shield behind
17which they could live in relative safety. Consequently, a 
ship sailed for Valdivia, picked up the remaining forty-four 
residents and transported them to new homes in Chilofe.
Several years later, after Rivera's experiment had been 
discredited by renewed violence, President Laso de la Vega 
again broached the subject of Valdivia's settlement to the 
king. In doing so, he played upon the ever-present royal 





18light of the recent Dutch colonization in northern Brazil.
Philip IV became convinced of the project's worth and ruled
on May 18, 1635, that Valdivia's resettlement should be
executed, but that the costs should be borne by the Chilean
or Peruvian treasuries9 Without royal subsidization, the
colonization project was somewhat less than appealing and
was consequently abandoned as too costly.
Valdivia's neglect continued until it was threatened
by a foreign nation. By the early 1640's, an influential
Dutchman visualized Chile as a magnificent opportunity to
establish the same type of overseas colony as his countryman
Count Johan Maurits had done on the northern coast of Brazil.
This man was Hendrick Brouwer, the former governor-general
of the Dutch East India Company, who had obtained permission
from the Dutch government to undertake an expedition to the
90west coast of America. The Dutch were xll-advxsed xn thexr 
scanty knowledge of Chile, believing it to be a land of great 
natural wealth. Brouwer reasoned that the taking of 
Valdivia would provide the basis for later colonization and 
a commercial foothold in the Pacific.
The tiny squadron of three ships left Holland in 
November, 1642, and arrived at the Dutch colony in Brazil 
the following year. Brouwer was received enthusiastically 
by Governor Maurits and presented with two additional
18Ibid., IV, 339. 19Ibid., 339-40.
^9Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 58.
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vessels. After passing Cape Horn, he stopped briefly on
Chilo6 , captured and then destroyed the small forts of
Carelmapu and Castro.^ The commander next set his sights
on Valdivia, but before arriving there, he fell gravely ill
and died at sea. His nephew, Elias Herckmans, succeeded him
as leader of the expedition and arrived at the deserted bay
79of Valdivia in August, 1643.
The enthusiasm of the Dutch was dimmed when the 
vessel carrying most of the munitions sank, and morale and 
discipline deteriorated among the ship crews. The Dutch had 
placed great faith in their ability to make the nearby 
Indians their allies; however, they found them unreceptive 
to European dominance and adamant in their refusal to supply 
the Dutch with food. Faced with dwindling provisions and 
the possibility of eventual starvation, Herckmans decided to 
return to Brazil in November, 1643, thus ending Dutch 
attempts to settle along the Pacific coast of America.
The presence of the Dutch was a startling revelation 
to the Spanish, especially when they learned that Brouwer 
intended to create a permanent colony. President Francisco 
L6pez Zhhiga was incapable of besieging Valdivia from the 
land side because the i^raucanians blocked all transit below 
the Bio Bio River. He had to content himself with
^AmunAtegui, Los precursores, II, 254.
^Barros Arana, Historia general, IV, 383-84.
23orrego Luco, La patria vieja, I, 93.
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bolstering the port defenses of Concepcidn.Although Peru 
possessed far more military resources than Chile, Viceroy 
Pedro de Toledo realized that months would pass before a 
naval squadron could be prepared to meet the Dutch challenge. 
By the time that serious consideration could be given to 
forming an expedition, the Dutch had left of their own 
accord. Nevertheless, Viceroy Toledo resolved to resettle 
the town, not only for strategic reasons but also with the 
knowledge that success in such an enterprise would bring 
prestige to himself and his family. Preparations were made 
for a massive expedition, for which it was necessary to 
solicit aid as far away as Quito. Antonio de Toledo, son of 
the viceroy, was placed in charge of the expedition, which 
departed from Callao for Valdivia on December 31, 1644.25
This was the largest military force ever seen in the 
Pacific up to that time, being composed of twelve armed 
galleons mounting a total of 188 cannon (45 of which were to 
be placed in the defenses of Valdivia) and 1,800 troops and 
sailors.26 On arriving at the port, Toledo erected the new 
town on the island in the center of the bay, which was named 
Mancera after the viceroy's title— the Marquds of Maneera.
As the intent of Toledo was to secure the port against any 
further foreign invasions, walled defenses and a large
2^Barros Arana, Historia general, IV, 392.
^Amun&tegui, Los precursores, II, 264.
26Ibid., 265.
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garrison of troops took precedence over civilian coloniza­
tion. Accordingly, nine hundred troops were left on the 
island when Toledo returned to Peru, a number which he
27thought would make the port safe from any future attack.
Valdivia's resettlement was a purely Peruvian ven­
ture, an accomplishment of considerable importance and a 
source of great pride for succeeding viceroys. The initia­
tive of Viceroy Toledo was interpreted as a precedent. His 
successors affectionately regarded Valdivia as their own 
special preserve, overseeing its operation and regularly 
providing the residents with supplies and arms. Although 
the city had originally been founded through the efforts of 
Chilean conquerors, it now became a de facto Peruvian pos­
session and an extension of the viceregal domain. The ties 
of authority were blurred, however, and legal jurisdiction 
of Valdivia became a long-standing source of contention 
between Lima and Santiago. This controversy involved more 
than jurisdictional pride or the appropriation of funds; it 
embraced complex issues such as military authority, political 
patronage and fundamental concepts of defense.
An acknowledged source of this confusion was the 
absence of royal mandates governing Valdivia's fiscal 
appropr i at ion s and the method of filling royal positions. 
There were no regulations concerning the amounts of money 
which could be spent on defenses or the respective troop
27Ibid.
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salaries. Nor were there rules governing the minimum number 
of troops which must be maintained or the method of appoint­
ing officials and granting promotions. Because of this, the 
level of assistance varied widely from year to year, accord­
ing to the generosity of each viceroy and the fluctuating 
status of the Lima treasury. Adding to this confusion was 
the intermittent assistance which came from Chile, either in 
the form of troops and convict laborers or the food subsidy 
sent each year from Valparaiso. This led to protracted 
litigation over who actually held legal possession of the 
city— Chile, by virtue of its proximity to the city, or 
Peru, by virtue of its heavy financing.
There were different motives in Peru and Chile for
the resettlement of Valdivia. For Chileans, resettlement
signified the abandonment of the defensive policy implemented
by President Rivera. After 1645, Valdivia served as a base
for renewed Spanish colonization of the south and a focal
point of military campaigns against the Indians. It was no
surprise that Chileans wanted the garrison to be manned by
their own sons of the soil, who had lived in the colony and
9ftwere trained in guerrilla-style Indian warfare. On the 
other hand, the viceroys were not directly affected by the 
devastation of the Indian wars. Their abiding concern was 
in using Valdivia as a defensive post against the Dutch or 
other European interlopers. Uppermost in their minds was
28carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, IX, 172.
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the possibility of foreign invasion and the jeopardy in 
which they would find themselves if Valdivia succumbed to 
the troops of European powers. As a consequence, they 
desired that officers and elected officials be appointed 
from the ranks of peninsular Spaniards who were well-versed 
in the accepted manner of European combat and methods of 
siege.2^ Especially desired were veterans of the war of 
Flanders or similar theaters of action.
In the years following its refounding, the many 
royal officials and military officers sent to Valdivia were 
appointed directly by the viceroy, usually every two years, 
from a list of three qualified candidates for each available 
p o s i t i o n . T h e  right to oversee promotions, salary bonuses 
and other rank advancements was also jealously guarded by 
the viceroys. Valdivia was regarded as a combat zone. A 
tour of duty there was considered meritorious, and troops were 
granted remuneration "for living in a presidio so disfavored 
by n a t u r e . P e r u v i a n s  did not wish to see their own 
appointees passed over for promotion or forced to compete 
with Chileans. Leaving aside the normal jockeying for 
position within the military chain of command, there were con­
siderations of political interest and special privileges 
involved in the control of Valdivia. The chronicler 
Carvallo y Goyeneche mentioned the "families" of the viceroys
2%[emorias de los vireyes, II, 399.
30Ibid., II, 398. 31Ibid.
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and the necessity of assuring their livelihoods in some form 
of public or military service. 4 In his memoirs, Viceroy 
Melchor de Navarra alluded to the family and the importance 
of relatives and friends receiving benefits from the vice­
regal authority.^ This leads to the conclusion that 
military appointments and governorships of towns such as 
Valdivia were a source of nepotism, intense patronage and a 
traditional method of political appointment. Consequently, 
Chilean efforts to obtain jurisdictional control of the city 
were met with hardened opposition by the Peruvian bureau­
cracy .
In a royal c6dula of April 9, 1662, Philip IV 
ordered that Valdivia be placed under jurisdiction of the 
captaincy-general, a measure which seemed entirely logical 
in view of its being located within Chilean territory.^4 on 
receiving word of this action, Viceroy Benavides vehemently 
protested, arguing the traditional merits of Peruvian supply 
and financing, plus the fact that Peruvian officers would be 
much more adept in combating European invasion. The 
sovereign became convinced of the impropriety of such a 
move, suspending execution of the order and allowing Valdivia 
to remain under the power of the v i c e r o y s D u r i n g  the 
following years, Chilean presidents made repeated attempts
•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, IX, 174. 
^ Memorias de los vireyes, II, 403-405.
34ibid. r 400. ^^Ibid.
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to win what they thought was their natural right to its 
jurisdiction. An example was President Diego D&vila y 
Pacheco, who reasoned that a splitting of the colony’s 
jurisdiction seriously obstructed war efforts and hindered 
coordination among the various military units. ° Unable to 
adjudicate between the interests of both parties, the king 
finally resolved in March, 1676, that Valdivia was to fall 
under Chilean authority due to its proximity to Concepcidn. 
The monarch reserved to himself the privilege of appointing 
the governors and officers from recommendations of the 
president. The viceroys were left with virtually no 
authority, in spite of the obligation of sending the situado
■a 7each year.
Acrimonious debate and petitions to the crown did 
not abate with this ruling but were only intensified on the 
part of the viceroys. They contended that garrison troops 
were discriminated against by Chilean authorities in every­
thing from their promotions to pay bonuses. The Archbishop 
of Lima and the governor of Valdivia also joined in the 
debate. They presented similar pleas to the crown, which 
finally resulted in the proclamation of a cddula on Decem­
ber 19, 1680.3® By this edict Valdivia remained under 
Chilean authority, and the crown still reserved the right to
3®Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn, IX, 171-72.
3^Memorias de los vireyes, II, 400.
38Ibid., 401.
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appoint the governor and two treasury officials, the veedor
3111(1 contador; but, all military vacancies must now be filled
39from the ranks of Peruvian officers. This strained and 
unresolved situation was to continue into the 17001s, during 
which time Valdivia's administration lacked direction due to 
jurisdictional rivalries. Because of this bickering, the 
town remained largely independent of either Peru or Chile.
It was an ideal environment for the despotism of governors 
and local corruption which became ingrained characteristics 
of the city.
During the 1730's, President Manso de Velasco 
recognized Valdivia as an impediment to the colonization of 
the south and a city which must fall under the direct 
authority of Chile if it was ever to progress. He presented 
his thinking to the king in a letter of February 28, 1739, 
relating the corrupt nature of Valdivia's administration and 
the commercial monopolies of its governors, which he said 
preserved the decadence of the city.4® The city could not 
be suitably defended while it leaned so heavily on distant 
Lima for assistance. After consideration, the king ruled in 
September, 1740, that Valdivia should henceforth be entirely 
subject to Chilean authority.4 -̂ President Manso accordingly
39Ibid.
40"Carta de..., February 28, 1739," Doc. No. 4123,
JMDI. CLXXXIV, 305-307.
41orrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 93.
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met in Concepcidn the following year with the Bishop of
Concepcidn, an oidor and the contador of the treasury in
order to compose a series of ordinances regulating the
political and military government of Valdivia. The result
of their labor was the Reg1amento para la Guarnicidn de
Valdivia (1741), which established the duties of the local
officials, set down rules governing the actions of the
governor, prohibited certain commercial activities and
42generally set the tone of local government.
Valdivia changed little after the transition to 
Chilean authority. Despite the changing jurisdictions and 
the comings and goings of troops the city retained its basic 
character— that of a military outpost on the edge of the 
Spanish frontier. Technically, its boundaries encompassed 
not only the town, but all the land between the Tolten and 
Bueno rivers, from the sea to the cordillera.^ Because 
there were no contiguous areas of settlement, Valdivia 
became a self-contained society, set apart and developing 
its own unique identity.
The most influential factor in the development of 
the town was, of course, the military. From 1645 until 1665, 
the garrison consisted of 2,000 men, and nearly 1,000 men 
until the end of the 1600's.44 As the troop level diminished
4 ^Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 98.
4 3"La verdad..., 1782, " AFA, XXV, 54.
44Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, X, 182-83.
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further to a single infantry battalion the civilian popula­
tion expanded, but even in the late 1700's a majority of the 
residents were either soldiers or related military personnel. 
Here, the career of army officer was in itself a respected 
profession, and the members of the Valdivia battalion 
selected their brides from among the most prestigious
A Cfamilies of the town. J Their choices were subject to 
approval, and to marry outside of an official army sanction 
was to risk harsh consequences. In the fairly rigid society 
of Valdivia, these marriages were subject to rigorous 
scrutiny. Among the requisites were the permission of the 
officer's father, proof of baptism, a dowry of at least
A C
2,000 pesos, and occasionally, direct royal approval.
Names such as Guarda, Carvallo, Pinuer and Molina were of 
longstanding prestige and belonged to long lines of respected 
officers.
According to Carvallo y Goyeneche, the native Vald- 
ivians possessed a distinct personality because the insecu­
rity of the region had bred a line of descendants who were 
robust, courageous and impetuous to the point of arrogance. 
Their dominant career inclinations were towards the army, 
and even those young men who took up a trade or merchantile 
occupation more often than not left it in time to join the
45Ibid., 180.
4®Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 180.
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military. ^  Youngsters grew up skillful in handling fire­
arms. From the age of seven or eight, they took up hunting 
as a sport and were inclined to play pranks and do other 
mischief with gunpowder. The women were intelligent, mild 
mannered and dedicated to their homes and families. Because 
their husbands were so occupied in military matters, the
women usually had to till the family gardens and handle
49other menial tasks around their homes. Even the local 
dialect was affected by army life. It was described as a 
polished Castilian reminiscent of that spoken in the military
campaigns of Europe, but without the Chilean provincial
50slang and lilted manner of speech. Despite the backward 
nature of Valdivia, there was a strong heritage of military 
aristocracy and a dedication to the profession of soldiering.
Everyday military life was not confined to the forts 
in the bay, but exerted a dominance throughout the town and 
local government. Probably the ultimate military influence 
was the fact that the cabildo, the fundamental institution 
of Spanish civil government and usually the first creation
of a new municipality, was not formed din Valdivia until
511808. There was a military counterpart of the cabildo con­
sisting of alcaldes militares, appointive posts for the
4^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, X, 180.
48"La verdad..., 1782," AFA, XXV, 46.
4 9Ibid.. 48. 50Ibid., 47.
^Gabriel Guarda Geywitz, " U n  intendente de la era 
portaliana," BACH (1971), 217.
183
assumption of local administrative duties. Still, the 
military governor exercised complete authority over civil­
ians and soldiers alike. He was normally a colonel or a 
brigadier, earning 3,500 pesos a year along with a daily
C Ofood ration for six persons. Should he die or become 
incapacitated in office, the sergeant major was first 
designate to succeed him and after this, the ranking captain 
of the battalion.^
The military establishment in Valdivia touched the 
lives of nearly everyone in one form or another. The most 
lasting impression made by the army, and certainly the most 
important after 1810, was that of preserving royalist senti­
ment and faithful devotion to the Spanish king. The 
discipline and self-denial of army life, coupled with a 
rigid heirarchy and social position of the officer corps, 
were not conducive to the growth of liberal political 
doctrine. The background of officers and staff were equally 
important factors. A great many officers came directly from 
Spain, the focal point of monarchism. Governors were
invariably peninsular Spanish, and numerous captains, lieu-
54tenants and other officers were of the same origxn.
52,1 Indice alfabetico.. "  [n.d.], AV, CCLXXXIII, 
"Gobernador de Valdivia."
By royal order of February 14, 1786, the governor's 
salary was raised to 4,000 pesos.
52Reqlamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 46.
54"La verdad.. 1782," AFA, XXV, 47.
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* * *
Valdivia and Chilo6 shared many similarities in 
their history. Both developed in environments set apart 
from the rest of the colony, which caused them to develop 
their own distinct character: Chilod, a poverty-stricken
island at the fringe of Spanish territory, and Valdivia, a 
tightly-knit provincial society with military overtones. 
The two areas underwent jurisdictional changes, but these 
shifts in authority were not nearly as influential as 
social, economic and military factors. Both were largely 
extensions of Peruvian influence and faithful islands of 
royalism in the south of Chile.
Chapter 9
MILITARY REORGANIZATION AND THE INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENT OF 1810
One of the changes taking place in society during 
the last years of the colony was the assumption of a more 
influential role by the civilian militia. The militia had 
traditionally been portrayed as rustic provincials, whose 
principal duties consisted of participating in public 
ceremonies. Nevertheless, they were a potentially influ­
ential political force, especially in the capital area.
They were far more numerous than the veteran troops, and the 
nobility and most prestigious colonial leaders were repre­
sented in the ranks.
During the last two decades of the 1700's, the 
militia acquired growing prominence, in large measure because 
of the reforms instituted by President Jciuregui. His 
reorganization of the Santiago militia in 1777 bred a new 
esprit de corps, encouraged by measures such as levying 
fines on those soldiers who failed to attend military or 
ceremonial functions where their presence was expected.-1-
^-Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Santiago, X, 53-55.
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The increased dangers of attack by foreign powers provided 
an additional avenue for the militia to increase their 
prestige, for there were too few veteran troops to simul­
taneously guard the frontier and the coasts. In 1780 and 
again in 1797, Santiago militia companies were sent by ship
to reinforce the Valdivia battalion against a possible
2 . . .  English invasion. In another year, 1800, over 750 mxlitxa
served on active duty throughout the colony, and their pay
oamounted to 62,000 pesos.
However, the real catalyst which placed the militia 
into the military arena was the English invasion of Buenos 
Aires in 1806, an event which convinced Chileans the next 
target of British imperialism would be their own colony.̂  
President Luis Munoz de Guzman convoked a defense council 
in September of that year, requesting that each participant 
present a defense plan to combat the English. The recom­
mendation which was finally accepted was that of Judas Tadeo 
Reyes, secretary of the colony, who proposed that militia be
2in 1780, a total of 280 men (four companies) were 
transported from Santiago to reinforce Valdivia. During the 
time that they served on active duty, their total pay was 
30,048 pesos ("Expediente formado..., 1780," AGG, DCCCLXIII, 
Cuademo 10) .
-*To obtain an idea of how this amount ranks with 
that of the entire veteran army, in 1800 a total of 277,455 
pesos was paid to all troops and auxiliary personnel ("Raz6n 
de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM, XLIX.
4jos6 P6rez Garcia, Historia natural, militar, civil 
y sagrada del reino de Chile (Santiago: Imprenta
Elzeviriana, 1900), CHPC, XXIII, 442.
187
mobilized to bear the brunt of the anticipated invasion.
Reyes' plan was deficient in its assessment of civilian 
capabilities; he confidently extolled the skill of machete- 
wielding militia levies in holding crack English troops at 
bay Under the circumstances, however, civilian volunteers 
were considered the only alternative for defending the 
capital, for there were no funds for creating new veteran 
battalions.
On March 18, 1807, President Munoz directed that a
training camp to instruct the militia be established just
6west of Santiago, at a place called Las Lomas. During the
four months of its operation (September through December,
1807), over one thousand militiamen from the capital area
took turns training, some firing a musket for the first time.
After their instruction, they were evidently more adept (or
at least more enthusiastic) in their duties, for one witness
reported that the troops could be armed and assembled on ten
7minutes notice. After it was learned that the British 
expedition under General John Whitelock had suffered an 
ignoble defeat to the Argentines, the camp was disbanded and 
the militia returned to their homes.
The exercises at Las Lomas were a pleasant diversion
^"Documentos relativos..., 1806-1807," CHDI, XXV,
56-57.
^P6rez Garcia, Historia, XXIII, 442.
7Ibid., 446.
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for the civilians involved and a welcomed change in the
routine of their occupations. More importantly, it gave
these men a perception of their strength and a feeling of
affinity with their victorious counterparts in Buenos Aires.
The creole aristocrats who were militia officers felt a
power they had not known before, which was easily translated
into strong sentiments of institutional loyalty. As one of
these soldiers later reflected:
We were so enthusiastic with the military service 
that we would have happily greeted the landing of 
any enemy expedition on our shores, and would have 
attempted to merit the glories that the heroic 
army of Buenos Aires achieved.8
This civilian involvement in military matters was destined
to become a factor in undercutting the strength of the
veteran army.
While the militia was undergoing a process of growing 
awareness, Chile was approaching the brink of a political 
abyss. The first manifestations of this became apparent on 
February 11, 1808, when the aged President Munoz died in 
office. According to a royal order of October 23, 1806: 
should a colonial administrative head die or become incapa­
citated in those jurisdictions where there was an audiencia, 
the interim leadership must fall to the senior military
Qofficer not below the rank of colonel. There were three
®Sergio Villalobos, Tradicibn y reforma en 1810 
(Santiago: Edicibnes de la Universidad de Chile, 19617, 63.
9"Real orden..., February 11, 1808," Doc. No. 5619, 
JMDI, CCXIX, 2-3.
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officers who satisfied these qualifications: Colonel Luis
de Alava, Intendant of Concepcibn; Brigadier Pedro de 
Quijada; and Brigadier Antonio Garcia Carrasco, all of whom 
were away from the capital.^®
Not wishing to risk the rule of some obscure army 
officer, the audiencia oidores met within hours to elect the 
regent of their corporation, Juan Rodriguez Ballesteros.
This act precipitated a challenge by the officers in ques­
tion, who convoked a council in Concepcibn and mutually 
agreed to uphold the right of Garcia Carrasco to become 
interim president. Facing a possible confrontation, the 
audiencia deferred to the aging brigadier, allowing him to 
take the reins of government. Accompanying Garcia Carrasco 
to Santiago was Juan Martinez de Rozas, the former asesor 
letrado of the Intendancy of Concepcibn, who was destined to 
have a guiding hand in the early independence movement. He 
became the new president’s personal secretary and attempted 
to use his position to influence the passage of liberal 
measures
Garcia Carrasco acceded to the presidency at what 
proved to be the most difficult of times. In August, 1808, 
word arrived to Chile of the abdication of Charles IV, the 
downfall of the Spanish minister Manuel de Godoy, and dis­
turbing rumors of Napoleon's true intentions toward the 
Spanish monarchy. The following September it was learned
l^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 11.
Hsimon Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Inde­
pendence (Cambridge: University Press, 1967), 84.
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that Ferdinand VII had yielded the Spanish throne at 
Bayonne, allowing Joseph Bonaparte to rule in the name of 
his brother. Amid the proclamations of fealty to Ferdinand, 
there were murmurings in Chile that the monarchy was suf­
fering an irreversibly fatal decline and that the Seville 
Junta lacked the authority to dictate colonial policy. Two 
opposing groups began to emerge in Santiago: the staunch
royalists, personified by the audiencia, and the proponents 
of autonomy, represented by the cabildo.
Garcia Carrasco was not the tactful, diplomatic 
president who was needed to soothe the tense political 
atmosphere. Accustomed to discipline and unquestioning 
obedience, he attempted to assert his authority by force. 
Years of army duty in isolated garrisons had developed an 
officer with little of the social polish which characterized 
successful career bureaucrats, as evidenced by his penchant 
for surrounding himself with lower-class cronies. Moreover,
he committed a series of mistakes which undermined his
12position and fueled the fxres of opposition.
In October, 1808, an English vessel, the Scorpion, 
was captured by Chilean officials along the northern coasts. 
The Spanish in question had feigned a willingness to enter 
into contraband trade with the English but at the moment of 
finalizing agreements, brutally murdered the captain and
12Ibid., 60-61.
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eight crewmen.^ The cargo was then divided after the con­
spirators declared it a fair prize. Chileans, who were 
usually tolerant of smuggling, were incensed at hearing of 
this atrocious act. Their ire was further aroused when it 
was learned that Garcia Carrasco had been in communication 
with the conspirators throughout the incident. The populace 
soon believed that he had masterminded the plot and had 
become wealthy from the sale of the ship's cargo. ^
During this time the cabildo, led by Juan Martinez 
de Rozas, was attempting a course of administrative reform. 
It was blocked at every turn by the conservative stance of 
the president. Frustrated in his attempt to impose reform 
by gaining the ear of the president, Rozas resigned his 
position and left the capital for Concepcibn, confident that 
his influence would fall upon more fertile ground in the
south.-*-5
Cognizant of the undercurrent of patriot resentment 
and determined to quell any symptoms of political discord, 
Garcia Carrasco took matters into his own hands. Without
■^Domingo AmunAtegui Solar, La revolucibn de la 
independencia, 1808-1813 (Santiago: Imprenta Universo,
S.A., 1945), 19.
"Representacibnes que hacen..., October-December, 
1808," CHDI. VIII, 117-64.
■^An additional cause for Rozas' departure was his 
alleged involvement in the Scorpion affair, from which he 
was supposed to have benefited financially (Domingo 
AmunAtegui Solar, Jesuitas, gobernantes, militares y 
escritores [Santiago": Editorial Ercilla, 1934T, 85-86) .
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prior consultation, he secretly ordered that 4,000 lances
fabricated under the orders of President Munoz in 1807, be
shipped to Lima. After the act was later publicized, he
justified it by claiming that the lances were needed by the
Spanish army, when in fact he feared that the patriots might 
isseize them. w
The act which turned public opinion against the 
president and ultimately brought his downfall was his 
imprisonment of three patriot sympathizers in May, 1810.
The men, Jos6 Antonio Rojas, Juan Antonio de Ovalle, and 
Bernardo Vera, were accused by Garcia Carrasco of anti- 
monarchial plots. Highly esteemed by patriots and royalists 
alike, they appear to have been victims of fabricated evi­
dence. ̂  The cabildo formally condemned the arrests, and 
even the royal audiencia urged restraint on the president. 
After being presented with a petition by prominent citizens, 
Garcia Carrasco agreed not to exile the men to Peru as he 
had planned, but to keep them detained in Valparaiso. 
However, in June, word arrived in Chile that the creoles of 
Buenos Aires had deposed Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo de 
Cisneros and installed a junta. Apprehensive that a similar 
Chilean movement might already be in progress, Garcia 
Carrasco quietly shipped Rojas and Ovalle to Lima, leaving
16"oficio de respuesta..., May 9, 1810, " CHDI,
XVIII, 25-35.
"^Galdames, A History of Chile, 148, 154.
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Vera behind because of what appeared to be a grave illness.
The revelation of this action brought about a popular demand
18for the president's resignation.
The audiencia, aware of the resignation which must 
soon come and desirous of naming a favorable successor, 
assembled on July 16 and persuaded the president to step 
down. In his place they appointed Mateo de Toro Zambrano, 
Conde de la Conquista, a feeble-minded octogenarian whom 
they were certain could be manipulated to their policies.
At first taken aback by the initiative of the 
audiencia, the cabildo recovered its political composure and 
began to press Toro Zambrano for an open cabildo. Hopelessly 
trapped between two opposing factions, the aging patriarch 
was alternately besieged by royalists and patriots. He 
reversed his directives almost daily, tending to agree with 
the last group with whom he had conferred. After endless 
rounds of vacillation, he finally assented on September 12 
to patriot demands for an open cabildo, having been persuaded
O f )that failure to do so would lead to civil strife. u
During the genesis of political unrest in Santiago, 
from 1808 to 1810, the veteran army was generally dis­
associated from partisan conflicts. In its ranks were sup­
porters of both political factions, but few officers could
1 8 "Testimonio d e l . .., 1810," CHPI, VIII, 310-13.
1 9 ”Banda en que..., J u l y  17, 1810," C H D I . XXIX, 26. 
^ c o l l i e r ,  Ideas and Politics, 47-48.
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be counted among the intelligentsia or the aristocratic 
elite. For the most part, officers remained in their posi­
tions along the frontier or in coastal forts, too preoccupied 
with the Araucanian situation to contemplate any unified 
action. Those officers stationed in the capital either 
adhered to their duties in preserving public order or became 
instruments of wiser civilian leaders.
In 1810, the veteran troops in Santiago consisted of 
the following; the dragoon company of the Reina Luisa (50 
men) led by Captain Manuel de Ugarte; an artillery company 
(70 men) commanded by Colonel Francisco Javier de Reina; and 
two companies of frontier dragoons (200 men) under Captain
Juan Miguel Benavente, who had come to the capital in the
91 ■entourage of Rozas.  ̂ Sergeant Major Juan de Dios Vial,
commander of the city's military forces, was an adherent of
colonial autonomy, as were Ugarte and Benavente. However,
their sworn responsibility was to insure public order, so
they refrained from overt attempts to force Garcia Carrasco
to resign.
The militia took the initiative in supporting the 
drive for autonomy, partially as a result of the training 
which they had received during the preceding years. Within 
Santiago there were two militia cavalry regiments of four 
squadrons each, the Principe and Princesa, and two infantry 
battalions; the Reqimiento del Rey and a battalion of
21fiarros Arana, H i s t o r i a  general, VIII, 138.
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pardos.22 In September, 1810, these units had been mobilized 
and were quartered throughout the city, receiving pay. They 
were augmented by other units from Melipilla and Rancagua. 
Altogether, the militia numbered 3,000 men who were nearly 
unanimous in their support of the cabildo. Even if the 
veteran forces present had all been unified and supportive 
of the audiencia, they would have been unable to overcome 
the combined civilian levies.
On September 18, 1810,. ^  \ open cabildo was held in 
Santiago, attended by 340 military, civilian and govern­
mental officials. The assembly elected a seven-man junta 
gubernativa presided over by the figurehead Conde de la 
Conquista, which was to serve until a representative con­
gress could be convoked the following April.2  ̂ It was 
recognized as the legitimate executive body of the colony by
every cabildo in Chile, including the royalist-tainted
?4corporations in Concepcibn and Valdivia.
22Manuel Antonio Talavera, Revolucibnes de Chile. 
Discurso histbrico, diario imparcial, de los sucesos 
memorables acaecidos en Santiago de Chile por un vecino 
testigo ocular (Santiago: Imprenta Mejia, 1901), CHDI,
XXIX, 119.
23"Acta de..., September 18, 1810," CHDI. IX, 70-74.
^Governor Alejandro Eagar of Valdivia answered the 
communications of the Santiago cabildo with a formal recog­
nition, although his terse reply belied a basic mistrust of 
the new government. In Concepcibn, news of the junta's 
creation alarmed Intendant Luis de Alava so badly that he 
fled to Lima by ship. An open cabildo was called which 
pledged allegiance to Santiago, and was supported by such 
ardent royalists as Tombs de Figueroa and Bishop Martin de 
Villodres.
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One of the most pressing issues facing the new 
government was that of military security, for the declaration 
of similar juntas in Quito and Upper Peru had brought bloody 
reprisals by Viceroy Jos6 Fernando de Abascal. There were 
two opposing factions within the patriot camp, concerning 
the defensive measures which should be taken. A moderate 
group emphasized the economic burden of assuming an army 
buildup and contended that this would only serve to provoke 
viceregal retaliation. A more vocal faction (spearheaded by 
Rozas and the radicals) viewed Peruvian retaliation as a 
certainty and favored a military buildup to counteract the 
inevitable invasion. The latter faction predominated, which 
led to a three-man commission being appointed to draft a 
plan of defense for the colony. Juan Mackenna, an ardent 
patriot and military officer, directed the work of this 
commission, the results of which were presented to the junta 
on November 27, 1810.
The defense plan of 1810 was intended as a justifica­
tion for a thorough reorganization of Chile's military 
forces. Superficially, the stated aim of the plan was the 
protection of Chile from a possible French invasion; the 
occupation of Spain by Napoleon had bred an exaggerated fear 
of French conquests spreading to America.^ In reality, it




was a strategy for defense against a royalist attack from 
Peru. It had the overall effect of relegating the existing 
veteran forces to a secondary status and elevating the 
civilian militia to a position of prominence. In terms of 
geographic emphasis, it was an effort to bolster the defenses 
of the capital area at the expense of the south and what was 
thought to be its traditional military importance. The 
Santiago government's disregard of the south1s military 
potential and its failure to insure the loyalty of the army 
there, was a serious error in judgment on the part of the 
patriot leaders.
Mackenna rejected the longstanding axiom that the 
southernmost garrisons of Chilo6 and Valdivia were integral 
to defense against an invasion around Cape Horn. To his 
thinking, both were so isolated and devoid of supplies that 
they could be of no use to any enemy, except for the artifi­
cial attraction of their forts. In addition, they were 
located too far to the south to be used as a base for raids 
on shipping. As an example, he pointed to the Dutch attempt 
in 1643 to colonize Valdivia, an effort which ended in utter 
failure. With regard to the expedition of Anson, Mackenna 
stated that the British crown was obviously as ignorant of 
Valdivia's uselessness as was the court of Madrid, which had 
infused many millions of pesos into the port in the delusion
o  7that it was vital. As for the frontier forts, in
27Ibid., 119.
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Mackenna's judgment they served as little more than a flimsy 
screen to protect endangered colonists, and their use in 
launching offensive operations was practically nil. The 
logic behind this downgrading of Valdivia and the frontier 
was probably an attempt to appropriate the costly situado to
O Othe Santiago area.
According to Mackenna, the only enticements of a 
coastal town to an invader were food, a target for pillage, 
or a base from which to raid shipping. The only three 
Chilean ports fulfilling these needs (and the only ones
meriting a defense) were Valparaiso, Concepcibn and Coquimbo,
29perhaps along with Huasco and Copiapb.
The plan envisioned by Mackenna involved a complete 
reorganization of existing military forces. Because of the 
escalated dangers of attack by foreign nations, he main­
tained that there was a need for a much larger army; but the 
strained financial situation of the colony did not permit 
the paying of even the ordinary expenses, let alone the 
creation of additional troop battalions. The only recourse, 
he argued, was to reduce the veteran forces significantly,
onto a permanent level of slightly over one thousand men.
Considering the uselessness of Valdivia, it was
2®Guarda, La toma de Valdivia. 24.
29,,Plan de defensa..., November 27, 1810, " CHDI. XIX, 
136, 146.
290rrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 479.
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proposed that its garrison be reduced by one-half, leaving 
only three hundred men to guard the town and forts. Almost 
half of the frontier forts were to be abandoned, and all 
veteran troops would be transferred to coastal ports.
Militia units would provide the necessary security for the 
remaining forts along the Bio Bio River. Concepcibn was 
one southern city which did merit a much stronger force than 
its usual one-hundred man garrison and would now be rein­
forced to four hundred twenty men, along with two hundred 
more troops in the port of Talcahuano. With the exception 
of the aforementioned troops in the south, all other 
military personnel would be transferred to Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo or Santiago.
The militia was meant to fill the vacuum left by the
depletion of the veteran forces, and for this purpose would
19be increased to some 25,000 men. Mackenna's estimation of 
the militia was high, for he termed it "the true army of 
Chile." A minimum of one thousand of these men would be 
necessary to defend the capital, as well as numerous other 
companies in Valparaiso and adj acent ports. By forming new 
battalions, the loyalties of army personnel could be assured 
and molded to the will of the junta.
Mackenna's argument for the reapportionment of the
31"Plan de defensa..., November 27, 1810,” CHDI. XIX,
133-34.
32Ibid., 153. 33Ibid., 152.
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armed forces was recognized as a thinly-veiled plot to shift 
troop deployment to areas of patriot sentiment, without 
arousing the suspicion of royalists. He and his associates 
were primarily concerned with protecting Santiago by placing 
numerous battalions in the city and along the adj acent 
coasts. Had the plan been undertaken in its entirety, the 
Santiago government would have had little to fear from 
organized resistance in other provinces. As it turned out, 
however, only half of the proposals were enacted. New army 
units were formed in the capital, but there was no effort to 
reduce the southern garrisons or transfer their troops to 
Santiago where they could be kept under a watchful eye. It 
was the veteran army in the south which was to later become 
the base of the royalist invasion from Peru.
Utilizing Mackenna •1 s proposals as a framework for 
protecting the capital, the junta decreed on December 14, 
1810, that new veteran military units be formed in Santiago. 
In the heady enthusiasm of the first months of the junta's 
existence, there was little reasoned thought for the security 
of areas other than the capital or in making use of the 
standing army which already existed in the s outh. Santiago 
residents of whatever political stripe eagerly enlisted in 
the army in order to indulge their sentiments of patriotism 
or vanity. Four new artillery companies were created with a 
combined strength of 280 men, 75 of whom were supposed to be
201
selected from current veteran companies. ^ An infantry
battalion was formed, the Grenadiers of Chile, with a total
of nine companies and 693 nen. And last, a cavalry squadron
was drawn up, the Dragoons of Santiago (or Hussars, as they
35were known), of six companies totaling 650 troops.
Although the full strength of these new corps could not be 
immediately filled, their strength on paper almost equaled 
the entire veteran army already in existence.
While some veteran officers were used in positions 
of leadership in these new units, most of the officer corps 
were derived from civilian militia or the nobility of 
Santiago. Political allegiance and social status were the 
principal criteria for receiving commissions, rather than 
records of distinguished army service. Juan Martinez de 
Rozas was one of the most avid proponents of employing 
regular veteran officers to lead these units, arguing that a 
rough geographical balance should be maintained with regard 
to representing the Valdivia and Concepcibn g a r r i s o n s .36 
But his efforts were recognized as a scheme to 
buttress his personal power by surrounding himself with 
military cronies from the south, and were largely counter­
acted by the Santiago aristocracy. Sergeant Major Juan de
34"Documento sobre..., December 16, 1810, " CHDI. XXV,
334-35.
35"Decreto que..., December 22, 1810, " CHDI. XXV,
346-47.
36"Memoria sobre.. "  CHDI, II, 34.
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Dios Vial and Captain Juan Miguel Benavente, two veteran
officers from Concepcibn with admirable records, were
originally promised command of the hussars and grenadiers.
37They were later passed over in favor of other candidates. 
Bernardo 0 'Higgins, one of the most capable young officers
on the frontier, was reduced to second in command of a
38militia regiment in the Laja district.
For the most part, it was the influential families
of Santiago who managed to win military appointments,
despite the fact that they were inexperienced and unfit to
lead their new commands. The awarding of positions was
favorably influenced by those wealthy aspirants who could
afford to equip and clothe their own companies. For example,
Ignacio Carrera, father of the influential Carrera family,
was able to confirm his sons Juan Jos6 as sergeant major of
39the grenadier regiment and Luis as an artillery captain.
The bonds of kinship extended even to the established army 
units. For example, the Conde de la Conquista was able to 
name his son as commandant of the frontier dragoon 
squadron.^8 Manuel Antonio Talavera, a royalist witness to 
the intense rivalry for administrative and military appoint-
37Ibid., 36.
38Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo del general 
don Bernardo 0 'Higgins (Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio,
1860), 1 1 0.
39"Memoria sobre...," CHDI, II, 35.
^^Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 110.
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ment, observed that:
The multitude of aspirants to positions of new 
creation is incalculable. It is sufficient only 
to understand that the partisans that actively 
cooperated in the installation of the Junta, went 
with the hope of some reward and of improving their 
status. This personal interest, which is now called 
patriotism, . . .  is the most frequent topic con­
sidered in the Junta.41
The recruitment of common soldiers did not follow
the rigorous criteria of officer selection. In order to
fill the ranks of the army, it was necessary to scour the
jails and countrysides for volunteers. The pitifully small
number of uniforms and armaments gave the new units the
A 0}appearance of little more than an organized mob.  ̂ In its 
most basic form, it was a rich man's army, and the luxuriant 
acouterments of the officers sharply contrasted with the 
threadbare appearance of the common soldiers.
The costs of the new Santiago units were insupport­
able . All three branches incurred annual expenditures of
210,252 pesos, simply for the salaries of officers and 
43troops. No area of public finance was too sacred to 
escape the demands of military appropriation. Salaries of
4-^Talavera, RevoluciOnes. CHDI, XXIX, 127-28.
42"Memoria sobre...," CHDI. II, 36.
42The breakdown for the individual units was as
follows:
Artillery. . . . . . . . .  49,104
Infantry  .......... .. .105,696
Cavalry. .  ............  54,732




all public employees were lowered (including those of the 
clergy), a measure designed to increase revenues by 50,000 
pesos annually.44 Additional taxes were levied on tobacco 
and other monopoly items, and work was suspended on public 
edifices such as the cathedral of Santiago. One of the few 
economic measures to actually prove profitable was the 
proclamation of free trade on February 21, 1811. This act 
opened the ports of Valdivia, Concepcibn, Valparaiso and 
Coquimbo to foreign commerce with all allies of Spain and 
with neutral nations.45 In only six months, colonial 
customshouse receipts nearly doubled.45 Article XVI of this 
provision merits noting within the context of the military, 
for it permitted the duty-free entry of all pistols, swords, 
muskets, cannon, gunpowder and all such implements of war.47
Despite the inexperience of the new troops, the 
government sought to provide them with as high a status or 
higher than that of the established units. A comparison of 
wage levels reveals that while the veteran artillery companies 
received nearly the same wages as those in Santiago, the new 
infantry units were generally higher paid than the estab­
lished battalions.
44Ibid., 188.
45"Bando que declara..., February 21, 1811," CHDI. 
XXIX, 203. Excluded from this free trade provision were 
precious metals, liquors, and such items as tobacco, which 
fell under government monopoly.
4^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 274.
47Talavera, Revolucibnes. CHDI, XXIX, 208.
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Table 6
Annual Pay Scales, Infantry Battalions 








Second Lieutenant 244 360
Sergeant First Class 144 180
Sergeant Second Class 138 168
Drummer 96 132
Corporal First Class 120 144
Corporal Second Class 96 132
Soldiers 80 120
By early 1811, the patriot camp had reached a state 
of diplomatic limbo with the mother country and Peru, each 
side marking time until a definite advantage could be 
achieved. On receiving news of the Chilean junta's instal­
lation, the Spanish consejo de regencia was understandably 
suspicious, petitioning the Peruvian viceroy for his 
assessment of the matter. Nevertheless, the consejo 
announced that it would not oppose the junta as long as it 
dedicated itself to preserving public order and professing
4 8Ibid., 185.
"Liquidacidn que forma..., 1810," CHDI, VIII, 344-
47.
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loyalty to Ferdinand VII. Viceroy Abaseal was less concil­
iatory towards the junta, acknowledging it in the most 
reserved manner. Abascal would have dispatched an expedi­
tion to quell the seditious creoles long before then had not 
his troops been spread so thinly in Quito and Upper Peru. In 
addition, a severing of ties with Chile would have deprived 
Lima of Chilean grain i m p o r t s . T h e  matter of the junta's 
legitimacy was brought to the forefront on February 26,
1811, when the Conde de la Conquista died. Although he had 
never been more than a puppet, he was the legally recognized 
leader of the colony. His passing only accentuated the 
crisis of the junta's recognition.
Despite the cool reception of the junta abroad, the 
internal situation in Chile was more critical than the 
danger of invasion. The royalist faction had endured the 
initial moves of the cabildo and junta with only minimal 
reaction, partially from an inability to make their voices 
heard and their belief in the patriot declarations of 
loyalty to the monarchy. As the radical posture of the 
Rozas clique began to gain momentum, monarchial sympathizers 
thought of regaining by force the power which they had 
lost.'’® The individual whom they entrusted to carry out 
their plans was Colonel Tom&s de Figueroa, a troop commander
4®Mariano Torrente, Historia de la revolucidn de 
Chile (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1900), III, 37.
^°0rrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 492-93.
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stationed in Santiago.
Figueroa was one of the most colorful figures of
late colonial Chile, with a background that was as volatile
as the frontier where he served. Born in Estepona, Spain,
around 1746, he entered the military as a young man, being
SIappointed to the palace guard of Charles IV. Notorious 
for his impetuous behavior and amorous escapades, he was 
discovered in the chamber of a court lady and forced to 
resign from the army. The incident led to a duel with a 
rival, whom Figueroa killed. The king commuted the normal 
death sentence and ordered Figueroa to serve in Valdivia, 
but the resourceful convict was able to escape after several 
years imprisonment, disguised as a priest. He returned to 
Spain, where he was finally pardoned and awarded an officer's 
commission. He returned to Valdivia as a captain, becoming 
a distinguished officer in the fortress where he had once
c pbeen imprisoned.
Prior to the independence movement, Figueroa was 
stationed in Concepcidn, where he had gained a reputation as 
an influential frontier caudillo. He developed a close 
friendship with Rozas, and with the exception of this man, 
Figueroa may have been the most influential personality on
51Benj amin Vicuna Mackenna, El Coronel don Tomas de 
Figueroa (Santiago: Rafael Jover, 1884), 43.
^"Expediente sobre..., July, 1789," Doc. No. 5194, 
JMDI, CCVII, 311-17.
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the frontier.^ When Rozas journeyed to Santiago in 1810 to 
take a seat on the governing junta, he took Figueroa with 
him in the hope of making him a powerful ally. Within a 
short time, Figueroa broke away from his mentor and formed a 
liaison with prominent royalists.
In late March, 1811, delegates began to assemble in 
Santiago to attend the national congress, scheduled for 
April 1. Early on the morning of the assembly, Juan de Dios 
Vial, commander of the city's forces, instructed Captain 
Juan Miguel Benavente to lead a company of fifty frontier 
infantry to the plaza where the assembly was to take place, 
to guard against possible violence. After taking the 
infantry from San Pablo barracks, Benavente found them surly 
and in subord in ate, saying they would follow the orders of no
C Aone except their commander, Tomas de Figueroa. Under the 
leadership of a corporal, the troops threatened to kill 
Benavente if he interfered with their plans and returned to 
the barracks to enlist others to their cause. Besides this 
company, in the barracks were housed almost the entire 
squadron of frontier dragoons and the new units of Santiago
C Chussars, altogether totaling three or four hundred men.
The majority of these soldiers were of royalist sympathies,
^^Vicuna Mackenna, El Coronel, 79.
54"proceso seguido..., April 1, 1811," CHDI, XIX,
241.
55 ~Vicuna Mackenna, El Coronel, 83.
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although their primary loyalties were to Figueroa.
A messenger was then sent to bring Figueroa to the 
barracks. On arriving, he lost no time in breaking open the 
magazine, distributing cartridges to each soldier and leading 
a force of about two hundred fifty men to the plaza of the 
consulado to confront the assembled junta and cabildo. On 
finding the square still vacant, he conducted the mob to the 
main plaza. He arrived about nine o'clock and entered the 
palace of the audiencia. The oidores, having been forewarned 
of a plot to depose the junta, had been in session since 
seven o'clock that morning. Figueroa conferred privately 
with them, after which a note was sent to the junta, asking 
for its resignation.
In the meantime, Vial and Benavente had assembled
over five hundred armed soldiers along one side of the main
57plaza, along with two cannon. On leaving the audiencia 
palace, Figueroa was startled by the sight of organized 
opposition but placed himself at the head of his troops and 
confronted the patriots. During a moment of confusion 
general firing broke out, followed by panic on the part of 
the royalists as they fled from the plaza. The number of 
dead was placed between two and ten men, mostly among the 
royalists, with up to twenty persons wounded.
When the gunfire had first begun, Figueroa fled from
56Ibid., 95. 57Ibid., 106.
58"Proceso seguido..., April 1, 1811," CHDI, XIX, 240.
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the plaza and sought refuge in a convent, hiding in a court­
yard. After the battle, a search was conducted for him led 
by none other than Martinez de Rozas, who offered a reward 
of five hundred pesos for the perpetrator of the conspiracy. 
Figueroa was apprehended and tried for his actions the same 
day, being found guilty of plotting to overthrow the junta.
At four o'clock on the morning of April 2, he was executed
in his cell by a firing squad, and his body later exhibited
59xn the plaza.
Regardless of the royalist loyalties held by Figueroa, 
it appears that personal ambition was the motivation behind 
his assuming leadership of the militant troops. Neither was 
he the sole organizer of the rebellion, for evidence tends 
to point towards a deliberate attempt of the audiencia to 
bring about the overthrow of the j u n t a . I n  any case, his 
execution was only a secondary consequence. The audiencia 
was solidly implicated in the revolt, as well as a variety 
of other crown officials. During the following months, 
popular pressure forced the resignation of the now thoroughly 
discredited oidores, as well as former president Garcia 
Carrasco.61 This dissolution of the highest colonial
59Ibid., 261.
®9In his confession, Figueroa maintained that he had 
not acted alone but on orders from higher authorities, 
alluding to the audiencia. Ibid., 260.
61"Acuerdo para separar..., April 24, 1811," CHDI, 
XIX, 348.
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tribunal and the exile of its members temporarily broke the 
backbone of organized royalist opposition and paved the way 
for the brief ascendancy of the constituent congress.
From the revolt of April 1, the militia and new army 
units in Santiago gained renewed prestige and a sense of 
their own power. Promotions were liberally dispensed, and 
all those soldiers who had participated in the suppression 
of the revolt were presented with shoulder patches inscribed
/r owith "I saved the fatherland. In the following weeks,
the junta stationed nearly two thousand troops in the 
central plaza and placed the militia on a mobilized status. 
These militia came from as far away as Aconcagua, Melipilla 
and Rancagua, forming security patrols that roved about the 
city each night. Militiamen were suddenly cognizant of 
their role in determining the course of political action, 
and civilian leaders were aware that these new units were 
now indispensable elements in obtaining their political 
ends.
Until this juncture, Chile had occupied the unique 
position of not having to overcome great barriers in its 
progress towards independence. The patriots had directed 
their movement with moderate firmness and had treated their 
most ardent adversaries with respect. Although there was a 
deep animosity between the opposing factions, no open
"Premios concedidos..., April 9, 1811," CHDI, XIX,
348-49.
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violence had taken place. The revolt of Figueroa once and 
for all set the tone of the revolution and irreparably 
polarized both camps against each other. For the moment, 
the patriot movement was unified, with both the moderates 
and the radicals pitted against a common enemy.
Chapter 10
THE ASCENDANCY OF JOSE MIGUEL CARRERA AND THE 
PATRIOT JUNTAS OF CONCEPCION AND VALDIVIA
The occurrences of April 1, 1811, no matter how
evocative of the need for order, could not indefinitely 
quell the deep divisions within the patriot movement. Once 
order had been reestablished the old dissensions returned, 
now highlighted by a widespread dissatisfaction with Juan 
Martinez de Rozas and the radical stance which he repre­
sented. The moderates, led by the governing junta and 
cabildo of Santiago, naturally opposed Rozas' jacobin 
philosophy and were jealous of his ascendancy to power.
They were joined by the clergy and other supporters of the
old regime. And Rozas' own party, the radicals, were
alienated by his one-man leadership and the violence which 
had resulted under his tutelage."*'
By mid-1811, Rozas was nearing the zenith of his 
political influence in the capital. His support was based 
on the rabid loyalty of a minority of the provincial 
electors to the rescheduled national congress, which was to
^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 334.
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convoke in July. Earlier in the year, the Santiago cabildo 
had secured the right to send twelve delegates to congress, 
a number which seemed excessive to the provincial electors. 
This action reinforced their suspicions that the cabildo was 
attempting to insure the moderate composition of the congress. 
On April 30, a majority of Rozas' supporters assembled 
before the junta ejecutiva and demanded participation in 
executive decision-making. The junta acceded to their 
demands and a thirty-member executive directory was created, 
now predominately composed of provincial representatives
ployal to Rozas.
Alarmed at this power play on the part of the 
exaltados, combined with the exclusion of the capital from 
the new directory, the Santiago moderates immediately 
scheduled an election for congressional deputies. In the 
election of May 6 , the moderates scored an outstanding 
victory by electing a majority of their members to the up­
coming congress. From this point on, the radical faction 
was in a minority, shorn of its former power. Rozas' down- 
fall in the capital was now almost inevitable.
On July 4, 1811, the long-anticipated congress was 
finally convoked, and the junta which had served since 
September 18, 1810, was formally dissolved. This congress 
was the first real expression of representative government
^Martinez, Memoria histbrica, 99.
■^Orrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 523-24.
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in Chile, and while meriting a certain historical veneration, 
its accomplishments should not be exaggerated. It was com­
posed chiefly of aristocrats with little comprehension of 
their representative obligations, for there was no parlia­
mentary tradition on which to base their actions. Rather 
than acting as a machine of change, the congress was a 
faithful reflection of the structured social hierarchy of 
the period.
From its inception, the congress was fractured by 
political discord and philosophical differences, which 
impeded the course of reform and reduced the regular sessions 
to bouts of verbal abuse. Three distinct groups began to 
emerge from this chaotic assembly. There were the radicals, 
led by Rozas, who although possessing only twelve delegates, 
were resolute and dedicated to the democratic transformation 
of the colony. The moderates represented a more numerous 
faction and included many of the wealthy gentry and socially 
prominent colonial leaders. They were the advocates of an 
enlightened, reformed government, but without a sharp break 
with tradition. Finally, there were the royalists, com­
prising a definite minority but vehemently opposed to ideas
Aof autonomy.
The congress and the directory were now fast becoming 
oriented towards the moderate, and even the royalist, view­
point. As the moderates increasingly consolidated their
'Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 116.
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power by electing their own adherents to governmental posts,
the Rozas faction desperately attempted to regain lost
political ground. Inflammatory literature attacking the
moderates was circulated, and they were constantly provoked
in public or accused of treachery against the cause of
liberalism. Rumors of a revolt by the exaltados spread
throughout the city. Colonel Reina, the royalist artillery
officer and an instrument of the reactionaries, was ordered
by the congress to redouble armed patrols throughout Santi-
5ago to counteract revolution.
On July 25, an English warship, the Standart, arrived 
at Valparaiso from Cadiz to convey Chilean deputies to the 
Spanish cortfes and to collect contributions for the war 
against the French. The congress refused to comply with 
either of these demands, which was a temporary political 
victory for the exaltados. Rozas, however, was aware of 
his fading prestige and determined to take radical measures 
to regain it. Through his confidants, he circulated a rumor 
that the captain of the Standart had landed troops in 
Valparaiso, capturing the port and local garrison. It was 
hoped that this ruse would frighten the congress, causing 
them to elect Rozas dictator in order to restore tranquility. 
The shallow plot was recognized, though, and Rozas' remaining
7prestige sank even lower.
5 Barros Arana, Histona general, VIII, 358-59.
6 "Comunicacibnes cambiadas..., 1811," SCL, I, 45-48.
^"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 34-35.
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The final demise of the exaltados came during con­
gressional debate over the formation of a three-man junta 
ejecutiva, with one member representing Concepci6n and two 
representing Santiago (based on the 30 to 12 congressional 
ratio). This proposal was overwhelmingly approved, leaving 
the south in a nearly powerless legislative position.
Realizing that they were no longer a viable political body
in the capital, Rozas and the twelve radical deputies 
resigned their posts on August 9, and returned to Concep- 
ci6n.®
The resignation of the exaltados was the ultimate
triumph for the moderates, but marked a retrogress ion in the
progress of the revolution. The reactionaries now became
dominant, with public posts being presented not only to
timid patriots but to outright royalists and enemies of the
regime. Two appointments which particularly alarmed the
liberals were those of the moribund Conde de la Marquina as
commander of the frontier infantry battalion and Rambn
Jim6nez Navia as the battalion sergeant major. The latter
officer had been implicated with Tom&s de Figueroa in the
9abortive coup of April 1.
Believing that the potentially violent situation 
could be thwarted by a simulated change in government, the 
congress convoked a closed session on July 10, 1811, and
®"Exposici6n que..., August 12, 1811," ABO, I, 115-16.
^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 381.
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named a three-man governing junta. In reality, the new 
junta was almost powerless and subject to strict supervision 
by the legislative body which had elected it. On August 13, 
congress declared its power to decree laws, review military 
promotions and appointments and conduct foreign relations. 
Even so, government operations reached an impasse as the 
legislative sessions degenerated into petty debate and 
rivalries. In the meantime, Rozas had begun to build a move­
ment of his own in Concepcidn, dedicated to the destruction
11of monarchism and his enemies m  the capital. His actions 
were symptomatic of the congressional inability to determine 
its own destiny, let alone that of the rest of the colony.
The political impasse was also propitious for the advent of 
a military caudillo in Santiago.
At this juncture, Josd Miguel Carrera entered upon 
the political stage and in only a short time became the 
dominant figure of the revolutionary movement. Born into 
one of the most prestigious families of Chile, Carrera was 
sent to Spain in 1806 by his father to serve as a merchan- 
tile apprentice. He instead entered the military, a fitting 
occupation for his violent personality, and served valiently 
in a militia regiment during the French invasion of the
■^The three junta members were Martin Calvo Encalada, 
Juan Jos6 Aldunate and Francisco Javier de Solar.
■^Several valuable documents relating to the dis­
trust and animosity of towns in the south against the 
congress can be found in the SCL, I, 58-62.
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peninsula. On receiving word of the upheaval in his home­
land, he returned to Chile to take a place beside his 
brothers and father. He arrived on the Standart in July, 
1811, the same vessel which had brought the orders for finan­
cial assistance from the Spanish cort6s. At once, he placed
himself in contact with radical leaders who advocated
12violent methods of obtaining power.
The exaltado supporters in Santiago were quick to 
court the support of Carrera and convinced him that the 
moderate congress, supported by Colonel Reina, intended to 
reinstitute the old monarchist regime. Carrera refused to 
lend his support until he was assured that he and his two
brothers would assume the command and execution of the
revolt.^ At noon on September 4, Carrera carried out a 
revolt against the royalist artillery barracks and the con­
gress, with the death of only one soldier. He was supported 
by almost all of the officers and troops of the grenadier 
and hussar battalions, in addition to part of the artillery
corps, led by his brother Luis
The movement of September 4 placed the radical 
element back in power. On the same day, a junta ejecutiva 
of five members was installed, one of whom was Juan Martinez
12,Diario militar..., " CHDI, I, 17.
•̂ iri Carrera' s own version, he implied that there 
was vacillation on the part of the radicals as to who would 
lead the revolt, and he offered his services to break the 
impasse ("Diario militar..., 1 CHDI, I, 20) .
14Ibid., 20-23.
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de Rozas This body implemented a harsh reaction to the
supporters of the former government, such as demanding the 
loyalty of all religious orders and their membership. On 
September 14, the junta absolved itself from future recrimi­
nations it might carry out against royalists by ordering 
that all political dissenters register with the government
1Cin thirty days. Those who did not do so would be subject 
to deportation, should they be judged as subversive. While 
the residents of Santiago were being distracted by struggles 
among these immature political factions, equally vigorous 
but unconnected movements were being organized in the South.
On his arrival in Concepcidn in late August, Rozas 
received an enthusiastic reception by the townspeople and 
manifested his plans of creating a local junta in opposition 
to Santiago. A gathering of patriots met in the home of a 
young lawyer, Manuel V&squez de Novoa, and proclaimed their 
desires for an open cabildo. Colonel Pedro Jos6 Benavente, 
the provincial military governor, was himself partial to the 
cause of reform and gladly decreed the meeting for September 
5. On that day, an assembly of over 180 delegates met for 
the stated purpose of electing new deputies to the capital, 
but went much further by forming a provincial junta of four
Other members of this junta were Juan Enrique 
Rosales, Martin Calvo Encalada, Juan Mackenna and Josd 
Gaspar Marin. Two secretaries were designated: Agustin
Vial and Jos6 Gregorio Argomedo.
16"Proclama sobre..., September 14, 1811," CHDI, 
XXIX, 439.
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17members, presided over by Colonel Benavente. One of these 
was Rozas, who now enjoyed the distinct privilege of occupy­
ing positions in the governments of both provinces. Only 
the most rabid opponents of the junta failed to give their 
affirmation of support.
The new junta made it quite clear that it submitted 
to the authority of the capital, but reserved for itself the 
right of all provincial appointments, both military and 
civilian. One of these was the replacement of the Conde de
la Marquina by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Calder6n as
18commander of the frontier infantry battalion. Rozas and 
the principal architects of that movement were aware of the 
difficulties they might incur from the viceroy or from 
Santiago, and began to deliberately replace officers of 
doubtful loyalties with others devoted to their cause. The 
following letter, from Rozas to Bernardo 0 'Higgins (dated 
December 3, 1811), is illustrative of the extent to which 
political loyalties were beginning to distort the composi­
tion of the veteran officer corps. This in itself is not so 
extraordinary as the fact that civilians played the leading 
role in determining appointments and promotions, not regular 
army officers. The document is pertinent to an understanding 
of the political metamorphosis of the military chain of 
command.
17"Noticias sobre..., September, 1811, " CHDI, XXIX,
439.
18,,Diario militar.. ” CHDI, I, 33.
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Dear Friend,
I have written to don Juan Mackenna concerning 
the necessity of reorganizing the artillery corps, 
in which everything is maligned and defective; time 
is of the essence. What is most urgent is the 
appointment of officers. I can say to you that we 
do not have any, and without officers there is no 
artillery train, nor is there artillery, nor is 
there defense. Don Jos6 Zapatero, who was retired 
for being incompetent, is the [artillery] captain 
and commander. He knows nothing nor is he capable 
of learning anything, nor of applying or upgrading 
himself. He is a European; moreover, he is a 
saracen [royalist] in his conduct, and besides, you 
must know that he is feeble, sick and without char­
acter . If the Limenos [Peruvians] or other enemies 
come, what will become of us with such a commander?
We will be denounced and betrayed without recourse.
You must quickly order that Zapatero return to his 
retirement with the pretext of saving money or with 
that of his infirm condition and not being fit for 
combat duty, and replace him as commander with don 
Juan Torres. And if he cannot serve, then with don 
Francisco Formas, but in any case, he must come 
voluntarily and he must be a dedicated and active patriot.19
Valdivia represents another course taken by the 
patriot movement. There, the isolation of the city, the 
dominant military spirit of the inhabitants and the self- 
contained, provincial society were seemingly anathema to the 
growth of political liberalism. Valdivia was the only dis­
trict in Chile which had abstained from sending delegates to
the national congress in Santiago, in spite of ample notifi- 
20cation. Nonetheless, the seeds of liberalism had been 
planted under the guidance of a small group of devout 
patriots in 1811, but they were assisted by several
■̂ ■̂ Rozas to O'Higgins, December 3, 1811, ABO, I, 176-77. ---
20"Lista de los diputados..., 1807," ACG, DCDLXXVII,
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influential officers of the local garrison.
The first signs of this movement became apparent
21when Valdivia's first cabildo was formed. At a time when 
other cabildos were taking upon themselves the duties of 
governing entire colonies, their counterpart in Valdivia was 
still uncertain of the bounds of its legal authority, a 
graphic reflection of the predominance of the military 
government. From its inception, it was viewed by army 
leaders as seditious and revolutionary. The arch-opponent 
of the cabildo was Governor Alejandro Eagar, a Spanish
officer of long and obedient service to the crown, who had
?2governed the city since April, 1807.
In its first year of operation, the cabildo was 
attacked by Governor Eagar, who attempted to nullify the 
first election of its regidores. The corporation promptly 
petitioned President Garcia Carrasco for protection of its 
rights, which led to a reprimand of the governor and instruc-
o otions not to impede cabildo deliberations. J
By 1810, another confrontation had arisen, stemming 
from Governor Eagar1s fear that the cabildo would emulate 
the actions of the open assemblies in Concepcibn and 
Santiago. In a legal brief which he drew up proposing the 
cabildo's abolition, the governor argued that the military
21"El gobernador..., April 10, 1810, " ACG, DCLVIII, 6-7.
22Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 214.
^Guarda, "Un intendente, " 218.
staff capably and efficiently resolved all aspects of city 
government, without the necessity of civilian inter­
ference .24 As evidence of this, he cited that while the 
cabildo had recently petitioned the right to jail common 
criminals in the city, there was not even a prison which 
could be used for this purpose. A more expeditious method 
was to simply remand lawbreakers to one of the forts in the 
bay, as had always been done. The harsh reaction of Eagar 
constituted more than a fear of alien political doctrine; in 
Valdivia, the tradition of military rule was the most 
deeply-ingrained precept of the town's existence, an almost 
sacred privilege which resisted all innovation.
This city under my command has the perrogative of 
being purely military but also has the nullifica­
tion of a newly-created cabildo, contrary to all 
law and custom of a military presidio. . . .26
After receiving news of the downfall of President
Garcia Carrasco and his replacement by a junta, Eagar became
even more concerned with the effects on the Valdivia cabildo.
Concerning the proclamation of the Santiago junta, he wrote:
"This occurrence has raised the spirits of this cabildo so
much that they are continually in private councils, playing
27capriciously with the established authority. . . . "  While
24"El gobemador..., 1810," ACG, DCLVIII, 6-7.
25Ibid., 8 .




Eagar regularly communicated with the royal audiencia and 
other governmental branches in the capital, his most intimate 
correspondence was with Viceroy Abascal, whom he regarded as 
his immediate superior. In a letter of October 7, 1810, 
Eagar wrote that the spirit of rebellion had spread to the 
regular troops because of ", . . the relations of kinship 
and affinity that exist among the officers of this battalion, 
the cabildo, and the citxzenry. As a consequence, the 
only officers in whom he felt he could place his trust were: 
Miguel Maria Atero, the commandant of engineers; Lucas de
Molina, sergeant major of the battalion; plus the treasury
29official, Francisco Marin O'Ryan.
The governor was all too aware of the unique depen­
dence of the garrison on outside assistance and foresaw an 
eventual breaking of relations with the capital. On 
September 9, 1810, he petitioned to Viceroy Abascal for 200 
to 300 additional troops and a small warship, letting the 
viceroy know that the very existence of the city might hang 
in the balance.38 He added that the fiscal condition of the 
army merited equal consideration, with only 7,446 pesos 
remaining in the treasury. Eagar proposed that the situado 
be remitted directly from Peru, which would assure the 







The patriot leaders in Valdivia did not represent 
the majority will, but due to the ambiguity of their goals 
they were able to win numerous followers. They received 
intellectual support from the analogous movement in Concep- 
ci6n. The philosophical leader of the movement was Father 
Camilo Henriquez, a native Valdivian and self-appointed 
delegate to the Santiago congress. ^ Henriquez was one of 
the first fiery advocates of complete separation from Spain, 
and while not actually present on the day of the revolt, he 
indirectly influenced the actions of the participants.
Two more priests, Isidro Pineda and Pedro Jos6 
Eleisegui, actually led the movement. Pineda, the vicar of 
the local church, used his pulpit to equate patriot dogma 
with righteousness and religious salvation.33 Eleisegui, 
chaplain of the royal hospital, was the guiding hand in 
arousing cabildo resentment against the military govern­
ment.-^ These clerics were able to convert a number of 
prominent officers to their cause, and with their support 
instigated a movement which was referred to as the "revolt
"Lista de los diputados..., 1811, " SCL, I, 30-31. 
Camilo Henriquez was b o m  in Valdivia in 1769 and educated 
in Lima. He returned to Chile in 1810 and assumed the 
editorship of the colony's first newspaper, La Aurora de 
Chile, which he used to promote his revolutionary ideals. 
During the course of the revolution, he became the editor 
of ten different newspapers in Santiago, using the pen name 
of Quirino Lem&chez.
^Guarda, "Un intendente, " 220.
34,1'Causa contra..., 1814," ACG, MXLVII, 4-13.
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35of the priests."
The day of the revolt was a religious festival, 
November 1, 1811. On that date the town residents met at 
the parish church for a Mass, including Governor Eagar and 
the engineering officer, Miguel Maria Atero. During the 
Mass, the priest (either Pineda or Eleisegui, the account 
is not clear), produced a pair of pistols from beneath his 
robe and took Eagar and Atero prisoner. Eagar managed to 
send a soldier to the troop barracks to obtain assistance 
from Sergeant Major Lucas Molina, but on arriving the 
messenger found most of the battalion already called to arms 
in support of the rebellion.3®
On that same day, the local citizens assembled in 
the presence of the cabildo and formally deposed the 
governor, replacing him with a provincial junta of five 
members under the authority of Concepcidn. Heading this 
junta was Colonel Ventura Carvallo, the ranking officer after 
Governor Eagar, who despite being a devout monarchist was 
awarded the post because of his popularity among the 
troops. 7 Other junta members were Father Pineda, Chaplain 
Eleisegui, Vicente G6mez, Jaime de la Guarda, and a secre­
tary, Diego P6rez de Arce. Command of the battalion was
35orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 43.
36,,Noticias tomadas..., 1811, " AMV. LIV, 230.
37Carvallo came from a renown family of Valdivia and 
was the brother of the soldier-chronicler Vicente Carvallo y 
Goyeneche (Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 223).
228
presented to Captain Gregorio Henriquez, a local patriot who 
had been politically converted by his nephew, the priest 
Camilo Henriquez.
It was decided that Governor Eagar and Atero should 
be sent to Concepci6n under the guard of a twelve-man 
detachment. For this purpose the junta requisitioned a ship 
consigned to a Spanish merchant from Concepcidn. The mer­
chant was Antonio Quintanilla, who later became a distin­
guished royalist officer and governor of Chilod during the 
last years of the war of independence. Quintanilla prevailed 
upon the ship's captain to sail to Chilod, rather than 
Concepcidn, which kept the prisoners from falling into the
O Qhands of the patriot junta. Eagar and Atero later served 
in the royalist army of Peru.
During the period of the revolts in Valdivia and 
Concepcidn, the Santiago junta was busily assembling new 
troop units or reassembling existing ones in the capital.
The militia battalion of pardos, one of the few units which 
had not taken part in the revolt of September 4, was now 
accepted as a loyal a m  of the government. Its command was 
presented to Colonel Juan de Dios Vial.^8 The veteran
38Ibid., 219.
Q  Q Antonio de Quintanilla, "Autobiografia del mariscal 
del campo don Antonio de Quintanilla," ADC, c, 4th trimester 
(1955), 115-17.
4°"Sesion del congreso..., September 12, 1811," SCL,
I, 71.
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company of the Reina Luisa was dissolved and its troops
placed in the asamblea de caballerla. so that the increased
force might better train the militia. A new militia unit of
eight companies was created, called the patriotas voluntarios
de Santiago, and the militia infantry regiment del rey was
divided into three separate battalions, each strengthened
considerably.^ The ancient batallOn de comercio, composed
principally of peninsular Spaniards, was disbanded and its
4-2infantrymen interspersed among other patriot units. On 
October 29, 1811, a decree was published in Santiago that 
all free men between 16 and 60 should present themselves 
within twenty days to the military units of their choice for 
enlistment or classification, should they be needed at a 
future date.^
All of these measures were oriented towards the 
capital, with little concern for incorporating the southern 
command. The net effect of this mad dash for army appoint­
ments by the Santiago citizenry was to insulate the capital 
from the rest of the colony and to deny the importance of 
the regular forces in the south. The composition of these 
new battalions was regulated to insure personal obedience to
41"Decreto aprobando..., October 17, 1811, " CHDI, 
XXIX, 556.
42jyiartlnez, Memoria histOrica, 377.
43"Bando para..., October 29, 1811," CHDI, XXIX, 556.
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44the individual commander, not to the institution. Such 
sentiments paved the way for military praetorian ism and the 
politics of coercion.
The news of two patriot juntas being proclaimed in 
the south brought popular acclaim in Santiago, Yet, the 
struggles for political power in the capital made the 
announcements more of a novelty than a significant political 
event. Carrera made only slight mention of the Concepcidn 
coup in his Diario militar, for the most part noting the 
regretable fact that the jtinta was so adversely affected by 
the personal ambition of Martinez de Rozas,4^
Those influential persons in Santiago who might have 
shown concern for the future of revolutionary ideals were 
over shadowed by the figure of Jos6 Miguel Carrera. Although 
distrustful of the entire Carrera family, the congress 
awarded military promotions to its members in an effort to
AGLplacate their hostile temperaments. But Jos6 Miguel felt 
snubbed by receiving no high appointment, despite his 
leading role in the revolt of September 4. Under the guise 
of preserving the patriot movement but with the real goal of
44Carrera, himself, ruefully noted that all of the 
positions in these military units were reserved for friends 
or relatives ("Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 36).
45Ibid., 33.
4^Ignacio Carrera, the father, was awarded the rank 
of brigadier. Juan Josd was made commander of the grenadier 
battalion and Luis received command of the artillery brigade 
(Orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 51).
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attaining personal control, he secretly drafted plans for 
another coup. He realized that his success could not be 
attained only with support of the army; it was vital that 
the movement have the collaboration of civilians. Although 
disaffected with the controversial actions of the radicals, 
the moderates were unwilling to risk violence as an alterna­
tive . It was the saracen, or royalist element, which was 
the declared enemy of the government. Its members vividly 
recalled the September 14 decree ordering all dissidents of 
the government to leave the colony, and quickly lent their 
support to Carrera.
With the weight of the combined civilian and military 
support behind them, the Carreras acted on November 15, 1811. 
Juan Jos§ Carrera led the grenadier battalion against the 
government by surrounding congress with his troops. The 
only forces capable of opposing Carrera's were the newly 
reorganized militia under Colonel Juan de Dios Vial and the
hussars led by Joaquin Guzman, both of whom deliberately
47abstained from opposition. The congress met with the 
Carreras in an attempt to win a return of power to the 
legally elected body, but Jos6 Miguel refused to negotiate. 
Instead, he called for a popular assembly to ratify his 
accession. On November 16, this public assembly was con­
voked, and its approval of Carrera led to the resignation of
47 "Documentos relativos..., November 15, 1811," SCL.
I, 185-90.
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the junta ejecutiva. A three-man executive triumvirate was 
selected to replace it, composed of one representative from 
each province-— Jos6 Miguel Carrera (Santiago), Jos6 Gaspar
A QMarin (Coquimbo), and Juan Martinez de Rozas (Concepcidn). 
Neither Marin nor Rozas were present at that time, and both 
later refused to serve in the farcical junta. Bernardo 
0 'Higgins was designated to replace Rozas but likewise 
declined to take part.
The patriot composition of the new junta made the 
royalist supporters of the coup realize that they had been 
badly deceived. And members of the congress were similarly 
disappointed in Carrera's dictatorial mandates. For all his 
power, however, Carrera still chaffed under the presence of 
a congress and two other junta members. These could techni­
cally veto his mandates, and any decrees on his part would 
lack full legitimacy. For Carrera, the only alternative was 
the abolition of the junta and congress.
Within the army, there was considerable discontent 
with the caudillo image which Carrera was forging for himself. 
In November, 1811, a conspiracy was contrived by several army 
officers to depose the Carrera family. Two army captains, 
the brothers Jos6 Antonio and Jos6 Domingo Huici, were the 
leaders. They planned to capture Juan Jos6 Carrera, com­
mander of the grenadier battalion, and use his troops as a
"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 42. The province of 
Coquimbo was created by the first national congress on 
September 23, 1811.
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fulcrum to subvert other troop units.4:9 The Carreras were 
forewarned by one of the conspirators and arrested several 
plotters on the night of November 27, as they attempted to 
kidnap Juan Jos6 „ Neither of the Huici brothers were appre­
hended, but Josd Miguel Carrera arrested a number of patriot 
leaders, based on the denunc i at ion s of a conspirator. Among 
these were the influential veteran officers Juan Mackenna 
and Juan de Dios Vial, who were proclaimed guilty in a
cnhastily-called trial and imprisoned.
Carrera's rapid and harsh reaction was greeted with 
mass anger by the citizens of Santiago. Members of congress 
accused Carrera of having contrived the entire episode to 
further his suspected plans for a military dictatorship.
There was ample justification for such a theory, for Mackenna 
and Vial were the only two military leaders capable of 
mobilizing troops against Carrera. Yet, no documented
Clevidence was presented to prove their complicity. And the 
leaders of the revolt, the Huici brothers, somehow managed 
to escape to Concepci6n unharmed. The entire affair was 
viewed with suspicion by both patriots and royalists, who 
saw how beneficial the plot had been to the fortunes of the 
Carrera family.
49"proceso por la conspiracibn..., November 27, 
1811," CHDI, XX, 1-341.
50"Diario militar...," CHDI. I, 45, 51.
Cl ,
3X0rrego Luco, La patria vxeja, II, 80.
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Josd Miguel was now absolute commander of all the 
troops in the capital, including those commanded by his 
brothers and the militia of Santiago, Rancagua and Melipilla. 
There were no troops at the disposal of the congress. 
Fortified with undisputed armed force, Carrera carried out 
the last phase of his dictatorial designs. On the morning 
of December 2, 1811, a troop review was called in front of 
the convened congress, and its deputies were forced to sign 
a document dissolving their corporation.33 Carrera excused 
his actions with the justification that Chile was as yet too 
politically immature to dally with democracy. He also made
use of the Huici conspiracy by claiming that the congress
53was full of assassins and conspirators. A factor on which 
he counted for his supremacy was the political ignorance or 
apathy of the populace and the gullibility of many sup­
porters . His power was complete, and throughout the province 
there was not a single local assembly which failed to pledge 
loyalty to him.
The coup of December 2 and the abolition of con­
gress marked the third armed revolt by Josd Miguel Carrera 
in little more than ten weeks after he had arrived to his 
native land. When the congressional delegates began 
returning to their homes, Carrera detained the representa­
tives from Concepcibn until he was convinced that no
^"Diario militar..., " CHDI, I, 50. 
53Ibid., 48.
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retaliation would be attempted against him. He was mistaken 
in his thinking, for the abolition of congress crystallized 
hostility towards him in the south. The refusal of Marin, 
Rozas and O'Higgins to serve on the junta widened rather 
than narrowed the breach between Santiago and Concepcidn. 
These events destroyed the last vestiges of unity between 
the two provinces and revealed the fragility of their 
democratic institutions.
Chapter 11
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND CONCEPCION
After the series of revolts by Josb Miguel Carrera 
which culminated in the December 2, 1811, coup and the 
abolition of congress, the two governments of Santiago and 
Concepcibn began to drift apart, each suspicious of the 
other's intentions. The dissimilarities between the two 
cities were historical, each developing as an opposite pole 
on either end of the colony.̂  But much of the political 
animosity between the provinces was heightened by the diplo­
matic blunders of Carrera and his quest for power. As the 
most forceful leader of the independence movement during 
this time, he alienated Concepcibn and completely disre­
garded the army in the South, especially in Valdivia. 1812 
was the crucial year of the patria vieja, for during it, 
mass political aspirations were channeled by resolute 
leaders and loyalties were permanently cemented. During 
that year, the stage was set for Chile's division into a 
royalist south and a patriot north, each arming for open
^In terms of effective settlement, colonial Chile was 
only about 700 miles long. Because of this, the two provin­




When word of events in Santiago since November 
reached the Concepcibn government there was justified con­
cern and even fear, for until that time it had been in 
strict accord with the congress and ruling junta. The arrest 
of prominent patriots and members of congress alarmed the 
Concepcibn junta. Also, the avowed loyalty of the new junta 
ejecutiva to the patriot cause rang hollow when it was con­
sidered that two of its members refused to take their seats, 
leaving Carrera as de facto ruler. On December 5, 1811, the 
Concepcibn junta addressed a letter to the national congress,
asking for details about the state of affairs and offering
2military assistance and troops, if needed. This letter and 
other correspondence with the junta revealed a determined 
opposition by leaders in the South to the Carrera family.
Carrera1s apologists attribute his dictatorial 
actions to impatience in implanting reforms; however, his 
detractors present a more plausible interpretation, as
3evidenced by his deceit and chicanery with Concepcibn. In 
anticipation of conflict, Carrera had dispatched agents to 
the South to intercept dispatches of the provincial junta, 
and in this way learned of its offer of troops to the 
national congress. He persuaded Bernardo 0 'Higgins to return
^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 369.
^Roger M. Haigh, The Formation of the Chilean 
Oligarchy, 1810-1821 (Salt Lake City: Historical S. and D .
Research Foundation, 1972), 38.
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to Concepcibn to manifest his peaceful intentions and work
for the resolving of differences. 0 'Higgins was deceived by
the false pretenses of Carrera and naively accepted the 
4commission.
After the abstention of Gaspar Marin and Martinez de 
Rozas from the ruling triumvirate, Carrera launched a quest 
for political legitimacy by obtaining substitute junta 
members. He desired two figureheads, respected and well- 
known but without any strength to oppose him. In a farcical 
election on December 16, 1811, by the cabildo and military 
commanders, Juan Josb Aldunate and Josb Nicolas de la Cerda 
were elected. They were two figures who aptly fulfilled the
Cqualifications of weakness and impotence. Aldunate refused 
the post and was subsequently replaced by the customshouse 
administrator Manuel Manso on January 10, a known enemy of 
the patriots.6 The selection of these men, without any 
participation of the provinces they supposedly represented, 
was convincing evidence of the real intentions of Carrera.
Invoking the name of the junta in all his actions, 
Carrera began to mobilize troops along the provincial boundary 
to forestall a possible invasion by forces from Concepcibn.
On December 14, the same day in which 0 'Higgins departed on
^Junta to 0 'Higgins, Santiago, December 13, 1811,
ABO. I, 160.
5Barros Arana, Historia general. VIII, 507.
6Ibid.. 508.
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his peacekeeping mission to the South, Carrera ordered the
subdelegado of Talca to marshal the provincial militia along
the Maule River and to impound all of the launches that were
7used to ferry passengers across the river. In Santiago, 
new recruits were added to the grenadier battalion, raising 
its strength to 1,200 men. The recently-formed artillery 
corps was dissolved and reorganized over a base of 500
Odragoons called the hdsares de la gran guardia. Carrera 
could not risk another attempted coup by leading the troops 
southward himself, but appointed his father, Ignacio Carrera, 
to do so. The appointment of the old patriarch was a 
repudiation of the talents of regular military officers in 
Santiago, which led to his being ignominiously called the
Q"New Ceasar. Ignacio Carrera left Santiago on December 24, 
with a force of 200 troops. During the following weeks, 
hundreds of additional soldiers marched southward to the 
boundary line between the provinces, increasing the chances 
for accidental war.
The Concepcibn government followed suit by calling 
all available troops to arms. These included the provincial 
militia units, the veteran artillery brigade and two 
frontier dragoon squadrons.^® Food, horses and donations of
^Ibid.
®"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 52.
^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 371.
-*-°Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 159-60.
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money were solicited from provincial inhabitants in the name 
of preserving the autonomy of the province. Before these 
troops could reach the Maule, Rozas received peace proposals 
from Carrera in Santiago. Bernardo O'Higgins was entrusted 
by Carrera to deliver these messages, which outwardly appeared 
to be genuine.
Rozas feared civil war above all else and eagerly 
grasped at this opportunity for conciliation with the 
capital. The provincial junta of Concepcibn assigned Manuel 
Fernando Vbsquez de Novoa to work with 0 'Higgins in drafting 
a treaty acceptable to both provinces, which would serve as 
Chile's government until a permanent constitution could be 
drawn up. On January 13, 1812, the junta ratified the 
treaty of twenty-five articles, providing for the creation 
of a new national junta of three members (one from each 
province) to govern for three years.^ The principle of 
regional autonomy was upheld, each province confirming its 
own military and civil appointees. One of the articles 
sponsored by Rozas provided for the creation of a small, 
permanent senate to manage issues of national importance such 
as foreign treaties, the coinage of money, taxation and the 
declaration of w a r I t  was believed by the drafters of 
this document that the Santiago government would quickly 
ratify it and put an end to the impending conflict.




Carrera feigned an interest in signing the document, 
praising 0 'Higgins profusely for his ambassadorial efforts.
In reality, he had no intentions of peaceful coexistence 
with Concepcibn but was stalling for time while military 
mobilization took its financial toll on the rival government. 
Concepcibn possessed its own provincial treasury but was 
traditionally dependent on the capital for the salaries of
governmental functionaries and the situado for paying the
l "3frontier army. These funds were now cut off by Carrera, 
which dictated that sooner or later the province must 
succumb to the pressure of Santiago.
By this time, Concepcibn's leaders had amassed over 
8,000 troops along the frontier, among them nearly 1,000 
veterans. ^  The forces of Santiago were considerably fewer 
in number but were numerous enough to present a formidable 
appearance. Neither side attempted to violate the territory 
of the other, but the stalemate along the Maule and the 
mutual suspicion between the bivouaced armies caused a 
virtual devastation of the regional economy. Inter-provin­
cial commerce came to a halt as merchants and travelers were 
detained, searched and occasionally arrested. Those mer­
chants who attempted to transport their goods past the 
blockaded river often found them requisitioned by the army.
-^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 377.
"^Guillermo Feliti. Cruz (ed.), Conversacibnes 
histbricas de Claudio Gay (Santiago: Editorial Andrbs
Bello, 1965), 17-19.
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Agricultural production came to a standstill, for the mobil­
ized militia were deprived of tending their fields. Bands
of undisciplined soldiers roamed at will throughout the
1 5countryside, stealing and looting from the populace.
Carrera's deliberate stall technique was all too 
effective, for with no funding from Santiago the army of the 
South almost reached the point of disbanding. On March 7, 
1812, the junta of Concepcibn met for the purpose of electing 
its representative to the proposed triumvirate in Santiago. 
Instead, the assembly selected an agent, Luis de la Cruz, to 
confer with Carrera and ascertain his reasons for not signing 
the a c c o r d . B e r n a r d o  0 'Higgins was elected to accompany 
Cruz to arrange for the resumption of the situado and 
government funding. On April 13, Rozas made a desperate 
plea to the Buenos Aires government for 100,000 pesos to be
1 7used to support the army during the remainder of the year.
The refusal of that government to meet his request left 
Rozas with little hope for continued resistance. It also 
heightened his apprehensions that his regime might be over­
thrown by dissatisfied military elements within the province.
During the first months of 1812, Bernardo 0 'Higgins 
actually proposed leading a division of troops north of the
15Noya to 0 'Higgins, Los Angeles, January 13, 1812, 
ABO, I, 194.
^Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 506-507.
17Amunategui Solar, Jesuitas, 115.
243
Maule to defeat the carreristas, pointing to that army' s
18greatly reduced strength of only 500 men. Rozas resisted 
this movement, fearing a bloody civil war would result. The 
sentiments of Pedro Josb Benavente, the ranking provincial 
army officer, bordered on cowardice. He also urged that 
O'Higgins avoid an outbreak of war by any possible means,
even to arbitration with Bishop Martin Villodres of Concep-
19ci6n, a noted royalist.
In the meantime, Carrera had found the provincial 
disunion to be injurious to his rule. His unsteady coalition 
of royalist and patriot supporters was weary of the finan­
cial sacrifices imposed by an army in the South and the 
continued obstinacy of Concepcibn. Divided, the colony was 
even a likelier target for Peruvian reprisals. Finally, 
Carrera advised Rozas that he wished to reach some sort of 
conciliation, and in late April, the two met near Talca to 
hammer out an agreement. Their talks were cordial but 
unproductive in reaching a permanent accord. The only
benefit derived from this was the withdrawal of both armies
90to thexr respective capitals. ^
While the governments of Concepcibn and Santiago 
were engaged in antagonistic saber-rattling along the
•^Stephen Clissold, Bernardo 0 ‘Higgins and the 
Independence of Chile (New York: Praeger, 1968), 97.
•^Benavente to 0 'Higgins, Concepcibn, March 19,
1812, ABO. I, 198.
20"Diario militar...," CHDI. I, 55-56.
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frontier, the Valdivia patriot junta serenely went about its 
own affairs. The movement of November 1, 1811, was a 
genuine expression of patriot sentiment, but its success was 
due to the endeavor of a handful of fanatical liberals, not 
the majority of the local residents. By 1812, the city was 
ripe for another political change. Throughout the colony, 
the early phase of the patria vieja was characterized by 
ideologically-confused patriots and royalists alike who 
experienced mental anguish in choosing sides. It was a 
crucial phase in which time, circumstance and the influence 
of a few chosen leaders swayed the loyalties of the great 
mass of the population. In Valdivia, however, a long tradi­
tion of monarchism was the factor which was to ultimately 
determine the city's political course.
Jos6 Miguel Carrera's interests in Valdivia were 
purely mercenary. Although the city had declared its support 
of Santiago, it remained administratively subject to the 
province of Concepcibn. On encountering strong resistance 
from Martinez de Rozas and his followers, Carrera thought of 
instigating another revolt in Valdivia and replacing it with 
a junta loyal to himself. Such an act would help to isolate 
Concepcibn and further reduce the power of his rivals there.
In Santiago resided an officer of the Valdivia
garrison named Pedro Asenjo Pinuer, who possessed a degree
21of influence by virtue of his family relations. In late
“̂ Guarda, Historia de Valdivia. 226.
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1811, Carrera persuaded Asenjo to return to the city to 
establish contact with military officers dissatisfied with 
the governing junta and to eventually supplant it with
p panother. Pinuer seems to have been intellectually limited 
and a mere tool of Carrera, but he successfully completed 
the task assigned to him. Among the contacts which he made 
were Sergeant Major Lucas Molina, Captain Julian Pinuer and 
the artillery commander Jos6 Berganza, who would lead the 
planned revolt.
On March 15, the day before the uprising, post com­
mander Jose Berganza took the precaution of reinforcing 
Valdivia's forts with trustworthy troops. At four o'clock 
in the morning of March 16, he fired three cannon shots, the 
signal for conspirators in the city to take action.33 By 
eight o 'clock the bloodless revolt was complete. According 
to the official account of the rebellious officers which was 
later sent to Santiago, the battalion troops and townspeople 
gathered in the plaza with shouts of "Long live King 
Ferdinand VII! Long live the Supreme Spanish Regency! Long 
live the president of the capital, don Jos6 Miguel Carrera, 
and death to the disloyal.1,34
The previous government was declared defunct and
22Ibid., 226.




replaced by a new consejo de guerra, temporarily presided 
over by Captain Jos6 Ulloa. This council elected to retain 
Colonel Ventura Carvallo as the junta president, in con-
O  Csideration of his being the ranking senior officer. The 
members of the former government were placed under house 
arrest but freed several days later, with the exception of 
Captain Gregorio Henriquez and Father Eleisegui. Henriquez, 
the battalion commander, was imprisoned in Niebla until the 
last days of the captaincy-general.26 Father Eleisegui was 
given six hours to leave Valdivia and departed for Concep­
cibn under escort the same day
The position of the new council of war was precarious 
in that the troops depended for their survival on the situado, 
an allotment which was no longer forthcoming. The Lima 
authorities had placed this responsibility on the shoulders 
of Chileans during the first decade of the 1800's. Since 
1810, however, preoccupation with the independence movement 
and the forming of new army units in Santiago had brought 
the discontinuance of the Valdivia subsidy. When the junta 
drafted a communiqub to Carrera concerning the events which 
had taken place, it was couched in terms of their urgent 
need for the subsidy.
25Ibid., 51.
2^Guarda, Historia de Valdivia. 230.
2^"Manifiesto individual..., March, 1812, " CHDI, 
XXIII, 51.
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The junta's composition was thoroughly royalist, but 
the officers astutely refrained from revealing their true 
sentiments. Playing on the vanity of Carrera, their com­
munique of March 22 was steeped in adoration and praise of 
the dictator, a measure intended to convince him of their 
loyalty.
By the act of this council of war and testimony that 
we include, you will be advised of the events in this 
plaza and the motives which inspired us. It has been 
a deed that we have believed absolutely necessary to 
vindicate our honor. Be calm, then, most excellent 
sir, and approve it, secure in what we have achieved. 
Since the province of Concepcibn had the audacity of 
arming itself against the capital, we regret that no 
orders from you have arrived, or at least correspon­
dence that would advise us of your will. The govern­
ment of Concepcibn wished to make you believe that we 
were your disloyal party. And although we only 
possess seven thousand pesos in this treasury, we have 
resolved to submit ourselves to the greatest efforts 
and self-denial rather than turn ourselves over to 
jurisdictions other than our capital of Santiago.28
In consideration of this dedicated loyalty, the officers
asked for a resumption of the situado, depicting in no
uncertain terms the consequences of not doing so:
We conceive of ourselves as isolated and with communica­
tion cut with the rest of our army, that is under the
orders of Your Excellency. In this situation, we wait
for you to remit the subsidy to us, because if not,without doubt we will p e r i s h . 29
The junta sent the letter overland through the 
province of Concepcibn to Talca, where Carrera was encamped. 
He received the letter on May 5, the same day on which he
28"Oficio a..., March 22, 1812," CHDI. XXIII, 39-40.
28Ibid., 40.
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ordered his troops to retire from the Maule River.30 Carrera
could only hear the acclamations of his name and the slander
of Concepcidn, completely misreading the intentions of the
o f f i c e r s . i n  his reply to the consejo de guerra, he
feigned innocence of complicity in the revolt, referring to
it as "this determined and brave group of officers" who
worked to destroy tyranny and oppression.32 He aiso pledged
his steadfast commitment to Valdivia and to provide it with
the subsidy and any other assistance needed:
The [Valdivia] governing junta, to whom the documents 
have been remitted, protect this city and its worthy 
defenders under my jurisdiction, and extending their 
pleas, I will not deny them any manner of assistance.
The noble Valdivians are valorous and persevering and 
we are all at their disposal. I received the previous 
correspondence from Valdivia. I remitted it to the 
capital in order that the subsidy be sent, for which 
purpose I allowed a boat to sail from Valparaiso. 
Yesterday I received word that it had left port.33
The Santiago junta and knowledgeable counselors were 
not misled by the officers of Valdivia, clearly recognizing 
their subversive intentions. They chided the officers for 
their stated affirmation of support for the Spanish regency 
and the "president of Chile," J o s 6  Miguel Carrera, pointing 
out that Chile had no president.3<̂  Before any subsidy could
30Orrego Luco, La patria vieia, II, 141.
31Ibid., 142.
32"Oficio al..., May, 1812," CHDI. XXIII, 54.
33Ibid., 55-56.
3^Orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 143.
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be sent, the junta demanded a formal declaration of obedience, 
but by this time Carrera1s will had prevailed.
The Nueva Limeha, owned by a Valparaiso merchant, 
was the vessel which Carrera selected to be loaded with food­
stuffs and military supplies. As soon as it anchored at 
Valdivia and was unloaded, the consejo de guerra drew up a 
declaration expressing its true intentions. Dated June 26, 
1812, this proc1amation renounced the authority of Santiago,
the officers stating they had been deceived in their belief
35that Carrera was a faithful supporter of the crown.
. . . if this plaza has continued until now dependent 
on the capital of Chile, it was out of the belief that 
the new government erected by it was substantially 
devoted to the cause of our king, Ferdinand VII. . . .
The officers now placed themselves under the authority of
the viceroy and until further instructions from him would
obey orders from the governor of Chilo6 , Ignacio Justis.
They returned this reply to Carrera on the same vessel which
had brought the subsidy after first stripping it of all gun
carriages, arms, and other materials which might later be
used against them.
The actions of the consejo de guerra placed the
Valdivia military in the forefront of the monarchist movement
in Chile. The port was to become the open door through which
the invading Peruvian army entered, and would remain faithful
33"Acta de la..., June 26, 1812," CHDI. XXIII, 77-85.
36Ibid., 78. 37Ibid., 84.
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OOuntil its conquest by Lord Thomas Cochrane in 1820. Nearly 
all of Valdivia's troops and officers fought in the name of 
the mother country, and many distinguished themselves in the 
early clashes of 1813 and 1814. Among the members of the 
consejo who rose to prominence were Lucas Ambrosio de Molina, 
who was promoted to colonel and commander of the royalist 
troops at Chilian (August 10, 1813), where he was killed.^® 
Julian Pinuer fought at Chilian, Rancagua, and was later 
made commandant of the Valdivia battalion. Jos6 de Berganza 
became general of the second division in the royalist army 
and served as Intendant of Concepcibn.̂
It is ironic that nearly all of the members of this 
consejo de guerra were not peninsulars, but creoles. Of the 
fourteen members, thirteen were army officers. Only one of 
these, Jos6 Berganza, was a peninsular Spaniard; the rest
A Owere native-born Chileans.  ̂ The strong royalist feelings
Jaime de la Guarda, one of the exiled members of 
the patriot junta of 1811, returned to Valdivia in 1820 with 
the conquering expedition of Lord Cochrane. He found the 
city much the same as he had left it eight years earlier—  
loyal to the crown ("Carta a..., May 25, 1820," AVM, LXXXVII, 
48) .
■^included among these faithful troops were nearly 
all of the cadets of the battalion (Nicanor Molinare, Los 
colejios militares de Chile, 1814-1819 [Santiago: Imprenta
Cervantes, 1911J, 35) .
40Quarda, Historia de Valdivia, 236.
^ Ibid.
^The Chi1ean-born officers were: Colonel Ventura
Carvallo; captains Josb Ulloa, Dionisio Martinez, Julian 
Pinuer; lieutenants Diego Adriasola, Teodoro Negron, Juan de
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of these creoles supports the writer's contention that 
political loyalties in the army did not polarize along the 
traditionally-conceived lines of Spaniard and Chilean, but 
according to geographical and cultural factors. As pre­
viously discussed, the isolation of the port, a steady con­
tact i*/ith either Peru or Spain, and the composition of the 
local aristocracy were more powerful determinants of mili­
tary loyalty. This theory helps to explain Francisco 
Encina's contention that the war of independence was one of
A Ocreole patriots against creole royalists.
As virtual dictator of Santiago, Jos6 Miguel Carrera 
shares much of the responsibility for the loss of Valdivia 
to the royalist camp.^ From a military standpoint, Carrera 
was totally inept. His judgments were swayed by arrogance 
and the vainglorious notion that he could manipulate all of 
the colony’s military forces at will. He ignored the city's 
patriot junta until he thought it could be manipulated in his 
feud with Rozas. Suspicious of its loyalty, he indirectly 
brought about its downfall, only to find it replaced with
Dios Brito, Juan Manuel Lorca; second lieutenants Juan de 
Dios Gonz&les, Antonio Adriasola, Jos6 Antonio Martinez, and 
Sergeant Major Lucas Ambrosio Molina ("hojas de servicio, 
..., December, 1805," ACM, CLXV). The single civilian was 
the royal treasurer, Juan Gallardo.
^Francisco Encina, Resumen de la historia de Chile, 
Leopoldo Casteda (ed.) (Santiago: Zig Zag, 1953), I, 592.
^Encina, Historia de Chile. VI, 408.
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another government of staunch monarchist sentiments.
Carrera was not the only figure guilty of misjudgment. 
Martinez de Rozas, Bernardo 0 'Higgins and other leaders of 
Concepcibn were so engrossed in the struggle with Santiago 
that they paid no attention to Valdivia. After the instal­
lation of the consejo de guerra, Rozas stated: "This is an
incident of no concern, of no importance and results.
The prophecy of Juan Mackenna came to haunt those leaders 
who had not heeded his plea for disbanding the garrison in 
1810. Their failure to take advantage of those early oppor­
tunities had lasting consequences on the course of the war.
* * *
The province of Concepcibn had managed to weather 
the confrontation at the Maule River without recognizing the 
one-man government in Santiago. Rozas hoped to maintain 
this position until the following summer, by that time 
forcing the capital to accept a national pact based on 
representative, constitutional government, similar to the one 
proposed the preceding year. Great financial difficulties 
prevented the realization of this goal. The junta and the 
expanded military forces were near the point of collapse 
because of Carrera's continued withholding of funds to pay 
their salaries. In desperation, Rozas called a meeting of 
deputies from the surrounding districts in June, 1812, to
45()rrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 145.
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solicit contributions for funding the public administration. 
Instead of volunteering assistance, the deputies complained 
of the financial hardships imposed on them during the pre­
ceding months of besiegement by Carrera's army and called for 
Bishop Villodres to effect a conciliation between the two 
p r o v i n c e s R o z a s  realized the dangers of allowing a con­
firmed monarchist to speak in the name of the junta and 
offered himself to negotiate with Carrera.
Before these plans came to pass, a military revolt 
occurred in Concepcibn, on July 8 . Led by the dragoon com­
mandant Juan Miguel Benavente, Captain Josb Zapatero and 
Sergeant Major Rambn Jimbnez Navia, the veteran troops of 
the city imprisoned the junta members (with the exception of 
its president, Pedro Josb Benavente) and its most active 
s u p p o r t e r s T h e  following morning the former junta was 
officially dissolved and a military consejo de guerra formed, 
consisting of four officers and again presided over by Pedro 
Jos6 Benavente. Several of the officers were thought to be 
staunchly royalist in their sympathies, a suspicion which 
was borne out by their succeeding actions.
Rozas was the only member of the former regime who 
was not jailed or detained. Lieutenant Jos6 Manuel Zorrilla, 
a confidant and assistant of Rozas, was exiled to the fort 
of Arauco. Father Pedro Jos6 Eleisegui having already been
46Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 571. 
^"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 57.
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exiled once from Valdivia, found himself again under arrest 
on the pretext of subverting the troops.4® To the exaltados, 
these radical reactions were ample proof that the consejo 
would imitate the Valdivians by turning itself over to the 
viceroy.
Instead, the officers of Concepcibn addressed them­
selves directly to Santiago in an effort to obtain money 
with which to pay their military expenses. Whatever the 
political sympathies of these men, their immediate concern 
was in remedying the financial crisis of the treasury.49 
While they did not specifically mention the subsidy, their 
letter quite clearly expressed their needs. As with the 
letter of the Valdivian officers, there was an effort to 
convince Carrera of their submission to his authority:
We are pleased that this junta, this noble capital 
and all of its cities, towns and countrysides 
receives with great pleasure the union and most 
intimate fraternity of the capital [Santiago] and 
fully submits itself to the central government, 
affirming its obedience until death. As recom­
pense for its loyalty, vigilance and dangers 
incurred, the council of war asks that Your Excel­
lency approve the necessary dispositions, com­
municating to us your judgment relative to our 
general welfare. . . .5°
The first reaction of the Santiago junta to news of 
the revolution was exuberance, for it at last seemed that 
Concepcibn was falling under the authority of the central
48Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 378.
49Felid Cruz, Conversacibnes, 20.
^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 573.
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government. Many of the faint-hearted patriots now lent 
their active support, convinced of the ultimate victory of 
their cause. Carrera demurred from enthusiasm, fearful that 
while Rozas remained in the South there was a danger of his 
regaining power through another armed revolt. To prevent 
this, he ordered that Rozas and the rest of his jailed
followers be escorted to Santiago for confinement, to which
51the consejo readily complied. This brought the political 
career of Rozas to an end. After a period of house arrest 
in Santiago, he was exiled to his boyhood home in Mendoza, 
Argentina, where he died in May, 1813.
The imprisonment of Rozas did not allay Carrera's 
mistrust of the consejo de guerra. for the deceit of the 
Valdivian officers was still fresh in his memory. In August 
of 1812, he again resorted to treachery in order to assure 
his continued predominance. Juan Antonio Diaz Munoz, 
sergeant major of the dragoon regiment and an enthusiastic 
supporter of the dictator, was sent to Concepcibn for the 
avowed purpose of arranging conciliation between the two
COprotagonists.  ̂ In reality, he was entrusted with instiga­
ting another revolt which would place the province firmly in 
the orbit of the capital, for which purpose he was provided 
with a considerable amount of money.
According to testimony by Juan Miguel Benavente, 
Carrera sent forty to fifty thousand pesos to Concepcibn in 
return for Rozas and other prisoners (Feliti Cruz, Conver- 
sacibnes, 20).
52"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 58.
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On his arrival in Concepcibn, Diaz Mufloz capitalized 
on the discontent of the patriot faction there and persuaded 
its members of the ease with which they could gain control. 
At two o'clock in the morning of September 24, Colonel Pedro 
Jose Benavente and a number of officers armed part of the 
local garrison and placed the members of the consejo de 
guerra under house arrest. The versatile Benavente took 
command of the new government as governor-intendant of the
C Oprovince and declared allegiance to the Santiago junta.
The establishment of a government in the South 
pledging subservience to the capital did not in itself 
signify colonial unity. In Concepcibn province there was a 
deep undercurrent of monarchist sympathy which could not be 
erased by mere administrative changes. Moreover, the 
defenders of the king were active in propagating their 
beliefs among the inhabitants.
Perhaps the most indefatigable of these propagandists 
were the members of the provincial clergy, both regular and 
secular. They had ample justification for their hatred of 
liberal institutions, for since the first Santiago junta was 
formed, they had been harassed and mistreated. Convents 
such as the Colegio Carolino de Naturales, for example, 
found their allotments of food, clothing and other supplies 
cut off in an effort to bring their c l o s u r e . T h e  majority
-^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 380.
54"Relacibn de conducta..., April 1, 1816," CHDI,
IV, 14.
257
of the priests were peninsulars, respected for their posi­
tion. In all of their proselytizing activity, they invoked 
the venerated names of the king and the Catholic faith. With 
such a formidable doctrine, they were able to favorably 
influence most of the rural population, who did not grasp
C Cthe import of revolutionary teachings.'’''
Along the frontier there were more missions and
reduccibnes than forts, each led by a small group of priests
attending to the needs of the nearby Indians and Spanish
settlers. After 1810, these fathers visited their Indian
wards frequently, promising them continued financial aid and
presenting the patriots as robbers who would steal the lands
given them by the king.^ Several of the more militant
priests of the frontier were Angel Gatica of Chilian, Luis
Josb Branas of Yumbel, Juan Antonio Ferrebu of Rere, and
Juan de Dios Bulnes of Arauco. Dios Bulnes was one of the
more notable priests who served as agents in receiving secret
57correspondence from the vxceroy.
The most powerful of these clerics, however, was the 
Bishop of Concepcibn, Navarro Martin de Villodres. A native 
of Granada, Spain, Villodres was appointed to the Concepcibn
S^Diego josb Benavente, Memoria sobre las primeras 
campanas de la guerra de la independencia de Chile 
(Santiago: Imprenta de la Opinibn, 1845), 36.
S^TomAs Guevara, Los araucanos en la revolucibn de 
la independencia (Commemorative Edition, ADC, 1910), 242.
57Ibid., 243.
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diocese in 1807, after obtaining a doctor of theology degree 
at the University of Salamanca.68 He was an invincible 
opponent of representative government and was a major factor 
in preserving the frontier intact for the royalist cause.
In 1812, he personally toured the frontier missions to 
assure the political loyalties of the Indian parishioners in
R Qwhat was officially designated as church business. When 
hostilities finally commenced in 1813, practically all of 
the Indian tribes from the coast to the cordillera avidly 
upheld the cause of the king.
The Araucanian population, arch enemy of the Spanish, 
was to be of considerable importance during the independence 
movement. By 1810, there were perhaps 180,000 Indians, and 
if their active military support could not be obtained it 
was imperative that at least their tacit friendship be 
secured.60
The patriot forces had attempted to gain Indian 
allegiance, although in haphazard manner. On October 24, 
1811, over 400 warriors attended a parliament in Concepcidn, 
sponsored by the ruling junta. After rounds of drinking and 
gift-giving the Indians departed, swearing loyalty to the
CQGaldames, A History of Chile. 154.
6^"Relaci6n de conducta..., April 1, 1816, " CHDI,
IV, 23-24.
6° "Revista de la guerra...," CHDI. V, 312.
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provincial cause.61 Other parliaments followed in 1812 and 
1813, although they were too feeble and too late when com­
pared to the organized royalist efforts.
During the preceding decades, the Araucanians had 
built up close relations with the capit&nes de amigos, who 
lived with them and conducted their legal affairs. Many of
these officials were loyal to the crown, and their influence
62naturally diffused to their native dependents. The work 
of these Spaniards, coupled with the evangelical grip of the 
reducei6n fathers, constituted a grassroots hold on the 
Indians which was to last through the independence wars.
After the liberation of Chile in 1817, Indian participation 
degenerated into plundering and looting, but it was nearly
/• qalways done in the name of the king. The failure of the 
patriots to propagandize effectively in the South enabled 
the Peruvian expedition of 1813 to enter the colony unopposed, 
while the forces of Carrera and 0 'Higgins were distracted by 
mutual mistrust and fear of attack by the other.
61Benavente to O'Higgins, Concepcibn, October 24, 
1811, ABO. I, 174.
^Guevara, Los araucanos, 241.
63collier, Ideas and Politics, 216.
Chapter 12
THE EXPEDITION OF BRIGADIER ANTONIO PAREJA, 1813
The state of internal discord between the provinces 
and the antagonism among the various political factions 
which characterized Chile in 1812 was about to enter another 
phase. The Peruvian viceroyalty, which for so long had 
watched patiently from the sidelines, was now ready to enter 
the colony1s affairs in the name of preserving monarchial 
integrity.
Viceroy Abascal was not desirous of coexistence with 
Chile, but the need of its grain exports and the engagement 
of his forces in other rebellious colonies had until that 
time prevented him from taking punitive measures. He also 
desisted from the fear that he might push the Chileans into 
an alliance with Buenos Aires. By late 1812, however, the 
viceroy could no longer ignore the situation in Chile, no 
matter how limited his military strength. The petition of 
the Valdivia consejo de guerra to be placed under Peruvian 
authority provided ample justification for initiating hostil­
ities against the colony
^Fernando Diaz Venteo, Las campanas militares del 
virrey Abascal (Sevilla: Artes Gr£ficas, 1948), 377.
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In late 1812, the Chilean estanco de tabaco pur­
chased a shipload of tobacco in Havana, but the vessel
carrying it to the colony was detained in Montevideo and its
2cargo seized by the Spanish governor. This official then
remitted the tobacco directly to Peru in order to cancel 
part of a debt which was owed to the viceroyalty . Abascal 
not only approved the action but gratefully accepted the 
tobacco as payment, which placed him in a position of 
belligerency towards Chile. In October, he began to issue 
letters of marque to Peruvian captains for the capture of 
foreign vessels trading in Chilean waters. These provoca­
tions were compounded by the knowledge that the viceroy had 
asked the Bishop of Concepcidn to incite royalist disobedi­
ence to the government.
The Chilean junta had wished to avoid an open schism 
with Peru. Its previous correspondence with the viceroy had 
been firm, but without the disrespect or enmity which would 
place it in the ranks of an unfaithful sister colony. How­
ever, these deliberate acts of aggression moved the junta 
(or properly, Carrera) to issue a vigorous protest. In a 
letter of August 29, 1812, the tobacco seizure was con­
demned, as well as the purported legitimacy of the Valdivians
2"Oficio al virrey..., August 29, 1812, " CHDI,
XXIII, 8 6 .
•^Orrego Luco, La patria vieja. II, 203-204.
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in their secession from the colony.^ Concerning the cor­
sairs which raided shipping in Chilean waters, the junta 
wrote;
To prohibit the introduction of European and even 
Spanish goods which are imported by this route, is 
an act rarely practiced between civilized nations, 
even when they are at war, . . .
In a reply of October 12, Abascal accused the junta
of being power-hungry, ruffian malcontents who had defied
the highest magistrates in America with their anarchist
behavior. He refused to reimburse the Chileans for the
tobacco and justified the corsairs in their scouring the
coasts for "contrabandists. He warned the Chileans that
by continuing in their present course they could expect an
invasion as soon as royalist troops had liberated Upper Peru
7and defeated the Argentine insurgents. His remarks 
amounted to a definitive economic and political break with 
Chile, and a virtual declaration of war.
The publication of this letter in Santiago brought 
resounding public support for the junta from the majority of 
the populace and induced frenzied military preparations in 
anticipation of invasion. In a junta de corporacidnes
^"Oficio al virrey..., August 2 9 ,  1 8 1 2 , " CHDI. 
XXIII, 8 5 - 9 1 .
5ibid., 8 8.
6 " 0 f i c i o  a la Junta..., October 1 2 ,  1 8 1 2 , "  CHDI, 
XXIII, 9 1 - 1 0 1 .
7Ibid.. 100-101.
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convoked in the capital on November 17, 1812, all those 
present agreed on war as the only alternative but prudently
Qdesisted from offensive actions. Many entrenched mercan­
tile interests were opposed to a rupture which would close 
Chile's primary export market and bring severe internal 
disruption of the economy. In his Diario militar, Carrera 
recorded the mixed emotions of the assembly— the desires of 
redeeming wounded pride for the brazen viceregal threats 
versus the economic consequences of such a stance.
Everyone present agreed that these insults of the 
viceroy were tantamount to war, but it was wisely 
noted that our armament was not yet sufficient to 
begin a campaign. We held our efforts in abeyance 
until after we had subjugated Valdivia, all the 
time benefiting from the commerce with Lima. Now, 
the season and advanced state of all my efforts 
offered me the opportunity of securing southern 
Chile„^
As this statement reveals, Valdivia was by that time 
a painful thorn in the side of the patriot movement and a 
source of concern to Carrera. Obviously, Carrera considered 
it indispensable to restore the city to his personal 
authority but was ignorant of the obstacles of such a 
venture. By then, the early opportunities for winning that 
garrison's loyalty had been frittered away, and the young 
dictator was increasingly beset by political enemies in 
Santiago. Before leading any army southward, he found it 
imperative to assure his continued dominance in the capital.
®Orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 208-209. 
^"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 65.
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This was a continual struggle, for the powerful Larrain 
branch of the aristocracy was thoroughly alienated by 
Carrera's self-proclaimed leadership and was eager to sup­
port any charismatic figure who could unseat him.^® And the 
adherents of the exiled Martinez de Rozas were also sus­
pected of revolutionary designs against the Carrera family.
On January 28, 1813, Jos6 Toribio Torres revealed to 
Juan Josd Carrera a plot to assassinate the entire Carrera 
family by a certain Manuel Rodriguez and his brother, 
Ambrosio. The scheme involved falsifying the signature of 
Jos6 Miguel Carrera to release 200 troops from the national
guard barracks and unite them with the artillery corps led
11by Ram6n Picarte. The conspirators were arrested before
enacting their plans and were either exiled to Argentina or
l!7sentenced to prison terms on Juan Fern&ndez. A This ill- 
fated conspiracy more closely resembled a comic-opera plot 
than a genuine threat, but it was a factor in convincing 
Carrera of the dangers in temporarily leaving his base of 
power.
As if the discontent and political opposition were 
not enough to discourage a Valdivia expedition, Carrera 
encountered general apathy among the populace of Santiago.
l^In his diary, Carrera repeatedly accused members 
of the Larrain family of instigating the coups against him 
("Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 65).
H'Troceso por la conspiracidn..., January 28, 1813," 
CHDI, XXI and XXII.
■*-2"Diario militar..., " CHDI, I, 67-69.
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To have mobilized the militia and veteran units would have 
required them to forsake their agricultural pursuits and 
abandon their fields, an impossible task during the crucial 
spring and summer months. Large landholders were equally 
vocal in their opposition to a campaign. It was argued that 
such an expedition could be formed no sooner than March, 
after the harvesting of the crops.13
Viceroy Abascal possessed neither the funds nor the 
troops to undertake a Chilean venture. The aggressive 
bearing of his October 12 letter was fortified by an invasion 
plan proposed by Brigadier Antonio Pareja, a Spanish naval 
officer and veteran of Trafalgar. Parej a had come to Peru 
in 1810 after being appointed military governor of Concep- 
ciOn, but was unable to take his command because of opposi­
tion by the newly-created Santiago junta.14
His plan for subduing Chile centered around taking a 
small detachment of soldiers to the royalist strongholds of 
Chilo6 and Valdivia, joining with the troop battalions there, 
then moving northward in a campaign to bring the capital of 
Santiago to its knees. Information had been supplied to the 
viceroy by Chilean agents concerning the divided sentiments 
of Concepcidn province and the disinterest or frank opposi­
tion of many officers to the independence movement. Abascal
I3orrego Luco, La patria vieja. II, 218.
14Vicente Rodriguez Casado and Jos6 Antonio Calderdn
Quijano (eds.), Jos6 Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de 
Gobierno, II (Sevilla: Editorial Catdlica, 1944), 166.
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believed that the mere presence of Pareja in the South would
be sufficient to restore the traditional order and bring the
capitulation of Santiago.15 In any case, it was thought
that there would be little or no resistance from Concepcibn
and other cities in the South. Parej a was given one ship,
fifty infantrymen and the modest sum of 6,000 pesos for the
support of his anticipated army, the rest of the money to be
furnished by the treasuries of Valdivia and Chilo6 . ° The
small expedition left Callao on December 12, 1812, led by
Pareja who carried with him a small group of officers.
On arriving in Chilo6 on January 18, 1813, Pareja
was cordially received by its governor, Ignacio Justis.
Since the last years of the eighteenth century, the veteran
battalion of the island had been increased to over 400
troops, with over twice that number of militia. These
troops and the rest of the island population were practically
untouched by the spirit of the revolution. Their isolation
denied them intellectual stimulation and kept out subver-
17sives, which left them blindly loyal to the king. Juan 
Tomcis Vergara, the island's royal treasurer, presented Parej a
with the sum of 160,000 pesos to be used to further his
1 Rcampaign. And the civilian populace enthusiastically
l^Barros Arana, Historia general, IX, 10. 
l^Diaz Venteo, Las campahas militares. 377.
17 "oficio al rey..., April 1, 1822," CHDI, X, 196. 
ISorrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 218.
enlisted as soldiers.
In three weeks Pareja reorganized and trained the 
militia of Castro, which was formed into a unit renamed the 
Volunteers of Castro. The treasurer Tomas Vergara and 
Governor Justis were sent to Valdivia to prepare its troops 
to join the taskforce, which was accomplished without diffi-
\  Qculty. In late March, Pareja departed for Valdivia, 
carrying with him an army of over 1,300 men. It was composed 
of the veteran battalion of San Carlos (450 men), the 
Volunteers of Castro (800 men), and an artillery brigade 
(120 men) with eight cannon.
On arriving in Valdivia the expedition was joined by 
that city's entire troop battalion, including many experi­
enced officers. Numerous civilians also joined the army. 
Pareja remained there only three days in order to outfit a 
gunboat and merchant vessel to accompany the force. On 
March 23, the expedition left for ConcepciOn with a total of 
nearly 2,500 men, a testimony to the royalist solidarity of 
southern Chile.2^
The Concepcidn junta had received prior notice of 
Pareja's arrival in the South from the crew of a merchant 
vessel from Valdivia. By this time an invasion should have
■*"9"Apuntes sobre la guerra..., 1843, " CHDI, IV,
209.
?0 "Revista de la guerra...," CHDI, VI, 54.
21"Noticias de...," [n.d.], AMV, LIV, 233.
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come as no surprise, although distressingly few defensive 
measures had been taken by the government, A total of 1,535 
troops were garrisoned in the city; 870 veteran infantry 
under Ramdn Jimenez de Navia; 180 additional veteran infantry
in the port of Talcahuano, led by Captain Rafael de la Sota,
22and 485 militia under Captain Pedro Barnechea. These were
only a portion of the total veteran and militia forces which
at that moment were stationed within twenty-four hours travel
from the city. For some inexplainable reason, they were not 
23summoned.
A certain amount of this inactivity was due to the
sharp division of political loyalties within the officer
corps. Even more was attributable to the incompetency and
lackluster performance of such men as Colonel Benavente.
Although he was a firm advocate of the patriot cause,
Benavente's lack of initiative was often mistaken for
royalist sympathy.
Neither did the city fathers reveal any sense of
urgency in their actions. In the weeks prior to the invasion,
the cabildo enacted measures concerning such mundane matters
as public hygiene, fixing the hours of duty of regidores,
24and providing for the food supply of the city.
On the afternoon of March 26, the invading squadron
22"Relacidn hecha..., 1813," CHDI. I, 80.
^Feliti Cruz, Conversacidnes, 226.
24Amun&tegui Solar, El cabildo de Concepcidn, 558-59.
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of two frigates and three transports arrived at the prom­
ontory of San Vicente, behind which was located the port of 
Talcahuano. Captain Rafael de la Sota, the port commander, 
placed his 150 man force on alert and advised Colonel 
Benavente in Concepcidn.2  ̂ The intendant immedictely dis­
patched 80 men to reinforce Sota and began to organize the 
bulk of the city's forces under Jimdnez Navia to relieve the 
garrison. On the following morning, the royalists attacked 
Sota's small force along the heights of San Vicente and 
crushed it, sending Sota and a handful of uncaptured soldiers 
in retreat to Concepcidn.^  After this initial victory, 
Pareja fortified the approaches to the city and asked for 
its capitu1ation.
The entire patriot defense was a fiasco. Amid the 
confusion of Pareja's arrival, Benavente and his staff had 
failed to attack the troops as they disembarked from their 
ships, and consequently found themselves foolishly surrounded 
by an army overlooking them from the bluffs around the city. 
Even worse, dissension had begun to spread among the troops. 
Jimdnez Navia, who led most of the patriot relief column to 
San Vicente, declined entering the battle and ordered his
troops to station themselves on a nearby hill, observing the 
?7rout of Sota. On returning to the cxty he presented 
excuses for his actions, but his prior record of pro-royalist
25"carta del gobemador..., 1813," CHDI, II, 273-74.
26Ibid., 277. 27Ibid., 278.
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activities led to his being branded a turncoat.
The intendant of the royalist army, Juan Tomes 
Vergara, delivered an ultimatum demanding surrender of the 
city in twenty-four hours. An open cabildo was called to 
consider the proper course of action, in which it was 
resolved that the city should be abandoned. During the night 
the provincial treasurer and a military escort fled to 
Santiago, carrying with them the 36,000 pesos remaining in
n othe treasury. The patriot forces were assembled in the 
main plaza to stage an orderly retreat, when the troops 
under Jimenez Navia revolted and declared themselves in 
support of the king.^ Sota and a few loyal soldiers were 
forced to flee the city, and Jimenez Navia took charge until 
the arrival of Pareja. Without this action by Jimenez 
Navia, the invaders would have entered a deserted city; as 
it was, they were able to add hundreds of troops to their 
growing force. Benavente and several leaders agreed to 
remain behind to devise a formal capitulation and provide a 
smoother transition for the new government. Pareja entered 
Concepcidn on March 24, and was greeted on the outskirts of 
the city by the friendly troops of Jimenez Navia.
The entire south of Chile was now in royalist hands,
28one of those who helped to convey the treasury 
funds to Santiago was the radical priest, Pedro Jose 
Eleisegui. He and the members of the escort were presented 
with medals by the Santiago government for their actions (El 
Monitor Araucano. April 6, 1813).
29"carta del gobernador..., 1813, " CHDI, II, 281-82.
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involving no more than a skirmish and the loss of a handful 
of men. In large measure, it was possible because of the 
lack of solidarity and breakdowns in the chain of command 
within the patriot army.3® After combining his forces with 
those of Jimbnez Navia, Pareja found himself with a total 
force of 3,570 infantry, 300 artillerymen and 250 dragoons.31 
The commander also found that he enjoyed the support of a 
majority of the provincial population, especially in the 
Laja district. From here he was soon reinforced by hundreds 
of militia and those veteran units remaining in the frontier 
forts. Parej a wisely retained Benavente and other patriot 
functionaries in their posts, which enabled him to exercise 
complete control over predominately patriot areas. He 
issued orders for troops, horses, and supplies to be sent to 
Concepcibn, each order bearing the signature of Benavente.
In this way the royalist army was able to accrue invaluable 
reinforcements and supplies in a short time, while local
authorities believed they were obeying the instructions of
39Intendant Benavente.
After refitting in Concepcibn, the royalist army 
pushed on to Chilian, picking up 2,000 additional militia­
men along the way. The frightened government of Santiago
30Felitl Cruz, Conversacibnes, 227.
31Diego Josb Benavente, Memoria sobre las primeras 
campahas, 30.
32orrego Luco, La patria viela, II, 227.
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hurriedly invested Jos6 Miguel Carrera with supreme military 
authority and sent him south to Talca with the patriot army. 
This confrontation along the Maule River set the scene for 
the first round of the war of independence.
Both armies were composed mainly of creoles, a civil 
war of Chileans against Chileans.33 There was little to dis­
tinguish the opposing armies in their armament, uniforms or 
their fighting ability. The combating armies were encum­
bered by thousands of raw militia and green recruits who fled 
during battle or whenever they became discontented with army 
life. Many troops were loyal to the landowners or caudillos 
under whom they enlisted, not to the concepts of liberalism 
or conservatism.3^ what followed was a winnowing process in 
which many troops deserted, fought for the opposing side, or 
were directed by mercenary or personal motivation. By the 
end of the first stage of fighting, the loyalties of the 
armies had been cemented, largely along the lines of hatred 
or retribution.
As in the three previous centuries of its unstable 
and often violent existence, the South played a leading role 
in this future struggle. Rather than serving as a base of 
action against the Araucanians, it now became the head-
33it was not until 1814 that the first peninsular 
troops arrived, the Regiment of Talavera, under General 
Osorio ("Apuntes sobre la guerra...," CHDI, IV). The only 
Spanish officers of Parej a 's expedition were two infantry 
colonels and the merchants Quintanilla and Elorreaga.
3^clissold, Bernardo 0 'Higgins, 101.
quarters of the royalist forces in Chile. It was of vital 
importance, if only for the alliance and military assistance 
of the Indian tribes. The ports of Valdivia, Chilofi and 
Talcahuano provided easy access points for Peruvian rein­
forcements and all manner of supplies and arms. The 
inhabitants of the frontier were practiced in the use of 
weapons and accustomed to the privations of military cam­
paigns. Under the enthusiastic leadership of the clergy and 
military officers, an almost invincible public solidarity 
was formed.
CONCLUSION
The Chilean military performed a distinctive role for 
the Spanish monarchy during the late eighteenth century— it 
was engaged in an on-going frontier war against the 
Araucanian Indians, a conflict which over a period of nearly 
three centuries had diminished but not subsided. This was in 
sharp contrast to other areas of Spanish America, where the 
subjugation of the native race had been completed in a few 
short years after the conquest. While other colonies were 
approaching the zenith of their development, Chile was 
engaged in a costly and debilitating war of attrition along 
its southern frontier.
As a result of its continuous protection of Spanish 
society against the Indians, the military became one of the 
most influential institutions of the colony. This promi­
nence was characterized by the constant presence of a 
mobilized army, a network of forts along the Araucanian 
frontier and a military budget which nearly equaled all other 
expenses of the colonial treasury combined. Officers occu­
pied civil bureaucratic posts in conjunction with their 
military duties and governed many towns and districts. 
Throughout the south, all of these features combined to 
create a strong military tradition, personified by an
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intimate association between the king's army and society and 
the ascendency of the professional soldier.
An additional factor accentuating the army's impor­
tance was the threat of foreign attack along the coasts, 
either by corsairs or European invaders. Southern Chile was 
considered highly vulnerable to such encroachments because 
of its limited population and because it was the first 
Spanish territory an enemy would reach on rounding the tip 
of South America. In the second half of the 1700's, the
decline of Spanish fleet commerce in the Caribbean and the
initiation of registry shipping in Pacific waters attracted 
numerous foreign interlopers to the Chilean coast. However, 
piracy was not nearly so attractive to Europeans as the 
natural resources of the Pacific and the potential for 
opening up new commercial markets. Chile experienced an 
influx of smugglers, whalers, and foreign fishermen whom 
Chileans fearfully regarded as a threat to Spanish omnipo­
tence in that part of America.
As a result of these dangers, Chileans were forced 
to divide their army, stationing nearly half of all the 
veteran troops in coastal fortresses. It was impossible for 
either the coast or the frontier to be adequately protected 
as long as half the army had its back to one enemy at all 
times.
Most of the army was stationed in the south, a 
factor which largely isolated it from contact with the 
capital of Santiago and the mainstream of colonial society.
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However, there was also a great deal of status isolation, 
brought on by the army's predatory role and its reputation 
for crime and corruption. Lawlessness and violence within 
the army were closely linked to the rough frontier existence 
and were also factors which set the army apart culturally 
from the rest of the colony.
Military men possessed considerable powers along the 
frontier, either as Indian intermediaries, fort commanders 
or military governors. Through their position, numerous 
officers (utilizing enlisted men or Indians as underlings) 
became involved in extortion rings, illegal businesses and 
smuggling. The unpopu1arity of army life, the low pay, and 
a lack of able-bodied men forced army officials to accept 
substandard recruits or impress other men to keep the bat­
talions at full strength. This led to high rates of crime, 
larceny, and desertion within the ranks as well as low 
levels of professionalism. Military penal codes were 
deliberately relaxed to comply with the reality of garrison 
life, and there was a tendency to reemploy deserters and 
other miscreants in the army.
Overcrowded civilian penal facilities led to the 
coastal fortresses being used as detention centers for 
criminals. These conviats admittedly performed a useful 
service by constructing fortifications, as in the case of 
Valdivia; however, their predilections for escape, criminal­
ity or arson distracted the troops, preventing them from 
carrying out their normal duties. The shortage of troops
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dictated that these desterrados be inducted into the army, 
where they became a worse burden.
One of the most influential factors in the Chilean 
army's development was the dominant role played by Peru. The 
influence of the viceroys was solidified through the Lima 
situado, a mechanism for supplying the isolated garrisons in 
the far south. This, combined with Peruvian jurisdiction 
over Valdivia and Chilo6, partially drove a wedge between 
the army and the government in Santiago. A steady flow of 
Peruvian and Spanish officers, money and bureaucrats, 
instilled in the inhabitants of these districts the notion 
of the viceroys as their patrons and protectors.
The military was a vital component of life in the 
south, where it was the major force in combating Indian or 
foreign aggression. Culturally and geographically, it was 
segregated from the capital. Reinforcing factors were the 
disreputable nature of the army, the low morale and predatory 
militarism of the troops, which set the army apart from the 
rest of Chile. Army officers did rise to positions of 
prominence in the colony through hard work, but they were 
disassociated from the aristocracy and the more cosmopolitan 
atmosphere of the capital. For the most part, these officers 
were socially and politically unsophisticated, more at ease 
with the monotony and routine of garrison duty.
The army was destined to exert a strong influence 
during the patria vieja (1810-1814), the early phase of the 
independence movement. The political attitudes of the
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officer corps during this period were attributable to its 
colonial heritage and its relations with Lima and Santiago.
After the creation of the first patriot junta in 
Santiago in 1810, the veteran forces in the south were, if 
possible, even more isolated from the capital and the course 
of the liberal movement. In Santiago the civilian militia 
began to emerge as the base of the new patriot army. Since 
the last years of the colony, militia had been periodically 
trained and called to active duty, which enhanced their 
institutional prestige and sense of importance. An entirely 
new standing army was created in the capital, composed 
principally of former militia and members of the aristocracy. 
While the veteran forces in the south should have logically 
served as a trained nucleus for this new army, they were 
completely disregarded. Juan Mackenna was one of the influ­
ential leaders who openly spoke against these measures, 
arguing the importance of veteran troops to the patriot 
cause and the danger of allowing them to remain unsubordi­
nated in the south. He urged that the forces there be 
drastically reduced, and the remainder brought to the capital 
where they could be placed under close supervision. His 
recommendations were not followed, and the army vacancies in 
Santiago were filled through patronage and the appointive 
power of civilian, aristocratic elements.
After 1811, the divisions within the patriot move­
ment overshadowed all other issues, in large part because of 
the personal ambition of a few leaders. The rift between
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Jos6 Miguel Carrera and Juan Martinez de Rozas nearly 
resulted in civil war as the provincial armies of Santiago 
and Concepcibn confronted each other along the Maule River. 
In the capital, Carrera’s major concern was to achieve com­
plete power for himself through a succession of armed 
revolts. He showed little concern for the problems of the 
south or the potential power of its military. An example of 
this disregard was the deposing of Governor Eagar in Vald­
ivia and the creation of a patriot junta in the city, which 
Carrera mistakenly interpreted as a threat to his power. He 
succeeded in bringing about its abolition, only to find it 
later supplanted by a military government of definite 
royalist sentiments.
The dissension and lack of foresight on the part of 
patriot leaders was definitely a factor in the south turning 
towards the royalist side. However, the features discussed 
previously were even stronger forces which impelled the army 
to take the course it did. The separation of the army from 
the capital, its close ties with Peru and dependency on the 
situado, and the deep-rooted loyalty to the king, were not 
conducive to sympathy for the patriot cause.
The political loyalties of the veteran army prior to 
1814 were not significantly influenced by the traditionally- 
conceived division between creoles and peninsulars. For 
example, the entire membership of the Valdivia royalist 
consejo de guerra of 1812, with one exception, were all 
Chilean-born. In both the army and in colonial society, the
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war of independence was one of creoles versus creoles.
The majority of Chilean troops and officers opted 
for the royalist cause, including the entire battalions of 
Chilob, Valdivia, and most of the Concepcibn garrison. When 
Brigadier Antonio Pareja came from Peru in 1813 to invade 
Chile, he brought with him only one company of soldiers and 
a handful of officers to serve as instructors. By the time 
Pareja reached the Maule River, his force numbered several 
thousand soldiers, which comprised the bulk of Chile's 
veteran army.
Pareja's success in recruiting these troops directly 
hinged on the army's geographical and status isolation from 
central Chile and a long history of economic and administra­
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